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First and foremost an audience reception study, Negotiating the Boundaries of 
(In)Visibility illustrates the dialogic relationship of racial discourse in the media and Asian 
American male identity in the United States. It combines in-depth interviews with textual, 
discursive, and industry analyses. I showcase how economic, political and technological 
changes in America and the media industry intersect with cultural shifts in narratives and 
representations. Defining the boundaries of their identity and culture, interviewees discuss 
the lack of an Asian American narrative in American popular culture. Rather, Asian 
Americans contend with larger stereotypes of ―Asian,‖ considered to be a loaded term 
accompanied by a long history of ethnic homogenization and racial and cultural 
stereotypes. This dissertation locates particular sites of identification—social 
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surroundings, news media, entertainment media—and how narratives of Asian, American, 
and Asian American are negotiated, contested, or made visible. 
In remembering news stories from the mid-2000s, interviewees show how diffuse 
the concept of ―Asia‖ is in forming identities as racial subjects in America. Analyzing 
news texts and the rhetoric used to describe these news events, I suggest that the anxiety 
over China‘s economic rise and the accompanying resurgence of ―yellow peril‖ discourse 
perpetuates the homogenizing definition of ―Asian American,‖ and how national discourse 
about a foreign threat can shape race relations within. These anxieties are countered by the 
rise of multicultural ensemble casts and Asian American male leads on primetime 
television shows. This juxtaposition shapes the complicated space in which Asian 
American men actively resist, negotiate, and accept racial stereotypes and problematic 
representations. Providing textual analyses of Lost and Heroes, I suggest that the 
seemingly progressive multiculturalism presented in entertainment texts perpetuates 
feelings of subordination and marginalization among racial viewers. Finally, I provide a 
close reading of television shows‘ transmedia narratives their treatment of race. In 
particular, I suggest the ways in which racial difference becomes more visible as texts 
appeal to more mainstream audiences. In doing so, I begin a discussion of how multi-














―I remember being kind of... shell-shocked, that there were Asians on a movie 
screen.‖ Aaron, a college sophomore, was explaining his reaction to a 2002 film called 
Better Luck Tomorrow. Focusing mostly on Ben (Parry Shen), a straight-A high school 
student who shapes his life to appeal to college admissions officers, the film‘s plot 
unfolds when Ben adds the basketball team to his list of extracurricular activities to push 
him not only to college, but also toward cheerleader Stephanie (Karin Anna Cheung). 
When Daric (Roger Fan) suggests that Ben is merely a token on the team, Ben quits 
basketball only to find his free time filled selling cheat sheets with Daric to other 
students. The unassuming Ben and preppy Daric are joined by Virgil (Jason Tobin), a 
hyperactive goofball, and Han (Sung Kang), a chain smoker taking cues from Hong Kong 
gangster films. Soon, the group‘s idealized notions of the underworld life begin to take 
hold as they move from dealing cheat sheets to hard drugs. Their criminal behavior 
suddenly makes them the cool kids on campus: so cool that the girls come flocking and 
the rules don‘t apply, especially when it comes to getting rid of Stephanie‘s rich 
boyfriend, Steve (John Cho).  
Here was a film in which Asian men were the main attraction, inhabiting different 
masculine character types, seamlessly moving in and out of filmic spaces, as well as 
within the Hollywood industry. Better Luck Tomorrow turned the ―model minority‖ 
stereotype of over-achieving Asian Americans on its head, with characters using the 
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stereotype as a cover as they incited violence and literally got away with murder. The 
film showed Asian American teenagers as the same as the other trash-talking, sex-
obsessed yet vulnerable and naïve high school counterparts in their California school. 
Given that Aaron denigrated the model minority and kung fu stereotypes that he felt had 
become so entrenched in making sense of Asian men on screen, this 2002 film was truly 
groundbreaking, evidence that stories of and performances by Asian Americans were 
marketable and consumable. 
Better Luck Tomorrow reached cult status even before its release, in part due to a 
controversial, raucous racial debate that exemplifies the context of this dissertation. After 
the film‘s debut at the Sundance Film Festival, an audience member suggested that 
director Justin Lin, an Asian American, was derelict in his responsibility to portray the 
Asian American community in a positive manner. While moving away from the ―model 
minority‖ portrayal, the film was accused of merely modernizing and updating the 
stereotype of the Asian gangster. The uproar of both acclaim and criticism in the 
audience made it impossible for the film‘s cast and crew to respond. It ended with film 
critic Roger Ebert standing on his chair and shouting: 
What I find offensive and condescending about your statement is nobody 
would say to a bunch of white filmmakers, ―How could you do this to 
your people?‖ This film has the right to be about these people, and Asian 
American characters have the right to be whoever they want to be. They 
do not have to ―represent‖ their people.
1
 
                                                 
1 See Richard Chang, ―Testing Limits,‖ Orange County Register, April 6, 2003. See also No Thrijpkaew, 




That the audience was silenced by a white male defending Asian Americans while still 
calling them ―these people‖ reveals the tensions Asian Americans face in an American 
media industry and influenced by the diffuse standards of whiteness, and its intersections 
with masculinity. In the American cultural and media landscape, white characters can be 
found as heroes, villains, and everything in between. White men have stomped, run, 
careened and loved their way across stages, but Asian men, as this dissertation will show, 
have been conscribed to narrowly defined narratives that more often than not keep them 
at arm‘s length from hegemonic masculinity. In this context, Better Luck Tomorrow upset 
the norms of race and gender in Hollywood.  
Better Luck Tomorrow broke the tradition of Asian American invisibility in 
mainstream media texts, but also made Asian Americans visible as racial minorities. 
While the Sundance debate centered on the visibility of Asian Americans making 
progress in a predominantly white industry, the acceptance Ebert called for is one that 
ostensibly renders difference invisible. The many different ways race complicated 
production, distribution and reception of Better Luck Tomorrow reveal some of the 
discomfort over inserting Asian America into racial discourses, the lack of vocabulary 
available to discuss Asian Americans in such a way, and the tensions of (in)visibility 
Asian Americans must juggle. 
Aaron‘s surprise also highlighted how absent Asian American men are on screens, 
and the limited venues for Asian American performance in the mainstream media 
industry. Indeed, while lauded for its Asian American cast, Better Luck Tomorrow was 
met with limited success; a ―normal,‖ mainstream film with an Asian American cast, has 
yet to be repeated. Years later, Broadcasting and Cable was still writing about the 
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―invisible Asian-Americans,‖ sorely underrepresented in the media industry.
2
 The 
marketing campaign for the film also pointed to the difficulty of defining and capturing a 
specific Asian American audience: Justin Lin recalls being told by MTV marketing 
executives that there was no ―Asian wedge‖ in the ethnic-specific targeting for his film: 




Recent trends suggest that America must acknowledge the Asian population in 
America beyond ―the white wedge.‖ The 2000 census reported that Asians are one of the 
fastest growing populations in America,
4
 are leaders in attaining bachelor‘s and advanced 
degrees,
5
 and are more likely than the general population to be in professional 
occupations.
6
 To some extent, Asian Americans have begun to earn visibility as a viable 
market: in 2005, AC Nielsen created the Asian Pacific American (APA) Advisory 
Council, stating that ―immigrants, youth and young adults, and second-generation APAs 
have different and unique viewing habits, which Nielsen cannot ignore.‖
7
 A 2007 Nielsen 
special report entitled ―The emerging Asian American market,‖ featured several key 
executives of Asian American advertising firms, acknowledging that Asian Americans 
represent a market with purchasing power of roughly $369 billion a year. Nielsen‘s 
measurement of Asian American audiences suggests that the Asian American community 
                                                 
2 Michael Hong, ―The Invisible Asian-Americans,‖ Broadcasting and Cable 135.3, January 17 2005, 78. 
3 Tasha G. Oren, ―Secret Asian Man: Angry Asians and the Politics of Cultural Visibility,‖ East Main 
Street: Asian American Popular Culture, ed. Shilpa Davé, Leilani Nishime and Tasha G. Oren (New York: 
New York University Press): 354. 
4 Jessica S. Barnes and Claudette E. Bennett, ―The Asian Population: 2000.‖ Census 2000 Brief. United 
States Department of Commerce. (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002).  
5
 It is important to note that this data does not parse out educational attainment for varying ethnic identities 
within the ―Asian‖ census category. Kurt Bauman and Nikki Graf, ―Educational Attainment: 2000.‖ Census 
2000 Brief. United States Department of Commerce. (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2003).  
6
 Barnes and Bennett, ―The Asian Population: 2000.‖  
7 November 29, 2005. 
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is beginning to be recognized as a legitimate population worth incorporating into the 
entertainment and advertising industry.  
As Arlene Dávila‘s (2001) Latinos, Inc. shows, the firm delineation of a 
particular, ethnic market can result in representational shifts in the media and a new level 
of cultural visibility. Her in-depth analysis of reactions to mass media fare targeted 
toward, or featuring Latinos, and Latinos‘ responses to the imagined Latinidad 
community constructed by Hispanic networks, have provided us with enormous insight 
into the contradictions minorities experience with texts that seem to speak for them.
8
 
However, Dávila focuses on the creation of specific, Hispanic-oriented TV networks and 
advertisements. As of yet, advertisements geared toward a specific Asian American 
market in the United States remain to be seen, and many of the ethnic, commercial media 
fare geared toward Asians—AZN, MTV‘s various iterations, etc.—have failed to endure 
on mainstream television.
9
 With no comparable texts for, or featuring Asian Americans, 
we see a failure to capture or define a distinctive, bounded Asian American audience. In 
some ways, the population is too distinct in its difference, allowing advertising agencies 
to cite difficulties reaching a pan-ethnic audience that is too diverse,
10
 and has no unified 
language.
11
 It is also considered similar enough to other demographics, seen in the case of 
Better Luck Tomorrow, to warrant its own category. 
                                                 
8 Arlene Dávila, Latinos, Inc.: The Marketing and Making of a People (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2001). 
9
 AZN TV as well as MTV Chi, MTV K, and MTV Desi all failed as ―Asian American‖ ventures on 
television, despite some success as web iterations. See Aswin Punathambekar, ―What Brown Cannot Do for 
You: MTV-Desi, Diasporic Youth Culture, and the Limits of Television,‖ Flow TV 10 (June 27, 2009), 
accessed June 30, 2009, http://flowtv.org/2009/06/what-brown-cannot-do-for-you-mtv-desi-diasporic-
youth-culture-and-the-limits-of-televisionaswin-punathambekarthe-university-of-michigan. 
10 Bill Imada, ―Forget the Asian American Market Myths But Remember These Truths,‖ Advertising Age, 
November 5, 2007. 
11 Allison Romano, ―The Asian American Market is Ready,‖ Broadcasting and Cable, October 10, 2005. 
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This dissertation is thus located at a contemporary moment at which the media 
industry and the concept of audience-as-community are in flux. Not only are advertisers 
and networks unsure of how to define Asian American viewers, but they are also 
struggling to attract Asian American viewers who are a part of an increasingly fractured 
audience engaging with a diverse array of distribution channels. While it was possible—
and still is, to some degree—to categorize audiences bounded by class, gender, race or 
even text and/or viewing time, it has become increasingly difficult to do so today. The 
rise of multiple platforms, timeshifted viewing and ―post-network‖ industrial practices, as 
I will detail in chapters 3 and 4, have divided and separated audiences into groups that are 
difficult to recognize or even pin down with any particular regularity. One man may be in 
his living room watching a network television show on the TV set at its scheduled 
broadcast time; another may be on the bus watching it on his mobile phone a week later.  
The main goal of this dissertation is to examine the dialogic relationship between 
Asian American men and their current media environment. Not only do men like Aaron 
contend with contradictions in their own lives and experiences, they also face a 
mediascape that is at once progressive and regressive in its representations of Asian men. 
Media representations of masculinity and discourses about America in a global economy 
combine with men‘s self-constructs and interactions to form an increasingly complex 
network of articulations and formulations of racial and gendered identity, at a particular 
historical moment, in the United States.  
How do understandings of the self relate to representations in, and discourses 
about, the media? In asking this, I aim to explore the contemporary political, social and 
industrial moment and mediascape that shapes the representations and experiences of 
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Asian Americans. At its core, my dissertation investigates what Asian American men are 
saying about representations of Asia, America, and Asian America in the media. First and 
foremost a reception study, this dissertation is focused on a locally situated group of 
Asian American men and how their histories, social and lived contexts, and media 
experiences are intertwined. First presenting interviewees‘ backgrounds and histories, 
this project next asks how Asian American men respond to categories of ―Asian 
American‖ and ―masculinity.‖ I then move my focus to news texts, presenting them as a 
source of some of the narratives that shape the social categories Asian Americans 
negotiate. Turning next to entertainment texts, I ask how interviewees bring this complex 
network of definitions and narratives to their interpretations of Asian American men on 
screen. Lastly, I analyze the role of transmedia narratives in opening up possibilities for 
articulations of race and gender. In looking at how the media industry might be shifting to 
account for diverse audiences, I discuss the ways in which multi-platform narratives 
might expand racial and gendered portrayals. 
Methods 
Interviews 
This project is grounded in interview data from 27 in-depth interviews with self-
identified Asian American men from a large metropolitan area surrounding a university 
campus in Michigan. Respondents were undergraduate and graduate students, as well as 
recent graduates—all ―in between‖ life stages and embracing the possibilities of upward 
mobility in their future aspirations. Ultimately, my work aims to build an understanding 
of Asian American consumer culture as it intersects with notions of race and masculinity 
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in the mainstream media; it also privileges the voices of Asian American men as they 
react to these portrayals. 
Announcements for the study called for ―self-identified Asian American men.‖ 
Flyers were placed in and around major buildings on the university campus, and were 
sent in weekly e-mail digests from a multi-cultural student organization. My interviews 
were in person and one-on-one, with respondents naming the time and the setting for the 
interview. All of them took place on or around campus, usually at a quiet table in a coffee 
shop or restaurant. Each interview was semi-structured with an interview guide (see 
Appendix A), and each lasted approximately an hour and a half; some men stayed to talk 
with me for two hours or more. Respondents were recruited using snowball sampling, 
with interviewees putting me in touch with family members, roommates, fraternity 
brothers, or other friends in the area. 
Interviews with self-identified Asian American men provide a specific example of 
how Asian American identities and masculinities are constructed at a particular 
intersection of race, age, gender and representation. Interviewing those who identify as 
Asian American empowers participants to define their own boundaries of exclusion or 
inclusion in the study. Through these interviews, I convey the stories of a population 
understood as situated in between understandings of Asia and America. Interviews with 
those who actively identify as Asian American provide valuable insight into the elements, 
experiences, and opinions that prompt identification with the term. This allows for an 
understanding of how ―Asian American‖ is conceptualized on the ground, and takes this 




Following Michael Patton (1990), my interview guide opened with warm-up 
questions about school, where they grew up, and their aspirations for the future.
12
 A 
series of questions asked about their past (role models as children, memories of Asian 
men in the media) as well as opinions and feelings about the present and the future state 
of Asian American men in the media. Questions were left open-ended for respondents to 
answer in their own terms. During conversations about media representations, each 
interviewee was presented with color images of contemporary leading Asian American 
actors, including 1) Masi Oka as Hiro Nakamura from Heroes, 2) Daniel Dae Kim from 
Lost, 4) John Cho and Kal Penn from Harold and Kumar, and 5) Jackie Chan from Rush 
Hour. Interviewees were asked to provide general impressions and reactions to these 
pictures. In all, I interviewed 27 men—8 Korean Americans, 11 Chinese Americans, 2 
Japanese Americans, 3 Indian Americans, 1 Vietnamese American, 1 Filipino American, 
and 1 bi-ethnic Asian American—ranging in age from 18 to 41. Their profiles can be 
found at the end of this introduction; names have been altered to ensure their anonymity.  
 This project is grounded in a constructivist approach, rejecting a presupposed 
ontological truth to be uncovered and instead focusing on the themes that emerge from 
texts, stories, and transactions. This approach takes into account the role of the researcher 
as an interpretive subjectivity in the research process, as an interpretive bricoleur 
working to piece together multiple representations within a complex context that emerges 
during the research.
13
 The constructivist paradigm is, at its core, concerned with socially 
                                                 
12 Michael Q. Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, 2nd edition (Newbury Park, CA: 
1990). 
13 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2000). 
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and experientially constructed realities,
14
 or the idea that ―the meanings of things rest 
with what people do with them, how they use them, and under what circumstances 
pleasures and significance are produced.‖
15
 Throughout the project, I rely on the stories 
told to me by the men I interviewed, as well as my own critical, cultural analysis, always 
acknowledging my own situated subjectivity within the realm of Asian American identity 
and American popular culture. 
After each interview, responses were transcribed, the first set of interviews by the 
researcher and the rest by a paid professional. Transcripts were then analyzed and coded 
by hand. Each transcript as well as notes from relevant television texts were coded line-
by-line, using Emergent Category Designation (ECD).
16
 This process involves organizing 
categories of ideas that emerge based on the tacit feel or connotations of open-ended data. 
To validate themes and designations, I engaged in peer debriefings with other researchers 
familiar with interviews and ethnographies. Lastly, interviews were followed by member 
checks, during which respondents were given the opportunity to review transcripts and 
themes, clarify statements, and reflect upon their original interview. This iterative process 
helped to ensure as accurate representation as was possible, as well as to continually 
generate new content as respondents added to or clarified their narratives. 
 Interviews are especially helpful in revealing respondents‘ thoughts about 
masculinity, Asian American masculinity, their opinions and values regarding the 
formation of masculine identities in America, and the meaning-making activities of self-
                                                 
14 Robin Means Coleman, ―Appendix.‖ African American Viewers and the Black Situation Comedy: 
Situating Racial Humor (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), 284. 
15 Herman Gray, Watching Race: Television and the Struggle for Blackness (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1995), 7. 
16 ECD is a classification procedure during which data is recursively sorted and grouped into intuitive or 
theoretical categories in order to establish an analytic framework. See David A. Erlandson, Edward L. 
Harris, Barbara L. Skipper and Steve D. Allen, Doing Naturalistic Inquiry: A Guide to Methods (London: 
Sage, 1993); also Yvonne S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry (New York: Sage, 1985). 
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identified Asian American men interacting with their media environment in the past, 
present and future. Interviews enable respondents to share the particularity of memories 
and situations remembered, as well as reveal their sensitivity to certain memories and 
texts. When respondents share affects linked to these recollections, it imbues their stories 
with an emotional and psychological complexity that other methods cannot provide. 
Their stories reflect, using Arlene Dávila‘s phrase, ―contextualized stories‖ that do not 
reveal generalizable ―truths,‖ but rather provide insight into how individuals‘ 




To organize my own interviews with a mostly college-age demographic, I draw 
on previous work with second-generation (U.S.-born) Asian Americans,
18
 which often 
highlight a community‘s struggles to negotiate being at once ethnic and American.
19
 
While I did not actively recruit second-generation interviewees, many who responded to 
the call for a ―self-identified Asian American men‖ were, in fact, American-born or had 
moved to the country at an early age. My interpretations of their responses explore 
whether being located in between two worlds makes these youth somehow different in 
their ethnicity, or whether they may ―also reproduce essentialized notions…in their 
                                                 
17 Dávila, Latinos, Inc., 182.  
18 Nazli Kibria, Becoming Asian American: Second-Generation Chinese and Korean American Identities. 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Mary Yu Danico, The 1.5 Generation: Becoming 
Korean in Hawai‟i (Honolulu, HI: Versa, 2004); Mia Tuan, Forever Foreigners or Honorary Whites?: The 
Asian Ethnic Experience Today (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1998); Mary Waters, Ethnic 
Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 
and ―Ethnic Identities of Second-Generation Black Immigrants in New York City,‖ in the New Second 
Generation, ed. Alejandro Portes (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996). 
19 As Kibria states, ―They are in between two different worlds, the immigrant world and the American, and 





 However, also interesting are the responses of self-identified Asian 
Americans who, by other respondents‘ standards, would be considered ―fresh off the 
boat‖ Asians. The responses from these men reveal how the processes of immigration and 
positions of class produce subjects ―in between‖ nations, cultures, and homes.  
My project is thus an attempt to see how ―Asian American‖ is conceptualized on 
the ground, as a wholly organic, authentic group in its own right. Instead of focusing on 
historical articulations or representations of Asian Americans, my work is largely situated 
in the present, examining the definitions contemporary Asian Americans bring to and 
take from their media experiences. Their stories reveal how this relationship might 
actively shape their sense of self as Asian Americans in the United States. The continued 
invisibility of Asians in front of and behind cameras has led to an era of absence and 
subordination that has shaped the lives of contemporary Asian Americans. This context 
begs for an investigation into how Asian Americans might conceptualize their 
community. 
Textual analysis 
Guided by interviewee responses and discussions of specific media texts, I 
conduct textual analyses, following discourses of race and gender in news and 
entertainment texts. As men identified news stories surrounding China as a prominent 
source of information about Asians in America, I turned to several news media outlets 
with which they were familiar. These included The New York Times and USA Today, and 
major newsmagazines TIME, BusinessWeek and Newsweek. I also include specific cases 
of televised news broadcasts from CNN and NBC to conduct close analysis of the 
                                                 
20 Mimi Nguyen and Thuy Linh Nguyen Tu, Alien Encounters: Popular Culture in Asian America 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 23. 
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rhetoric and frames used to describe Sino-American relations. More detail about the 
sample and methods for this analysis can be found in Chapter 2. 
At the core of this project is a focus on how audience members negotiate popular 
discourses of Asian American masculinity. National broadcast culture is a prime site 
where identities are articulated and reflected back to audiences. Media networks have the 
power to create common points of reference and shared cultural narratives, and 
formulations of specific identities in the popular imaginary are influenced by dominant 
media representations of race and gender. I work with the assumption that media sources 
and their markets are situated within a larger context of national and global relations, and 
shape how audiences conceive of normative behaviors and identities. In focusing on the 
contemporary images and narratives of Asian masculinity in fictional and news media, I 
answer Edward Said‘s (1979) call for a focus on ―representations as representations,‖
21
 
acknowledging that what is commonly circulated in cultural discourse and exchange has 
the power to define and guide interpretations of others.
22
 I also respond to Aihwa Ong‘s 
(2006) assertion that racial categories are reproduced through daily practices that are 
―activities of inclusion and exclusion.‖
23
 
Popular, primetime media texts provide common points of reference in a shared 
narrative of national identity, but also narratives—and hierarchies—of racial and ethnic 
identities within the nation. Often, these narratives are gendered, specifying particular 
hierarchies and histories of femininities and masculinities. Elizabeth Alexander (1994), 
                                                 
21 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1979; 1994), 20-21. Original emphasis. 
22 As M.T. Kato writes, ―Commodity culture constitutes the infrastructure of communication among the 
masses; popular culture gains its potential for producing affects, aesthetic values, and communal 
identities.‖ From Kung Fu to Hip Hop: Globalization, Revolution and Popular Culture (New York: SUNY 
Press, 2007), 3. 
23 Aihwa Ong, ―Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Cultural 
Boundaries in the United States.‖ Current Anthropology 37.5 (December 1996), 740. 
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for example, describes the ways in which the African American male body is inscribed 
with a history of violence and abject blackness, claiming, ―black bodies in pain for public 
consumption have been an American national spectacle for centuries.‖ In this particular 
formulation of racialized masculinity, the mediated national narrative of blackness in 
America has resulted in ―collective versions of African American male bodily history,‖ 
shaping the ways in which media representations ―crucially inform [black men and 
women] about the lived realities of how violence and its potential‖ informs 
understandings of group standing within America‘s racial framework.
24
  
Dominant narratives of difference can serve to strengthen a national American 
identity through exclusionary rhetoric, but can also strengthen the communal bonds of a 
minority group reacting to those narratives. While data show Asian Americans 
strengthening in numbers and (in some respects) their role in American politics, 
America‘s foreign relations with Asia abroad, particularly with China and North Korea, 
remain increasingly fraught with tension. Relations and policies with others beyond 
America‘s borders,
25
 have shaped discourses of ―peril‖—yellow, brown, red
26
—within. 
The concept of the ―Other‖ is shaped by dominant, national hierarchies of race and power 
relations. In a digital age, print, film, and media technology have become ―new fields of 
power [that] shape social norms by means of circulating images, narratives and 
information.‖
27
 It is precisely what these circulating narratives provide, and how they are 
                                                 
24 Elizabeth Alexander, ―Can you be BLACK and Look at This?‖: Reading the Rodney King Video(s).‖ 
Public Culture 7 (1994), 78-79. 
25See Darrell Y. Hamamoto, Monitored Peril: Asian Americans and the Politics of TV Representation 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American 
Cultural Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996). 
26 Robert MacDougall, ―Red, Brown and Yellow Perils: Images of the American Enemy in the 1940s and 
1950s.‖ Journal of Popular Culture 32 (1999): 59-75. 
27 Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1999): 158. 
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identified and interpreted, that is at the heart of my dissertation. As such, I focus on 
mainstream media texts as a site of struggle and meaning-making that is inexorably 
linked to formulations of race and gender.  
In more ways than one, I am an outsider to the arena of Asian American 
masculinity. Along with the gender difference, I have not had the experience of growing 
up male in the United States, contending with its formulations of gender and gender‘s 
unique intersections with a racial structure that is predominantly white/black. English is 
my first language and I have, if anything, a strong Midwestern accent; I am sometimes 
unfamiliar with the media fare men recall as their childhood favorites; I cannot share the 
stories of immigration and assimilation; still today, some racial stereotypes and phrases 
are new to me. As an American-born Chinese, raised in Hong Kong and put through an 
American school system, I was fascinated with American popular culture and largely 
identify with it today. At an international school, the beginning of each fall was marked 
with students returning from their visits to the U.S., showing off new trends, knowing 
what the next big band would be. I was only vaguely aware that components of Asian 
culture were as much at the core of a globalized American popular culture.  
Today, I am admittedly a fan of the best (and worst) American media has to offer, 
and have a love-hate relationship with how it portrays, in its myriad of outlets, gender 
and race. I loathed the race-based ―social experiment‖ of Survivor: Cook Islands, and 
cringed at the jester-like qualities of William Hung on American Idol. I also cheered 
when Chinese brother and sister Tammy and Victor Jih won The Amazing Race, and took 
delight in the portrayals of Harold and Kumar in the eponymous movies, as well as the 
integrated storylines of Asian characters in the primetime narratives of Lost and Heroes. I 
 
 16 
take note whenever a minor Asian character is allowed to speak a line on a television 
show. I am pleased to see others like me represented in the media, but often frustrated by 
the continued ignorance (laughter at my last name, insinuations that I will eat my cat for 
dinner) that—sometimes jokingly, sometimes seriously—pervades American culture. I 
am at once inside it, at once outside of it. 
This feeling of being simultaneously included and excluded is not unique to me. 
Indeed, it is reflected in an entire body of scholarship detailing Asian Americans as 
―perpetual foreigners.‖ It is the experience that Frank Wu details as the impetus for his 
book, Yellow: the contradictory acceptance of Asian Americans in schools and 
workplaces as the model minority, coupled with the ostensibly innocent compliment of 
,―Your English is so good,‖ or the question, ―Where are you really from?‖
28
 A goal of 
this dissertation, then, is to uncover the complexities and nuances of what constitutes the 
Asian American experience, especially as it is implicated in gendered narratives that also 
involve issues of class.  
Situating the study 
This dissertation makes significant headway in both Asian American and media 
studies, in that it offers an investigation into Asian American representations and how 
they are connected, or even nestled within, larger discourses of Asia and America; 
additionally, it does so with the guidance of in-depth interviews to point the way. In my 
analyses, I look at media representations of Asia and Asian America from roughly 2003-
2008. I identify this period as an historical conjuncture, in which the media 
simultaneously presented racial anxiety and multiculturalism. One need only to look at 
the contradictory media fare from 2008 and 2009 to see this juxtaposition. In March 
                                                 
28 Wu, Yellow, 18. 
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2008, Texas educators led a controversial effort to change to an ethnically diverse 
literature list for the state‘s reading curriculum. Opposing the inclusion of ethnic stories, 
State Board of Education chairman Don McElroy claimed that putting a Chinese story in 
an English book would not help students learn English: ―You really don‘t want Chinese 
books with a bunch of crazy Chinese words in them,‖ he said, but then added that, 
―words like ‗chow mein‘ might come in useful.‖
29
 In a public hearing on voter 
identification legislation a year later, Organization of Chinese Americans representative 
Ramey Ko explained the difficulties many Asian American voters face due to 
discrepancies between ethnic and translated English names on various pieces of 
identification. In a response to Ko, Texas Representative Betty Brown commented, 
―Rather than everyone here having to learn Chinese,‖ Ko and ―his citizens‖ should adopt 
names ―easier for Americans to deal with.‖
30
 And, earlier that month, a white student at 
Tufts University drunkenly attacked a group of Korean American students practicing a 
cultural performance, reportedly calling them ―chinks,‖ telling them to ―go back to 
China,‖ and that he would ―kill them all.‖
31
  
While moments of racial conflict and discourses of fear surrounding immigration 
proliferated in the news, entertainment texts presented audiences with more multicultural 
casts than ever before. In the 2000s film and television studios, along with interest 
groups, made conscious attempts to increase diversity in the entertainment industry‘s 
creative ranks.
32
 For the first time, Asian American men were given space on primetime 
                                                 
29 ―Educators Rip Book List in English Plan.‖ San Antonio Express-News, March 21, 2008.  
30 R.G. Ratcliffe, ―Lawmaker Defends Comment on Asians,‖ Houston Chronicle, April 9, 2009.  
31 Ben Gittleson, ―Alleged Bias Incident against Korean Students Prompts Widespread Reaction,‖ Tufts 
Daily, April 10, 2009. 
32 Networks with notable diversity initiatives include Disney/ABC with its Diversity Program, and CBS 
with its Diversity Institute Program to mentor minority writers for its network. The NAACP has also 
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screens, as well as entry into the sexualized arena of male celebrity, as seen in the rise of 
Asian American actors like John Cho, Harry Shum, Daniel Dae Kim, and Masi Oka. 
While multiculturalism is reflected in the increasingly colorful and integrated casts of 
primetime television shows and mass-marketed films, it is also a multiculturalism that is 
highly problematic, that some see as a threat to the social order, and can often erupt in 
episodes of violence. It is clear to those that I interviewed that while the media promote 
narratives of diversity, lived experience suggests that racial difference cannot be ignored. 
Sharing stories of being accepted on football teams or into white fraternities, interviewees 
also shared how their time in these venues was rife with jokes about Asians and 
stereotypes that prevented them from feeling fully accepted or integrated. Even if specific 
cases of discrimination could not be recalled or discussed, men were aware of discourses 
about Asians on a larger, national level that shaped some of the discomfort they felt as 
racial beings in America. 
Understanding “Asian American” 
Perhaps the dearth of, and complications in conducting research regarding the 
Asian American experience is due to the difficulty in defining the limits and scope of the 
Asian American population under study. The difficulty of labeling what is and is not 
―Asian American‖ has prevented many, including scholars and advertisers, from 
conceptualizing Asian Americans as a part of the American mainstream. The research 
design of this project contributes to a more nuanced and fluid understanding of what it 
means to be Asian American. Rather than defining the parameters of my research with 
my own potentially essentialized definitions of Asian America, allowing interviewees to 
                                                                                                                                                 
partnered with CBS and NBC on a Diversity Fellowship Program. However, criticisms of these initiatives 
point out that the networks still have the same distribution of majority talent. 
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determine their own standards for eligibility empowered them to shape their own 
category of ―Asian America.‖ 
This dissertation thus makes headway in Asian American scholarship by building 
on the more recent contention that ―Asian American‖ is a fluid term. Following Kandice 
Chuh‘s (2003) call to consider ―Asian American‖ as a situational category,
33
 I approach 
―Asian American‖ as not an essential identity, but one that is shaped within specific 
contexts such as imagined communities and media narratives. In their edited anthology, 
Alien Encounters: Popular Culture in Asian America (2007), Mimi Nguyen and Thuy Tu 
suggest a ―subjectless‖ approach to Asian American studies in order to avoid the debates 
over authenticity and essentialism that have long ravaged studies of Asian Americans and 
Asian American texts. They write: 
We argue that Asian American can be conceived as a marker of historical 
subjects, an axis of subordination, and a strategic coalition without 
presuming that it functions as a foundational property of our ―selves.‖ This 
does not mean that we cannot speak of the experiences of Asian 
Americans, but that we must account for the ways in which these political 




In gathering the stories and memories of Asian American men through a series of in-
depth interviews, my research provides insight into some of the social constructs, as well 
as raced and gendered deployments experienced by Asian Americans who are part of an 
American popular culture today.  
                                                 
33 Kandice Chuh, Imagine Otherwise: On Asian Americanist Critique (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2003).  
34 Nguyen and Tu, Alien Encounters, 6. Original emphasis. 
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A term created in the 1960s by Asians in America as a response to the derogatory 
label of ―Oriental,‖ ―Asian American‖ was subsequently adopted as an official racial 
category for use in U.S. public policy and census reports.
35
 Since then, some have 
declared the term as problematic, creating a pan-ethnic category that often eclipses 
national, cultural and geographical differences; currently, ―Asian American‖ now 
encompasses over fifteen ethnic and national groups.
36
 Not only is the term slippery in 
regards to geographical location and national origin, but also by generation: for some of 
my interviewees, Asian American included any Asian who shared the immigrant 
experience; for others, it meant being born in America and being an American who 
―happens‖ to be Asian.
37
 
These differences in definitions allow for us to critique the many contradictions of 
Asian images in the media without definitional limitations. Examining Asian men in 
mass media texts acknowledges particular configurations of power and representational 
history that often interchanges one type of Asian for another—Chinese playing Japanese, 
Koreans playing Chinese, etc.—resulting in a broad definition of ―Asian American‖ that 
includes performances of ―the Oriental.‖ Lastly, examining the rhetorical approach to 
China and Chinese nationals in political and economic discourse illuminates yet another 
configuration of power that has a specific definition of ―Asian‖ that influences 
understandings of ―Asian American.‖ 
Asian American Men 
                                                 
35 See Neil Gotanda, ―Exclusion and Inclusion: Immigration and American Orientalism,‖ Across the 
Pacific: Asian Americans and Globalization, ed. Evelyn Hu Dehart (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University 
Press, 1999); Nazli Kibria, Becoming Asian American. 
36 Shilpa Davé, Leilani Nishime and Tasha G. Oren, eds. East Main Street: Asian American Popular 
Culture (New York: New York University Press, 2005). 
37 Alejandro Portes notes that Asian is a ―particularly egregious term‖ because many second-generation 
―Asians‖ do not share parental languages; the distance between the first and second generation is greater. In 
The New Second Generation, ed. Alejandro Portes (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996), 1-2. 
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American mass media have historically treated Asian Americans in front of and 
behind the camera with ambivalence. Leading Asian characters—often without specified 
origin and instead presented generally as ―Orientals‖—were consistently played by 
Caucasian actors due to the reluctance of the movie industry to allow Asians to take lead 
parts. In ―yellowface,‖ a performance often including eyes pulled back by tape and overly 
harsh ―Oriental‖ accents, white actors portrayed popular Asian characters, most notably 
the detective Charlie Chan.
38
 Asian actresses such as Anna May Wong were more 
acceptable in the 1920s, but only as ferocious ―dragon ladies,‖ submissive ―lotus 
blossoms,‖ or exotic concubines.  
In this history of representations, the racialized spheres of labor, the economy, 
and material production have specifically affected Asian men. Asian men had fewer entry 
points in an entertainment industry headed by white men, while Asian women have been 
afforded wider arenas of performance. As interviewees will elaborate on in future 
chapters, Asian American women have been allowed entry into these arenas in part due 
to universal standards of beauty and exotification. While still problematically 
perpetuating patriarchy, these standards have never been applied, it seems, to Asian men, 
who have been instead presented as feminine or asexual. While contemporary Asian 
American actresses—names such as Sandra Oh, Lucy Liu, and Ming Na Wen arise—took 
on lead roles in films and television shows during the 1990s, Asian American male leads 
remained elusive, if not completely invisible.  
                                                 
38 Actors starring as Charlie Chan included Warner Oland, Sidney Toler, and Roland Winters. 
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While the field of gender studies has flourished with approaches of 
intersectionality,
39
 studies of masculinity have often looked at gender projects in the 
context of a singular hegemonic formulation of manhood. In her analysis of the (Western) 
masculine ideal, R.W. Connell (1995) identifies the current formulation of masculinity as 
a thoroughly modern identity accompanying the rise of nations. She argues that defining 
the masculine was a necessary component of empire-building and colonization, which 
also linked current hegemonic ideals of masculinity with violence, rationality, 
heterosexuality and, above all, whiteness. This idea of manhood becomes a common 
ideal and collective practice, setting the boundaries for an exceptional ―in-group‖ of men, 
marginalizing and feminizing those in the ―out-group,‖ through processes of both 
coercion and consent.
40
 As such, studies of masculinity can reveal moments where the 
formation of a gendered identity is consonant with dominant constructions. Even those 
masculinities not aligned with the hegemonic ideal can at times, work to uphold and 
perpetuate dominant notions of masculinity.  
This has resulted in a portrait of racialized masculinity that is easy to 
pathologize.
41
 Yet, the concept of dominant/subordinate masculinity is not as simple 
given the complexities of social relations. Tony Coles‘ ―Negotiating the Field of 
Masculinity‖ (2009) suggests: 
                                                 
39 See Kimberle Crenshaw, ―Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against 
Women of Color.‖ Stanford Law Review 43.6 (1991): 1241-1299. 
40 See R.W. Connell, Masculinities (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995). 
41 For example, Nhan Truong‘s analysis of Chinese American autobiographies is framed in psychoanalytic 
terms of melancholia and loss: ―Constructing Masculinities and Experiencing Loss: What the Writings of 
Two Chinese Americans Tell,‖ Men and Masculinities 8.3 (2006): 321-330. Anthony Chen‘s interviews 
with Chinese American men assumes multiple negotiations around one static concept of masculinity. 
―Lives at the Center of the Periphery, Lives at the Periphery of the Center: Chinese American Masculinities 
and Bargaining with Hegemony,‖ Gender & Society 13.5 (1999): 584-607. 
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While hegemonic masculinity can be used to describe the dominant 
version of masculinity within the field of masculinity, there are subfields 
within…that have their own dynamics of dominant and subordinate 
masculinities. Therefore, one may be subordinated as a gay man within the 
field of masculinity yet be dominant within the field of gay masculinity.
42
  
By talking to Asian American men about their concepts of manhood, we can see the role 
the ―dominant version of masculinity‖ plays in their understandings of gender, and how 
these ideals are challenged or affirmed when ―Asian American‖ is added to the mix.  
Most helpful here is Anthony Chen‘s (1999) short series of interviews with 
Chinese American men, which shows how career, education, and relationship choices 
were influenced by men‘s concepts of hegemonic masculinity and rewards of political, 
financial, and cultural capital. Some men compensated for being Asian American by 
meeting the ideals of hegemonic masculinity. Others attempted to deflect attention away 
from stereotypical Asian American traits, while others denied the existence of Asian 
American stereotypes. Still others repudiated the system of domination that perpetuates 
hegemonic masculinity entirely. While Chen‘s work makes headway in exploring a range 
of Asian American experiences, his main focus is to create a typology of ways in which 
hegemonic identities can be addressed. Beyond this, it has become increasingly clear that 
we must acknowledge the existence of multiple masculinities that fall within the 
hegemonic formulation. 
Definitions and performances of Asian American masculinity are influenced by 
dominant gender schema. As Emily Chivers Yochim (2010) writes, it is not enough to 
                                                 
42 Tony Coles, ―Negotiating the Field of Masculinity: The Production and Reproduction of Multiple 
Dominant Masculinities,‖ Men and Masculinities 12 (2009), 42. 
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consider a singular concept of masculinity as it intersects with a singular concept of race: 
rather, we must ―trac[e] the ways in which particular expressions of masculinity (e.g., the 
Sensitive New Age Guy, the Urban Cowboy, the Male Cheerleader) traverse expressions, 
locations, and identities vis-à-vis power relations.‖
43
 In other words, as we investigate the 
many ways in which Asian American men understand themselves as ―Asian American,‖ 
we must also look at the ways in which their understandings of themselves as men are 
complicated, made richer, or become more nuanced as they maneuver their social 
realities as Asian American men.
 44,45
  
Research on alternate forms of masculinity, then, often note how subordinated 
masculinities are never fully resistant in their formulations: in just one example, racially 
subordinate men can claim masculinity through patriarchal behavior and attitudes.
46
 In 
this way, literature on masculinity often results in cyclical arguments that at once point to 
the continued subordination of alternate masculinities as well as the subversive 
possibilities of the very same identities. This back-and-forth reveals how the 
simultaneous subversiveness of alternate masculinities, as well as the subordination to 
hegemonic masculine ideals, plays a role in men‘s understandings of self. By embarking 
on studies that explore men‘s self-awareness or reflexivity of their masculinity, we can 
                                                 
43 Emily Chivers Yochim, Skate Life: Reimagining White Masculinity (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 2010), 81. 
44 See Michael Kimmel and Michael A. Messner, Men‟s Lives, 5th ed. (Boston, Allyn & Bacon, 2001), xvi: 
―Masculinity is constructed differently by class and culture, by race and ethnicity, and by age. And each of 
these axes of masculinity modifies the others, See also Waters, Ethnic Options; and Coles, ―Negotiating the 
Field.‖ 
45 Truong asks how Chinese Americans ―at once negotiate between their many identities and construct 
viable masculinities as they contend with discrimination and stereotypes that can undermine their sense of 
manhood,‖ 32. 




lend to the literature by seeing how these two practices, seemingly at odds with each 
other, come together or build on each other during identification processes.  
Allowing Asian American men to speak for themselves helps us move beyond 
critiques of the hyper-masculine yet asexual, Asian kung fu male representation that has, 
for so many decades, shaped our understanding of Asian American men. Instead of 
offering my own views on how Asian American men may be configured within the race 
and gender narratives of the United States, I have sought out interviewees in an effort to 
report on their thoughts and opinions. Few scholars have focused their sights solely on 
Asian American manhood,
47
 with a burgeoning body of research on Asian/American 
masculinity found in the relatively new field of cultural psychology, where minorities 




Regardless of whether or not Asian American male identities resist or internalize 
hegemonic masculinity, they are still constructed in relation to the dominant codes, 
norms, and practices associated with it. For example, Keith Osajima‘s (1993) study found 
that Asian students at predominantly white colleges internalized the negative images 
whites held of Asians in order to form their own identities.
49
 Similarly, Peter Chua and 
Diane Fujino‘s (1999) study revealed that Asian men, regardless of immigrant status, 
evaluate their masculinity using dominant ideals as a standard: whites were considered 
                                                 
47 See Chen, ―Lives At the Center‖; David Eng, Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian 
America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001); Daniel Y. Kim, Writing Manhood in Black and 
Yellow (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
48 Cliff Cheng, ―Marginalized Masculinities and Hegemonic Masculinity: An Introduction,‖ Journal of 
Men's Studies 7.3 (1999), 295-315; see also Waters, Ethnic Options. 
49 Keith Osajima, ―The Hidden Injuries of Race,‖ in Bearing Dreams, Shaping Visions: Asian Pacific 
American Perspectives, eds. Linda A. Revilla and Shirley Hune. (Pullman, WA: Washington State 
University Press, 1993), 81-91. 
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more attractive, outgoing, sociable, and powerful than Asians.
50
 Studies such as these 
reflect Cliff Cheng‘s (1999) argument that Asian American men are more likely to have 
to negotiate multiple negative stereotypes within a dominant or hegemonic formulation of 
masculinity.
51
 As mentioned above, racial stereotypes often intersect with understandings 
of masculinity. Many of these stereotypes highlight the perception of Asian American 
men as physically smaller and as asexual or homosexual, as well as nerdy and introverted 
compared to white men.
52
 
Media and Cultural Studies 
My investigation of Asian Americans‘ relationship with the media extends the 
research constructing audiences as active interpreters contending with dominant 
ideologies perpetuated by the media. The focus on interpretive processes as well as larger 
systems of representation positions my work within the field of cultural studies, which 
―locates sources of meaning in social relations, communication, cultural politics. The 
stress on culture implies the social construction of meanings, but it also implies the 
existence of forms of political or communal reason transcending individual 
subjectivity.‖
53
 This approach considers the context—modes of production and 
consumption—within which texts are found, privileging the lived experience of meaning-
making and a dialogic relationship between audiences and texts. 
Studies on groups of audiences engaging with popular culture texts have 
expanded the field of cultural studies by elevating ostensibly mundane texts to levels of 
                                                 
50 See Peter Chua and Diane C. Fujino, ―Negotiating New Asian-American Masculinities: Attitudes and 
Gender Expectations,‖ Journal of Men‟s Studies 7.3 (1999): 391-413. 
51 Cheng, ―Marginalized Masculinities.‖ 
52 Eng, Racial Castration; Chua and Fujino, ―Negotiating New Asian-American Masculinities‖; see E.J. 
Kim, James O‘Neil, and S.V. Owen, ―Asian-American Men‘s Acculturation and Gender-Role Conflict,‖ 
Psychological Reports 79.1 (1996): 95-104. 




scholarly appreciation, revealing the importance of cultural representations in meaning-
making processes.
54
 The tension of how ideological opposition transfers to everyday life 
remains when audience studies shift to minority audiences and their experiences with 
mass media texts, which are commonly understood as a predominantly white, male, 
heterosexual institution. However, as Herman Gray writes in Watching Race (1995), 
―conceiving of television as a dense site or place of struggle over the symbolic meanings 
(and uses) of [race] in the production of the nation gives television a central role in 
cultural politics.
55
 As I extend my analysis of television texts to the multi-platform 
narrative environment of the mid-2000s, my study becomes one of the first to explicitly 
discuss the representations of race and gender in this experimental business model. 
Focuses on minority audiences has, in fact, shown that mass texts are interpreted 
selectively based on individual priorities, whether founded in gender, race, or class: Lisa 
Duke‘s ―Black in a Blonde World‖ (2000), for example, shows how Black female teens 
read teen magazines to learn about social interactions and boys, while ignoring largely 
White-oriented material like cosmetic tips and body ideals. Similarly, Robin Means 
Coleman‘s (1998) interviews revealed the tensions African American viewers felt toward 
the representations in Black sitcoms.
56
 While some enjoyed sitcoms that portrayed Blacks 
in elevated class positions, others preferred programming that depicted the Black 
working-class community. In her participants‘ responses, Coleman finds that interpretive 
                                                 
54 Here, I turn to Benedict Anderson‘s (1983) contention that mass media enables the development of 
common ties by creating what is, in effect, ―imagined communities‖ or, to use Janice Radway‘s (1984) 
term, interpretive networks. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983); Janice 
A. Radway, Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature (Chapel Hill, NC: 
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pleasures are derived from viewers‘ own beliefs about Blackness and the Black 
experience in America.  
Research on Asian audiences has yet to do the in-depth work that Coleman and 
others engage in, resulting in a limited understanding of how the media shape the ways in 
which Asians understand themselves as individuals within a larger social framework. 
What little work has been done with Asian American groups has shown that they, like 
other minorities, negotiate the rhetoric and images informed by dominant ideological 
approaches to race and gender. Asian American youth have been found to distance 
themselves from acculturative extremes, using predominantly white terms such as 
―FOB‖—an acronym for immigrants ―fresh off the boat‖—and ―whitewashed‖—
assimilated immigrants who act and speak ―white.‖
57
 As is seen in Mary Yu Danico‘s 
(2004) book The 1.5 Generation, such racialized hierarchies of Asian immigrants can 
have a pronounced influence on youth alliances and their relationship with their families. 
In terms of images, Ji Hoon Park, Nadine Gabbadon and Ariel Chernin‘s (2006) focus 
groups with East Asian, Black, and White viewers of Rush Hour 2 attempt to understand 
the different ways a seemingly progressive yet regressive film—black and Asian lead 
characters developing friendship, but perpetuating racial stereotypes and jokes—can be 
interpreted. The majority of their participants found the film‘s humor to be inoffensive 
and entertaining, leading the authors to insist that the comedy genre serves the ideological 
function of naturalizing racial hierarchies through humor. Most importantly, Park et al. 
suggest that Asian Americans balance negative stereotypes with a desire to see ―a 
positive image of an Asian man in a leading role that Asian viewers can be proud to cheer 
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 Park et al.‘s focus groups point to the contradicting ways in which 
Asian viewers engaged with Asian representations in the media, and suggest that 
dominant ideologies about manhood, whiteness and ethnic others may influence 
perceptions of the self and interactions with others. 
Asian American Studies 
While this dissertation aims to fill a gap in studies of minority audiences, it also 
aims to fill a gap in Asian American studies, where very few scholars have discussed the 
role the media plays in shaping, contributing to, or even forming facets of self. Much if 
the research on Asian American youth has discussed assimilative difficulties, 
intergenerational conflict, model minority stereotypes and other internalized stereotypes, 
and other facets of the Asian American experience. While some studies have looked at 
Asian Americans and their own venues of cultural production, media and Asian 
American studies have neglected to examine Asian Americans as part of an American 
mass audience contending with mainstream American mass media, which include 
representations of Asians and reflects attitudes of Asian Americans. 
I contend that literature on Asian Americans has pathologized their experiences to 
some degree. Research has long painted Asian Americans struggling with model minority 
stereotypes and becoming bastions of hybridity and diaspora. While such research has 
been invaluable in our understandings of minority experiences, particularly from cultural 
psychology and policy perspectives, cultural studies has neglected to consider Asian 
American audiences as part of a larger, more mainstream, American audience. Even 
studies of immigrant children, the 1.5 or second generation, have tended to focus on 
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intergenerational conflict, or maintaining or defining ethnic ―authenticity‖ and the 
negotiation of a hybrid culture. Asian American studies have focused on the ways Asian 
Americans may subvert popular culture by creating their own content, or remaining 
―ethnic‖ in some way.
59
  
These types of works have long situated Asian Americans, particularly second-
generation youth, as a population trying to contend with what Sunaina Maira (2002) calls 
a ―reflexive hybridity‖ linked to a ―deep desire…to find a clearly defined point of origin‖ 
as they live in the United States.
60
 Other scholars have taken a psychological approach to 
Asian American identity formation, investigating the struggles—such as intergenerational 
conflict and low self-esteem
61
—that accompany immigration and assimilative processes. 
However, the focus on assimilation has continued to highlight the tenuous position Asian 
Americans occupy in terms of race. Investigations of other second-generation 
immigrants, such as those from the Caribbean or Europe, have questioned the 
circumstances behind whether or not these youth identify as either black or white 
Americans, respectively, and how they maintain their ethnic identity.
62
 As neither black 
nor white, Asian Americans do not have this choice.
63
 
The trajectory of Asian American representations in the media is positioned 
within America‘s white-black racial discourse. Gary Okihiro‘s (1994) Margins and 
Mainstreams questions the influence of America‘s restrictive racial framework on 
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minority identity and inter-relationships. Contending that Asians have been marginalized 
in conversations of race, Okihiro points out that ―yellow‖ occupies a tenuous position 
between black and white: Asians are ―near whites‖ or ―just like blacks,‖ depending on 
educational attainment and occupation.
64
 This formulation of Asian American as a racial 
category, his work suggests, has fed into the construction of the model minority and 
yellow peril stereotypes, respectively. According to Okihiro, the two stereotypes work 
together to cast Asian Americans as walking paradoxes: assimilated (white) yet 
encroaching (black), masculine yet feminine. Building on this black/white dynamic, other 
studies have highlighted the continually tenuous position Asian American audiences and 
representations occupy in terms of race, gender, and class.  
Close examinations of what constitutes the Asian American experience have 
revealed a complex project of identification. For example, in Becoming Asian American, 
Nazli Kibria (2002), which Mia Tuan builds on (2005),
65
 finds her second-generation, 
Chinese and Korean American interviewees struggling with the dilemma of being 
―forever foreigners.‖
66
 While they at times defined themselves as ―American‖ rather than 
―Chinese‖ or ―Korean,‖ they were still aware of the qualities that set them apart (mostly 
physical/racial signifiers) from white America.
67 
Kibria suggests that Asian American has 
itself become a category of identity in America‘s racial lexicon, and her interviews 
investigate the nuances of how being Asian American is an ethnic or racial project. Work 
such as that of Kibria, Tuan, and Nadia Kim (2008) have been influential in 
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reformulating the category of ―Asian American‖ and studies of Asian American youth, 
but still largely ignore the role of the media in their respondents‘ nuanced experiences. 
Some have made an attempt to account for media representations, but only to a 
limited degree. Danico‘s (2004) investigation of young Korean Americans during the 
1990s in Hawaii reveals that youth learn stereotypical images of Korean Americans from 
interactions with peers, family, and newspapers. For example, internalized stereotypes of 
―fresh-off-the-boat‖ Koreans prompted youth to disassociate themselves with their 
Korean origins. Here, Danico suggests the importance of images and representations in 
influencing understandings of self, but neglects to explore how such representations and 
narratives may be articulated and circulated in the media. Not only can such racialized 
narratives and representations affect notions of self, but they can work to perpetuate an 
entire hierarchy of race. In analyzing American media and military propaganda narratives 
in South Korea, Nadia Kim notes that American mass media fare works to perpetuate the 
white/black racial framework that ―highlights Korean and Asian Americans‘ outside 
status relative to blacks.‖
68
 Not only do Koreans‘ exposure to U.S. mass media texts 
position the white upper-middle class as an ideal, but negative racial stereotypes—such 
as the black criminal—are highly influential in forming Korean attitudes abroad.  
In the larger scope of ethnic youth studies, not to mention Asian American 
studies, the role of American mass media in the formation of an Asian American identity 
has been largely overlooked. Studies have failed to examine Asian Americans as part of 
an American mass audience contending with mainstream American mass media, which 
include representations of Asians and reflects attitudes toward Asian Americans. The 
difficulties Asian Americans face in being considered a wholly independent media 
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market have been reflected in the relative invisibility of Asian Americans in media texts. 
As such, how does a minority population that has been denied definition in turn define 
itself in the face of mainstream media texts? Even with the existence of ―Asian 
American-specific‖ media fare,
69
 American popular media texts are just as much a part of 
a larger cultural narrative that implicates Asian Americans.  
Chapter Breakdown 
The discussions and themes raised in my research begin to build a spectrum of 
invisibility, touched upon by Nadia Kim‘s Imperial Citizens, that can be applied to the 
Asian American mediated and lived experience. In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of 
the definitions and narratives that interviewees deploy in their formulations of Asian 
America and masculinity, as well as how they negotiate a discourse of race and gender 
that is predominantly shaped by white America. The chapter‘s main goal, in addition to 
providing the histories of interviewees, is to identify the larger cultural narratives and 
stereotypes of race and gender that influence self-definition and social performance of 
Asian American men. Experiences with schools, friends and family, as well as with 
martial arts and model minority stereotypes, reveal feelings of being visible as a racial 
minority, invisible as an ethnic minority, the sense of absent diversity felt in 
predominantly white neighborhoods.  
What my interviewees reveal are their ideal definitions of ―Asian American‖ as a 
racial and ethnic category, juxtaposed against the practical definitions employed in 
complex social situations in predominantly white social (in neighborhoods, with peers) 
and institutional (educational) settings. Whether coming from diverse neighborhoods on 
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the East and West coast or, like the majority of interviewees, from small suburbs in the 
Midwest, men explained the ways in which they feel they are rendered simultaneously 
visible and invisible. They negotiate instances of racial subordination, countered by 
―model minority‖ expectations and the associated assumptions of class and education, 
and complicated by the experience of interchangeability brought on by the pan-ethnic 
category of ―Asian American.‖  
From interview data, I contend that the experience of being Asian American is in 
large part defined by a narrative of ―Asianness,‖ shaped by the politics of a white-black 
racial discourse that has marginalized or even prevented discussion of ―Asian American.‖ 
My interviewees have grown up in a period in which their schools (both their regular 
weekday schools or their weekend ethnic schools), neighborhoods, and the media failed 
to produce any visible Asian American narrative. Instead, the narrative that men seem to 
have worked with, and continue to negotiate, as Asian Americans, is the narrative of what 
it means to be ―Asian‖ or ―non-American.‖ Regaling me with tales of ―breaking 
stereotypes,‖ interviewees suggest that the day-to-day practice of being Asian American 
is one that incorporates assumptions of Asians as understood by white America. 
Ultimately, this chapter reveals that the men I interviewed are as much influenced by the 
presence and expectations of white definitions, as they are their own. 
Building on the notion that Asian Americans lack a narrative about what it means 
to be Asian American, Chapter 2 looks at how the concept of Asia informs Asian 
America. Turning its lens of analysis to the news media, this chapter looks at how news 
discourses work to define the social categories identified in Chapter 1. In this chapter, I 
asked interviewees if they felt that news stories about Asia influenced how they were 
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perceived as Asians in America. The overwhelming consensus was that interviewees felt 
implicated in larger discourses of Asia or the Orient writ large. Analysis of news events 
recalled by interviewees, from product recalls and the threat of global pandemics, to the 
controversies surrounding China‘s preparations for the 2008 Olympics, reveals the early 
to mid-2000s as a time in which China became the center of mainstream news stories, 
providing Orientalist formulations of Asians as advanced yet backwards, but always 
threatening.
70
 Identifying the main themes used by magazines and papers in coverage of 
these events suggests ways in which the narratives of China as contaminated, ruthless, 
and monstrous influence how Asian Americans feel they are perceived as Orientals, but 
also how ―yellow peril‖ rhetoric—with roots in 19
th
 century American anxieties over 
Chinese laborers—can work to accompany or eclipse the ―model minority‖ stereotype. 
Looking at how Asian difference is constructed and how it was reinforced with narratives 
of contamination, aggression and exoticism that proliferated in 19
th
 century America, we 
see how what it means to be ―Asian,‖ past and present, sets the context and vocabulary 
available to discuss Asian America. 
The anxiety and fear fostered in these news texts reached such an apex in national 
discourse about patriotism and the white middle class that after the 2010 mid-term 
elections, The New York Times reported at least twenty-nine candidates‘ political 
campaigns used China as ―a really easy scapegoat‖ and ―a straw-man villain.‖ Using 
China as ―an obvious punching bag,‖ both Republicans and Democrats criticized 
opponents‘ leniency toward China as the cause of America‘s suffering workforce.
71
 
Supporting China was unpatriotic, and un-American.  
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Perhaps the linkages between discourses of China and discourses of Asian 
America became most prominent when the conservative group Citizens Against 
Government Waste released their commercial, ―Chinese Professor.‖ In this ad, a Chinese 
professor explained America‘s economic downfall. ―Of course, we owned most of their 
debt,‖ he said, standing at the front of a lecture hall flanked by pictures of Chairman 
Mao. As the Chinese flag appeared behind him, he shouted, ―And now, they work for 
us!‖
72
 As he chuckled, his entirely Chinese audience laughed along with him. ―Chinese 
Professor‖ set the online Asian American community abuzz as viewers tried to make 
sense of the production and casting logics behind the ad.
73
 Testimonials from extras—
Asian Americans of all ethnicities—cast in the production, as well as debates about 
whether the ad was truly racist,
74
 revealed the tensions of ethnic interchangeability and 
the politics linking Asian America to larger discourses of China at this particular cultural 
moment.  
While anti-Chinese sentiment fomented in the news media, mainstream 
entertainment texts seemed to be embracing Asian actors. This juxtaposition shapes the 
complicated space in which Asian American men actively resist, negotiate, and accept 
racial stereotypes and problematic representations. Chapter 3 thus looks at the early to 
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mid-2000s, the period in which Asian American lead actors began to earn top billing on 
television and film screens across America, as a moment in which an Asian American 
narrative begins to be visible. While still playing largely Asian characters, the rise of 
Asian American actors in the American popular celebrity scene offered a new narrative 
of what it meant to be Asian in America.  
Chapter 3 investigates how the social categories defined in Chapters 1 and 2 are 
used as interviewees negotiate Asian American actors and characters on screen. The 
chapter shows how interviewees formulate a spectrum of what it means to be Asian 
American. Beginning with Jackie Chan, an Asian actor who lies at the forefront of Asian 
representations in American media, interviewees then discuss their interpretations of John 
Cho from Harold and Kumar, Masi Oka from NBC‘s Heroes, and Daniel Dae Kim from 
ABC‘s Lost.  
With a particular focus on the multicultural ensemble casts and racial diversity on 
popular primetime television shows like ABC‘s Lost and NBC‘s Heroes, this chapter 
ultimately shows how interviewees negotiate multicultural politics. These programs 
reveal Asian Americans‘ struggle for both visibility and invisibility within the American 
popular imaginary. Respondents suggest that the ideal Asian American portrayal is one 
that is simultaneously visible and invisible: they call for Asian Americans to be visible in 
the industry, but for narratives that render difference invisible by presenting an Asian 
American man as ―just another guy.‖  
Lastly, my dissertation points to the early to mid-2000s as a moment of tension, 
paradox, and experimentation in American television. While Chapter 3 maps the 
industry‘s embrace of diversity on screen, Chapter 4 maps the industry‘s embrace of new 
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channels of distribution to expand the traditional television show model. The chapter 
links this industrial shift to the ―post-network‖ era,
75
 the rise and solidification of on-the-
go audiences and portable media devices that changed the modes of production, 
distribution, financing, and consumption in traditional media business models. The 2007 
Writers Guild of America strike brought these uncertainties to the forefront, and 2010 
still saw the industry trying to adjust to a new era of audiences and programming.  
Chapter 4 thus turns its lens of analysis to industry production practices, first 
describing the tumult felt by the television industry in the period leading up to the 2007 
strike. I look at the emergence of the experimental practice of multi-platform, 
―transmedia‖ storytelling, which several broadcast television shows, including Lost and 
Heroes, embraced. The chapter provides case examples of these two television shows‘ 
transmedia experiments, such as alternate reality games and novellas, and their treatment 
of race and gender across platforms. In doing so, this chapter offers a discussion of how 
such platforms for storytelling may offer new opportunities for articulating race and 
gender beyond television. 
Interviewee Profiles 
Andrew is a second-generation Korean American, born in the late 1980s and 
raised in a ―very diverse‖ neighborhood in a large cosmopolitan city on the East Coast. 
He recalls being amongst many other Asian students in school, but in college feels very 
aware that he is often the only Asian student in a classroom. At home with his parents, 
who are both in business, he speaks English; he has never been to visit Korea, though he 
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would like to. As a college student, Andrew hasn‘t had much time for television but likes 
watching sitcom re-runs and dramatic shows like Lost when he can. 
Brad is a second-generation Chinese American, born in the late 1980s and raised 
in a Michigan suburb that he describes as ―picturesque suburbia…. A conservative town, 
largely Caucasian.‖ He only speaks English. Brad does not watch much television on his 
free time, but tries to stay abreast of popular culture with the help of his brother Aaron 
(also interviewed), and Internet sites like YouTube, Hulu, and Asian American culture 
blogs. 
Aaron is also a second-generation Chinese American, born in the 1990s. Along 
with his brother Brad, Aaron cannot recall knowing any other Asian Americans growing 
up in his Michigan town of ―95-98% Caucasian Americans,‖ outside of the five or six 
other Asian American students in his high school class. Aaron has never been to Asia, 
only speaks English, and plans to take Mandarin classes to help him speak to relatives. 
Aaron watches a lot of television on both the television set and the Internet. Brad and 
Aaron‘s family ended up in the Midwest when their father decided to pursue a 
professional degree; their mother works an office job to supplement the family income. 
Edison was born in China in the 1990s and, when he became school-aged, moved 
to various places in North America due to his parents‘ positions with a large information 
technology company. As a result, Edison has lived in Chinese, white, and black 
neighborhoods. His parents speak to him in Mandarin but he now responds in English. 
Edison says he barely watches TV, but watches the occasional show on both the 
television set and through Internet sites. 
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David is a second-generation Korean American who grew up in a ―mostly 
Caucasian‖ neighborhood on the East Coast. He was born in the late 1980s to a ―middle-
class family,‖ and Korean is his first language. His father is an independent business 
owner and his mother works in finance. David mostly watches television for sports, and 
the occasional television show or educational show. For serial dramas like Lost and 
House, he usually rents or downloads DVDs for ―marathon sessions.‖ 
Jae-Sun is a second-generation Korean American who was born in a medium-
sized Korean community near a large Midwestern school while his father finished his 
Ph.D. His mother emigrated to the U.S. to marry his father who, after finishing his 
degree, moved the family to a smaller, predominantly white town in Michigan. Jae-Sun‘s 
homemaker mother eventually moved back to Korea, where Jae-Sun goes almost every 
summer, especially now that his father works there as well. He was born in the late 1980s 
and mostly watches television for sports and reality television. 
Randy is a second-generation Japanese American who was born in the late 1980s 
and raised in a large cosmopolitan city in New England. Randy speaks both English and 
Japanese to both of his parents, who emigrated to the U.S. after World War II, pursued 
doctoral degrees, and are both professors. After attending Japanese summer school as a 
child, Randy became actively involved in Asian American issues in high school, and this 
has continued through college. Randy claims he has never watched a television show 
regularly, and that he ―downloads everything‖ that he watches from the Internet. 
Josh was born in Korea in the late 1980s, but came to the U.S. with his parents 
right after he was born. His father‘s position with a large global communications 
corporation brought his family to a predominantly white neighborhood in New England. 
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Despite being one of only a few Asian students in his high school, Josh feels he fit in 
because he played a lot of sports. As a child, he went to Korean school on the weekends. 
Though English is his first language, he speaks a bit of Korean with his parents, who 
have since moved back to Korea. As a child, Josh didn‘t watch much television but now 
watches television fairly regularly. 
Bobby is a second-generation Chinese American, born in the Mountain West in 
the early 1990s. He spent his early life in Asia, and then moved back to his birthplace 
when he was school-aged. He recalls being ―the only Asian kid in school‖ in their small 
Mountain West town, where his parents joined extended family in running a small 
restaurant. In college, he has given up television; he and his roommates decided that 
having cable was too expensive. Instead, he watches television on the Internet through 
YouTube or Hulu.  
Young Min was born in the U.S. in the late 1980s while his parents finished their 
advanced degrees, but then spent his childhood in Korea. When his parents‘ positions in a 
large international corporation brought them to the mid-Atlantic region an adolescent 
Young Min recalled socialization difficulties in a predominantly white school that had 
―two other Asian kids.‖ Despite this, Young Min decided to stay in the States to finish 
high school, living with extended family while his parents moved back to Korea. Young 
Min watches television through studio web sites and also uses streaming video sites for 
other cable shows. 
Ekram, an immigrant from India, was born in the late 1960s and decided to 
become a graduate student after working in a technical field. His parents are retired 
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professionals still living in India. Ekram describes his life as influenced by literature and 
magazines, and does not watch television at all. 
Hugh is a second-generation Chinese American who grew up in what he 
describes as an ―upper middle-class, predominantly Jewish suburb‖ in Michigan. Born in 
the late 1980s, Hugh attended Chinese American school on the weekends and is currently 
learning to speak Chinese. His father is in business, and his mother is a homemaker. He is 
involved in a college ethnic organization, and primarily watches reality television shows 
with his girlfriend.  
Partha, born in the mid-1980s, was born and raised in a predominantly white 
Midwestern town. His father went to a large Midwestern university, and is now retired 
after working for a large Michigan company; his mother still works her office job. A 
second-generation Indian American, Partha avoids the ethnic organizations in college 
because he feels he is completely ―white-washed.‖ Partha mostly watches television 
when his roommates watch it, and supplements this viewing with the occasional episode 
from studio web sites. 
Oliver is a second-generation Chinese American who grew up in Michigan. 
While he lived in a predominantly white neighborhood, he recalls having a large Asian 
American community due to a large international business in the area. His father, who 
worked his way through college in the Northeast, eventually came to Michigan to work 
for the automobile industry. Once Oliver began college, his father moved to China to 
work for an automobile manufacturer there. Oliver also attended a Chinese school on the 
weekends. He is actively involved in a college ethnic organization. Oliver claims to 
 
 43 
watch ―a lot of TV,‖ but only with his roommates. Independently, he will occasionally 
seek episodes on the Internet sites Hulu or Fancast. He has never downloaded a show. 
Jonathan is a second-generation Vietnamese American whose parents came to 
Michigan during the Vietnam War. Born in the early 1990s, he grew up in a small, 
―predominantly white suburb‖ with a stay-at-home mother and a father who worked in 
the automobile industry. Jonathan describes himself as culturally ―white-washed,‖ due to 
the fact that he was only one of two or three Asian Americans at school. He is active in a 
religious community along with his family, and in college he is a member of an ethnic 
student organization. Jonathan is an avid television viewer who has run home to catch 
new episodes of network shows; he supplements his viewing with the Internet sites Hulu 
and Surfthechannel. 
Fred, born in the early 1990s, came to America from India when he was school-
aged. His parents are both in the software industry, and work for a large corporation in 
Michigan, where he grew up. He recalls growing up in ―90% white‖ town that has since 
become more diverse. He is an active participant in an ethnic student organization in 
college. Fred doesn‘t watch that much TV due to his schedule, but watches DVDs of his 
favorite shows to catch up. He does not download anything. 
Nick is a second-generation Chinese American born in the late 1980s. He grew up 
in a ―predominantly white neighborhood‖ in a large cosmopolitan city in the Northeast, 
where he was one of few Asian students. He recalls hanging out with predominantly 
Asian students from a mixture of different neighborhoods while growing up. His father 
and mother both work for the family business, a company started by his father. Nick 
recalls going to Chinese school on the weekends, and continues to hone his language 
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skills by returning to China with his family each summer to visit relatives. Nick has not 
watched television in a long time, and does not own a television. He does not download 
anything, but occasionally watches episodes of shows his friends tell him about on Hulu. 
Hiroki is a Japanese American who was born in Tokyo, but moved to the U.S. 
right away while his father pursued higher education. Hiroki calls a fairly diverse, large 
college town in Michigan his home, where his father commutes to his job in the 
automobile industry as the head of a large department. He also went to Japanese school 
on the weekends as a child. Hiroki does not watch any real-time television; he mostly 
watches television shows from DVDs he has bought, a practice he shares with his father.  
Dean, a second-generation Filipino, was born in the 1970s and speaks only 
English. His parents are both college-educated (his father runs and independent business, 
and his mother is in healthcare) who lived in a predominantly white neighborhood, 
surrounded by black neighborhoods, in a large Michigan city. Dean is devoted to Asian 
American educational and policy issues, and is active in the community. Dean does not 
watch a lot of television, mostly because he is bothered by the lack of Asians on screen. 
Avery is a second-generation Chinese American who grew up in a small New 
England suburb that was ―96% white, the remaining minority Asian.‖ His parents both 
moved to the U.S. to pursue their doctorates, and are both in academia. Avery attended 
Chinese school on the weekends as a child. He understands his parents‘ Chinese, but 
responds to them in English. Avery watches some television shows fairly regularly, but 
―only when [he] can catch it.‖ He does not seek out shows on the Internet. 
Tom is a second-generation Korean born to academic parents. He spent his early 
childhood in the U.S. while his father finished his doctoral and post-doctoral work; the 
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family then moved to South Korea for his father‘s job, when Tom was an adolescent. 
After many cultural and linguistic difficulties, his family moved back to America so that 
Tom could finish high school in a large Northeastern city. Tom is part of an ethnic 
organization in college and believes it is important to spread his culture to others. He 
does not own a television and watches sports and other television shows on the Internet, 
mostly from Hulu. 
Ben was born in the mid-1980s to Asian parents of different ethnicities. Ben‘s 
parents‘ military service brought him to different bases around the world. He recalls 
growing up as distinctly ―American‖ on the bases: when he finally attended a public high 
school, he was shocked at how racial differences were so important to others. Ben grew 
up without cable television and now primarily uses the Internet to download episodes of 
popular television shows.  
Alex is a second-generation Korean American. He was born in Michigan in the 
early 1990s as his parents finished their college education, then spent his childhood in 
South Korea. When his father received a job transfer, Alex followed him to the Midwest; 
his mother stayed in Korea for her on job. English is Alex‘s second language. He 
describes his Midwest neighborhood as ―heavily Asian,‖ and had a lot of Asian friends in 
school. He claims to be a fan of a number of television shows, and watches all of them on 
Hulu. 
Francis, a Chinese student who came to America for college, was born in the late 
1980s. English is his second language. Francis describes himself as a world traveler who 
has studied abroad and often visits his parents in Asia, as they continue their professional 
work there. Francis considers himself more Asian American than Asian, and does not 
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know if he will go back to Asia to work once he graduates. He was a fan of some popular 
TV shows, but no longer watches television due to his schedule.  
Jimmy was born in the late 1980s, and is a second-generation Chinese American. 
Born and raised in a small town in Michigan, his parents are both professionals working 
for a small business. In his small town, he claims he was the only person of color and 
―had no choice but to be friends with white people.‖ In college, he was actively involved 
in ethnic organizations. He does not watch television unless it is on in public spaces like 
the gym. 
Gary is a second-generation Chinese American, born in the late 1980s, who grew 
up in a metropolitan suburb in Michigan. He recalls his hometown as ―mostly European,‖ 
and can only recall one other Asian American family in the town in which he grew up. 
Like other interviewees, Gary‘s family moved from town to town for his father‘s job after 
graduate school. Gary speaks Mandarin with his parents, and hopes to take classes to 
learn how to read and write; he sees this as useful ―in terms of getting jobs.‖ He likes to 
watch many popular television shows, sometimes from his cable provider‘s video-on-
demand service, but mostly on the Internet from studio web sites, Hulu, and tvfreeonline. 
He does not download files. 
Dan was born in Korea in the early 1990s and moved to America when he was in 
fourth grade. His father, facing financial difficulties in Korea, sent the rest of the family 
to the U.S. for better educational opportunities. When Dan‘s East coast school refused to 
admit him due to his lack of English skills, his mother moved them to the Midwest. He 
recalls the difficulties of fitting in with middle-school and high-school students, and now 
wants ―to have a lot of diversity‖ with his friends and not be ―too Asian-oriented.‖ He 
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Visibly invisible: Exploring “Asian America” 
 
―I guess the way I think of it is… Whenever I think of the stereotypically generic 
man, just a guy, I think of a white guy.‖ Brad, a quiet, bookish college senior, was 
explaining to me how he thinks of himself as a Chinese American man in the United 
States. By the end of an intense two hour conversation, Brad‘s description of Asian men 
in the media increasingly reflected the frustration and disappointment he felt in his own 
life, particularly when it came to dating: ―I don‘t really see Asian American men 
portrayed as sexually attractive, anywhere…. Is there something wrong with me or the 
way that I was brought up that makes me unattractive?‖  
Brad‘s need to negotiate his own sense of self and his everyday interactions with 
what he and others see on film and television screens reflects the intersections of media 
images and formulations of gender, race, and self-constructs. Time after time, the men I 
interviewed told me about how they often joke about being good at math and having 
―slanty‖ eyes, but also of fistfights spurred by racial jokes made in their predominantly 
white schools. They told me about how they admired Jackie Chan‘s prominence as an 
early Asian actor on screens, only to tell me later that kung fu stereotypes and jokes were 
tiring and damaging to their self-esteem. Unapologetic and aware of the contradiction in 
these experiences, these men know that they inhabit a specific space at the interstices of 
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multiple discourses—of race, gender, class—but also negotiate how mediated personae 
implicate understandings and experiences with lived personae.  
This chapter presents interview data from self-identified Asian American men, to 
add to our understanding of negotiations made in the formation of racial and gender 
identity, not the least of which involves experiences with popular media. In looking at 
their stories, I question how these men might identify with or against the concept of 
―Asian American,‖ masculinity, and negotiate the social scripts, role models, and ethnic 
constructions that surround them. While the following chapters focus on the meanings 
interviewees bring to and draw from the American popular mediascape,
76
 this chapter 
illustrates how and what a group of locally situated Asian American men choose to 
remember and defend in regards to narratives of Asianness and masculinity. It addresses 
how dominant narratives of masculinity and Asianness combine with men‘s self-
constructs and interactions to form an increasingly complex network of articulations and 
formulations of racial and gendered identity.  
Questions about Asians in the media prompted long lists of stereotypes that 
interviewees had encountered as children, including ―borderline homosexual,‖ ―good at 
math,‖ ―funny accent,‖ and ―martial arts,‖ and ―model minority.‖
77
 These were often 
listed in a mocking tone, with men often telling me what Aaron did: that these stereotypes 
are, as Brad‘s brother Aaron put it, ―completely disingenuous‖ to the Asian American 
experience. However, the degree and frequency to which these stereotypes were listed 
suggests precisely the opposite. For some of these men, these particular signifiers that 
                                                 
76 Arjun Appadurai, ―Disjuncture and Difference in the Age of Globalization,‖ in Modernity at Large: 
Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 33. 
77 Indeed, as Michael Hong writes in Broadcasting & Cable, these are the main roles that Asian Americans 
occupy within the industry. ―Invisible Asian Americans,‖ 78. 
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have become so entrenched in the discourse about Asian male bodies, naturalized to 
create a common-sense story of what is ―real‖ about Asian Americans. Additionally, 
scholarly critiques of the ―model minority‖ stereotype suggest the ways in which it 
positions Asians as visible and invisible. As Shimakwa (2002) writes, the stereotype 
depicts Asians as able to ―assimilate into the ‗mainstream‘ (with an eye toward 
eventually disappearing in/as it),‖ while singling them out for aptitude.
78
 The stereotypes 
listed by interviewees, while not reflecting any essential Asian American characteristics, 
constitute a very real, genuine discursive reality for Asian Americans as a racial minority 
in America.  
Another discursive reality for Asian Americans is the invisibility of Asian 
American men in mainstream narratives. When thinking about masculine types, 
Interviewees could not see Asian American men as football players, sports celebrities, 
news anchors, firefighters, or leading men in films. Interviewees felt they faced a massive 
invisibility in a culture that denies Asian Americans access to traditional notions of 
American masculinity. Juggling the burdens of both complete invisibility and of 
omnipresent, visible stereotypes, Asian American men find themselves uniquely situated 
in discourses of race and gender. 
Exploring Asian/American 
Brad: “There’s Something Going On.” 
Brad, whose thoughts opened this chapter, met me on a snowy evening on his way 
to work. A senior in college, his plan was to take some time off before pursuing a 
professional degree in health care. Brad was excited to talk to me because, it turned out, 
                                                 
78 Karen Shimakawa, National Abjection: The Asian American Body Onstage (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2002); see also David Palumbo-Liu, Asian/American: Historical Crossings of a Racial 
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he had a lot of pent up emotions. His enthusiasm to discuss casting practices and Asian 
American issues kept us talking for hours, and eventually Brad admitted the source of his 
interest:  
I can‘t help shake off this feeling that a lot of the troubles that Asian 
American men have in relationships – they can‘t get relationships – is 
because they‘re Asian, because of media portrayals, or whatever. I can‘t 
help but feel that that has something to do with it. Maybe it‘s white guys 
being portrayed as attractive, or Asian American men being portrayed as 
unattractive, or not portrayed at all, but something! I don‘t know quite 
what it is, but…it seems like something‘s going on. It‘s difficult because it 
affects your confidence…. It gets a little bit frustrating because I can‘t tell 
what‘s my fault and what is out of my control. I can‘t tell what I‘m doing 
wrong, and at what point it‘s not my fault. And really, it‘s media not 
portraying me in a good light and people not looking at me in a good light, 
stuff like that. It kind of seems minor but, at least to me, it‘s a big deal. 
Because this really affects my life, and I think it affects the lives of a lot of 
Asian American men.  
Brad‘s complaint points to multiple themes that will be addressed throughout this 
dissertation: the stereotypes of emasculated Asian American men, the expectations of 
masculinity, how narratives in the media are intertwined with lived experiences, and the 
active negotiation of multiple sources of narratives. Brad also registers an important 
element that will be discussed throughout this chapter – that he is aware of himself as 
defined by, and in, the eyes of the media as well as the eyes of others. His obvious 
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frustration is seen here, in trying to understand the reasons, limits, and terms of his felt 
subordination.  
Ultimately, interviews with self-identified Asian American men suggest that these 
men have grown up in an era of absence: they have developed self-concepts without any 
identifiable narrative presenting what it means to be Asian American, in day-to-day 
experience as well as in the media. Rather, distinctly visible narratives of what it means 
to be white, and what it means to be Asian, inform their lives. As Asian Americans, 
interviewees have contended with negotiations of visibility and invisibility. They are 
consistently made visible as racial minorities due to their physical appearance, but 
rendered invisible due to the pervasive definitions that homogenize the concept of 
―Asian,‖ as well as their difference from others as not-Asian, not-white. 
In discussing Asian American masculinity as well as the broader question of 
―what is ‗Asian American,‘‖ interviewees used many different standards. Yet, what 
persisted through these myriad definitions was the perceived invisibility of, specifically, 
Asian American men. Invisibility also carried into their childhood experiences in 
American institutions: namely, how schools overlook Asian American experiences by 
either marking students as ―model minorities‖ or socially inassimilable. Asian Americans 
are most visible in the educational context as model minorities, but the assumptions of 
class accompanying this stereotype further justify the invisibility of Asian Americans in 
discourses of racial discrimination.
79
 Interviewees revealed how they negotiate the 
boundaries of visibility based on cultural, racial, or ethnic differences, and when 
invisibility is welcomed. This simultaneous visibility and invisibility has resulted in 
                                                 
79 See Kim, Imperial Citizens; Stacey J. Lee, Unraveling the “Model Minority” Stereotype: Listening to 
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coping strategies that intersect with narratives of masculinity. This chapter explores some 
of the ways in which Asian American men‘s performances of self embrace dominant 
narratives of masculinity and whiteness in order to be visible.  
Locating Asian American Men 
A clear theme that emerged from interviews was that Asian men are missing from 
the media and subsequently other areas of national discourse: as Gerbner and Gross 
(1976) would put it, ―symbolically annihilated.‖
80
 Just as the early films of the 19
th
 
century used white actors in yellowface to play Asians as generalized ―Oriental‖ 
foreigners, the move to disallow Asian men portrayals is still prevalent. Shimakawa‘s 
critique of the theater circuit‘s scandalized casting of Jonathan Pryce as the Eurasian 
Engineer in Miss Saigon in 1990, for example, reveals the continued subordination Asian 
men on stage and screen. Given the very similar controversy of Asian ―whitewashing‖—
a practice that casts whites to play previously Asian characters—surrounding 2008‘s 21 
and Speedracer,
81
 it is evident that ambivalence toward Asian men continues to this day. 
This absence of representation suggests to Asian men that they are less desirable, and less 
worthy of representation, than other men and even Asian women. Chinese American 
Avery shared, ―I feel like we‘re more used to [Asian] women than we are to Asian 
males.‖  
Interviewees could name Asian American actresses—Lucy Liu and Sandra Oh 
were popular—more readily than they could name Asian American actors, which for 
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them reinforced the notion that America is ―more used‖ to Asian American women. 
When asked why this might be, interviewees began to think about contemporary 
standards for media portrayals; namely, beauty and sexuality. Korean American Dan 
concluded that getting cast in the media is more difficult for Asian American men: ―[It‘s] 
worse for men. For women, [you see] the more attractive ones. But for men…they‘ll just 
take whoever.‖ Korean American Josh added, ―Television is so superficial, and that‘s 
why it‘s fairer [for women]… beauty is universal whether they‘re Asian or not. Whereas, 
it‘s different for guys.‖ Josh later explained that a universal standard of feminine beauty 
allows women of all races to be found attractive, while the standard of masculine 
attractiveness has long been denied to Asian American men.  
Building on Josh‘s assessment of media and social standards. Korean American 
Young Min began a complex project of bringing together negotiations of masculinity, 
narratives of manhood and desirability, and racial hierarchies: 
In our society, men are portrayed as more dominant than women. [Except 
for Obama,] all the presidents have been white…. White men are mostly 
the ones who make money, mostly successful…. Just the fact that Asian 
American men don‘t have the same type of power and authority than 
American men; American women, I guess, wouldn‘t want that in a society. 
They wouldn‘t want a husband who doesn‘t have any power in the society. 
Trying to parcel out how he feels as a man that a white woman would not want to date, 
Young Min points to existing social structures and hierarchies that shape stereotypes of 
Asian American men as less able to access the trappings of masculinity. In a follow-up, 
Brad agreed with Young Min‘s assessment. Citing that it is common for audiences to see 
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many different women portrayed as sexually attractive, he moved on to discuss how 
sexual viability and masculinity has fewer entry points: 
For males, it‘s usually a white male lead character, like your Brad Pitt, 
George Clooney, Matt Damon kind of people… That might have 
something to do with it, that the standard for male attractiveness is those 
kinds of people. And then maybe some cultural stereotypes that might help 
certain other races. Like, some people might say that African American 
men are more muscular or athletic, or Latino men are very romantic, or 
things like that.  
When asked if there might be a similar ―positive‖ type for Asian men, Brad could only 
say that Asian men are presented as ―nothing really exciting.‖  
 Many other interviewees agreed with Brad‘s opinion, suggesting that hegemonic 
formulations of masculinity have provided some entry points for other races, but not 
Asians. While interviewees acknowledged that the image of the athletic African 
American is linked to a different representational history of negative stereotyping (the 
―brutal buck‖), they also felt that notions of dominant masculinity allow some of these 
stereotypes to become desirable figures in certain contexts. Chinese American Jimmy, on 
the other hand, shared that the stereotypes of Asian Americans have never allowed Asian 
American men entry into the arena of desirable masculinity:  
If anything, I think society still for the most part portrays Asian American 
men as submissive, effeminate, and nerdy, which implicates notions of the 
model minority myth, and ultimately socialize Asian American men to be 
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toward the bottom of the list of socially desirables in a predominantly 
heteronomative context. 
The narrative that Asian American men are presented as ―nothing really exciting‖ and at 
the ―bottom of the list‖ has been long projected via media representations of asexual 
Asian manhood, evident even in the hyper-masculine displays of Bruce Lee and Jackie 
Chan. This ―racial castration‖
82
 has fed into what interviewees feel is the long-standing 
belief that Asian American men are not desirable.  
For interviewees, the undesirability of Asian manhood is strongly felt, and is 
juxtaposed by a competing narrative about Asian American women. As Japanese 
American Randy explained, ―Asian American women are gonna catch a white guy‘s 
eye.‖ Several interviewees discussed interracial dating as more common for Asian 
American women,
83
 and at one point, Chinese American Gary lamented: 
Take The Bachelor or The Bachelorette. You don‘t see Asian men or 
women as the ones choosing. You know? I mean, I wouldn‘t need to 
watch all of them to say that the participants generally haven‘t been Asian. 
Have you seen them? Have you seen people being chosen and Asian?  
Put succinctly, Korean American David claimed, ―More white people have sex on TV 
than Asians.‖ When discussing the gender differences of being Asian American, 
interviewees‘ overarching narrative was that Asian American women are more desirable 
than Asian American men. What is interesting to note here is that men were both critical 
and envious of the ways in which Asian American women are exoticized and objectified. 
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Chinese American Oliver‘s explanation: ―People will talk about yellow fever [and] Asian 
women. But I don‘t hear that about Asian men. There‘s sort of a fetishizing of Asian 
women….I feel like sometimes people have prejudged me.. people might not think that I 
am a prospect.‖ In this light, Asian American women are perceived to be made visible in 
culture due to their exotified subject positions, as well as able to garner sexual and 
economic power through their albeit problematic visibility. 
 In this complex cultural context, interviewees feel so invisible that even 
exotification is somehow desirable. Interviewees show an awareness of patriarchal and 
gendered power dynamics that render Asian American masculinity economically, 
sexually, and socially unviable and invisible. Their comments identifying a hegemonic 
masculinity privileging white men, and this has made being ―at the bottom of the list of 
socially desirables‖ a common-sense factor in Asian American male identity. 
Defining Asian American: What Asian American is Not 
The sense of invisibility indicated by men‘s comments can be traced also to the 
more basic question of ―What is Asian American?‖ Many found the category difficult to 
―officially‖ define, but easy to conceptualize. One method for some was to emphasize a 
shared geographical origin – any national originating from the Asian continent, once in 
America, is considered Asian American. From this perspective the shared experience of 
migration creates an expanded coalition of ethnic groups, from South and East Asians to 
those from the Middle East. Yet, this was a minority view; when presented to others as a 
suggested definition, it was regarded as an ideal at the level of theoretical abstraction. 
The most common strategy was to define Asian Americans by shared physical 
characteristics. David, who struggled with a definition at first, eventually admitted, 
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―Honestly, someone who has black hair, yellow skin, and kind of black eyes…. I look at 
people…Asian, not Asian, it‘s clear.‖ Similarly, Korean American Jae-Sun explained, ―I 
think it‘s Japanese, Korean, Chinese…. If you think about Asian American, that‘s the 
Oriental Asian. Like a white person, I don‘t think they‘d think of Vietnamese or Thai.‖ 
All 27 interviewees said they had at some point been mistaken for an ethnicity other than 
their own. While men disliked how this ―Oriental‖ formulation erased ethnic difference, 
they also found it helpful in defining ―Asian American.‖ Indian American Ekram, whose 
definitions continued to change as he explained his experiences as an Asian in America, 
explained for me:  
For demographic purposes, I identify as Asian American. But, I also do 
think that it doesn‘t really make sense for South Asian Americans to be 
clumped together with, say, Chinese Americans…. Just because there‘s a 
continent called Asia and geographically it‘s a contiguous continent, it 
doesn‘t necessarily mean that I have something in common with a group 
of people who originate from China. [Also,] South Asian Americans don‘t 
look like Chinese Americans, or Japanese Americans…. For lack of a 
better word, ―Oriental‖ Americans are another big cluster.  
Even Ekram employs a dominant ―Oriental,‖ phenotypic definition of Asian American, 
for the practicalities of his lived experience. The position of Indian Americans in the 
larger framework of Asian America offers a site where the nuances of race and class are 
augmented:
84
 Ekram knows he is perceived in some situations as a ―model minority‖ 
Asian American, but also anticipated, and accepts, his standing as a person of color due 
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to the larger, black/white racial framework that shapes race relations in the United States. 
At the end of the interview, stressed that ―because of [my] dark skin,‖ he identifies more 
as a ―person of color.‖   
In contrast, Partha, an Indian American born and raised in Michigan, found the 
concept of being a person of color quite jarring. For him, his phenotypic, racial identity 
competes with his cultural and social identity. Socialized in ―a 99.9% white hometown,‖ 
Partha says, he ―didn‘t realize‖ he wasn‘t white until he was about thirteen years old: 
I felt like I was living a lie, and that I was different…. For the longest time 
I felt like I didn‘t really belong, after I realized that I was not white, you 
know? I felt like I didn‘t really belong in either culture. One, because I 
wasn‘t a typical white dude and then another because I wasn‘t a typical 
Indian dude either. So I was, like, lost in purgatory and I felt alone a lot of 
times.  
Partha‘s sudden realization of where he fit—or didn‘t—within a racial framework was 
shocking and troubling to him. Having a racial body in a racialized space helped him 
understand the boundary between who he thought he was, and how he was perceived. For 
example, he describes himself as ―whitewashed‖ but also recalls that during the 1990s, 
―people didn‘t even know what I was [racially].‖ Often labeled as Middle Eastern, 
Partha‘s confusion about his culture was compounded by the fact, as he puts it, ―the 
general public sees ‗Asian Americans‘ as.… I wouldn‘t say they see Indians.‖  
The exclusion—and invisibility, as suggested by Partha‘s use of the word ―see‖—
of South Asians from the Asian American category was reflected by many of the 
respondents, even those who were South Asian themselves. While scholars such as Nadia 
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Kim find that, for example, South Koreans are rendered invisible in racial discourse due 
to their ―in-between‖ positioning over blacks and below whites, we can see how this also 
applies to Asians within the Asian American spectrum. With the exception of one or two 
interviewees, the men I talked to shared that they were typically one of two or three 
Asian families in their predominantly white neighborhoods. In this sense, interviewees 
are aware that they are, indeed, a population viewed ―in between‖ – they are viewed as 
between black and white, as between Asia and America, and they are stuck in between 
the interpretations of both Asians and Americans due to their status as Asian Americans.  
Overall, racial distinctions seemed to be trumped by generational divides and, 
linked to this, class and assimilative status, in definitions of Asian American. Josh finds it 
helpful to focus on the American half of ―Asian American,‖ using cultural characteristics 
to define who should be included or excluded from the category: 
I think there are really two categories: People that are really 
Americanized, and then people that have a really strong connection back 
to [Asia]. And they‘re kind of two different species, almost. 
These definitions suggest that what is considered Asian American is, in these cases, more 
defined by the degree of American-ness, rather than Asian-ness. Ekram tells that 
younger, second generation Indian Americans he‘s talked to feel they identify as more 
―white.‖ This is also reflected in Sunaina Maira‘s work with desi youth, whose self-
identification is driven by acculturative status. As one of her second-generation 
interviewees declared, ―don‘t ever call me [Indian] because I‘m not Indian.‖
85
  
Using cultural and class distinctions allowed men to set themselves apart from 
unassimilated ―fresh-off-the-boat‖ Asians, or ―FOBs.‖ This distinction secures their place 
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as Americans first and foremost. This was especially highlighted due to the fact that my 
conversations were with upwardly mobile men whose families had the resources to settle 
in the U.S. or send them to be educated in the U.S. Possibly due to this, several men 
declared that they did not consider themselves wholly ―Asian.‖ Josh confessed, ―I think 
I‘m sort of different in that I fit in pretty well…. I don‘t give off the vibe of being really 
Asian, you know?‖ Often, when asked to define or provide specific examples of ―Asian 
American,‖ men like Chinese American Hugh used ―FOB‖ as a juxtaposition: 
I guess I sort of see it two ways. I‘d say primarily I think of Asian 
American as someone who‘s not—this will probably sound bad, but—not 
―FOBby.‖ I think it‘s based on how they‘re dressed, or how they talk, 
what they‘re interested in. But I think there‘s a clear distinction between 
those who seem to accept or embrace American culture and those who 
haven‘t.  
When pushed to define a ―FOB,‖ it became clear that the distinction is largely based on 
fashion, English language and social skills: in other words, cultural/class differences. 
Men told me that it was possible to ―just know‖ a ―FOB‖ on the street based on dress, 
composure, and even the peers who accompanied them.  
Often, the competing notions of feeling American and looking Asian complicated 
the social experiences of interviewees. While explaining his situational awareness and the 
influence of others in his interpretation of self, Vietnamese American Jonathan expressed 
an opinion that countered the traditional belief that diversity in college is welcome: 
Because there are so many Asians here, I kind of feel like I‘m judged 
before people even know me. I feel like when people look at me, they just 
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think, I kind of don‘t speak English well. I don‘t know if they actually—
like, I kind of feel whitewashed because of [the small Michigan town] I 
came from.  
Jonathan was aware of a racial and cultural stereotype against what he called ―true 
Asians,‖ or those not assimilated to the extent he is. While he is thankful for the diverse 
community at college, Jonathan is a member of a student body comprised of many Asian 
immigrants. In college, he finds himself being compared to ―true Asians‖ due to his racial 
markers, something he did not experience growing up in a predominantly white 
community. Many others I talked with shared similar social experiences and interactions. 
The degree to which one is Asian or American is in some ways a mindset, 
dependent on the situation and the ―audience‖ for their performed identity. From this 
social interactionist perspective, performing ―Asian American‖ is dependent not only on 
mainstream/white interpretations, but also by other Asian or Asian Americans‘ 
expectations. Chinese American Aaron shared a moment of discrimination not from a 
white student, but a mainland Chinese student at college: 
She asked me, ―Do you speak Chinese?‖ And I said, basically, ―A little 
bit. I was born here.‖ And her reply, she basically said OK, but walking 
off, I could hear her mutter under her breath, ―ABC.‖ Looking back on it 
now, it doesn‘t seem all that big, but at the time stuck with me a lot more 
than I thought it would. Just because, the idea that being Chinese has some 
sort of spectrum kind of blew my mind. But, at the same time, it was 
basically true. I was–I am–an A-B-C. 
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For Aaron, being an American-Born Chinese (ABC) places him as not-quite American 
and not-quite Asian. This experience is common for many of the interviewees: Aaron is 
aware of himself as an English-speaking Asian with the capacity to be both culturally 
American and Asian, but knows that there is a classed distinction between him and a 
class of Asians that may not have as much cultural capital as he does. These men 
highlight the ways in which multiple ―audiences‖ read their racial identities. Just as 
Jonathan believes he is perceived as Asian by whites on campus, Aaron shares an 
experience of having his identity assumed by a ―true Asian.‖  
The task of defining Asian American thus became much easier for men when they 
were asked to explain how others defined Asian Americans. The easily identifiable 
consensus was that, in the U.S. (white) imaginary, Asian American was generally defined 
by ―Oriental‖ phenotype and model minority stereotype, both formulations that erase 
ethnic difference. The experience of ethnic interchangeability, while highlighting a 
shared community, also raised an awareness—for some, a heightened sense—of 
difference. In this case, discussions of what constituted ―Asian American‖ became more 
abstract than the focus on phenotype or geographical origin. For some, recollections 
became much more emotional; for all, the conversation turned to their experience of 
―Asian American‖ as an experience that has been, continues to be, and will continue to 
be, shaped by interpretations by and interactions with whites. For Jae-Sun, his experience 
of being Asian American makes him a member of a specifically marked group, compared 
to other racial minorities: ―It‘s just weird. If there‘s an African American guy, you don‘t 
go up and ask, ‗Are you Ethiopian?‘‖  
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Jae-Sun feels that interchangeability is in some ways a unique experience of being 
Asian American, and it was clear that this feeling is accompanied by a sense of bitterness 
toward the ignorance he has encountered. Young Min built on this: ―Whites don‘t know a 
lot about Koreans. To them Asia is just one big country; we‘re all the same, we all look 
alike. They just come up and say, ‗Are you Chinese? Japanese?‘ Then walk away.‖ 
Randy took an even harsher stance: ―We‘re just Asian people walking around, just some 
minority they don‘t give a fuck about.‖ Later, he elaborated: 
White people—people in general—don‘t delineate between Japanese and 
all those different things…. It‘s how everyone views you. You‘re just an 
Asian guy. They don‘t think, ‗Is that a Chinese guy? Is that a Korean guy? 
What‘s the difference?‘ 
The feeling that his racial difference makes him visible to ―everyone,‖ but still invisible 
as part of an amorphous minority category, compounds Randy‘s frustration over being 
―just an Asian guy.‖ He is at once distinguished for his difference, but also 
indistinguishable from others who share his difference. 
Randy and others, when pressed about their feelings toward interchangeability, 
had no expectations of change in how they were understood or defined.
86
 In terms of 
movement in and out of different situations and racial frameworks, many believed that 
they have been, and always will be, first and foremost Asian due to their racial features. 
Avery said: 
The biggest part of [a] racial category is your background and your 
heritage. So, that‘s something you can‘t change. I guess you can change 




your cultural identity – sort of the cultural acclimation thing – but that 
takes a long time. 
By “heritage,” you mean – 
--Skin color. 
Filipino American Dean added: 
Race is always going to matter because there‘s so many different things 
that divide us. It‘s so easy to use physical appearances…to delineate us 
from each other. Whether it‘s a disability, whether it‘s our skin color, 
whether it‘s how we talk. There‘s all these different things….. You know, 
maybe in the future where we intermarry and maybe have babies with 
each other….maybe there will only be one single race. Maybe 100,000 
years from now. But I don‘t see it happening any time soon.  
A large factor implicated in their racial identity is the fact that it is shaped in part by the 
larger racial framework in which they operate, and how others define them. Oliver 
explained: 
I feel like such a large part of it [being Asian American] is how others 
define me, that it‘s really not easy for me to move around freely. And also, 
it‘s become part of my personal identity. I‘ve internalized…the idea that 
I‘m not white, that I‘m Asian. That I‘m not Black or Latino. It‘s just like: I 
am Asian and whatever comes with that; you know, how others see me, 
and the issues that I will face in life. 
What are some of the issues that come along with that? 
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A lot if it is how others might perceive me. Like, if they‘ll think that I 
speak English or something. And workplace discrimination, stereotypes 
and everything like that.  
For Hugh, a college senior searching for a job, class is inextricably linked to 
understandings of Asian American identity, particularly due to the model minority 
stereotype. This stereotype has penetrated his field of work so completely that he finds he 
faces even more pressure to conform to, and exceed, a level of excellence attributed to 
Asian Americans:  
I think for those Asians who obviously are in the upper category—
Chinese, East Asians, specifically—that just puts more pressure on them 
and puts a ceiling on them in terms of what they can accomplish. And then 
if you look at the poorer Asian groups of people, they still get those 
stereotypes put on them, but obviously they‘re not as close to an 
advantage as possible….I think being an Asian a lot of times does 
definitely detriment you and whatever you‘re trying to look for… It 
doesn‘t help you, being Asian. A lot of times it can hurt you.  
As a part of this ―upper category‖ of educated Asians, Hugh finds that the model minority 
stereotype is so diffuse that it puts undue pressure on him, to the point where he feels like 
being Asian ―doesn‘t help.‖ This echoes the assertion that racial subordinates may be so 
constrained by racial categories and stereotypes that they are ―forced to define themselves 
in relation to racial schemas and meanings.‖
87
 Hugh also acknowledges that his definition 
of ―Asian American‖ is classed, separating himself from the ―poorer Asian groups.‖ As 
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these interviews suggest, the complexity of Asian American identity involve the paradox 
of being an assimilable model minority and an unassimilable racial minority.
88
  
Oliver acknowledges that that a large part of how he moves throughout the world 
is how others define him, but also believes that an Asian American is ―anyone who would 
self-identify.‖ This disparity in definitions—feeling agency in some situations and 
constraint in others—suggests that definitions and performances of Asian American shift 
depending on racial contexts. A college senior who leads a pan-Asian student 
organization, Oliver has ―resigned‖ himself to the fact that he is Asian and understands 
how Asian bodies are at times influenced by larger structural forces out of his control.  
David: “I Guess it’s Kind of an Underdog Story.” 
When I met David, he was a senior in college and had arrived at the coffee shop 
early so he could do some studying before our interview. David is a gregarious but 
studious man who, slipping multiple jokes into our conversation, got very serious and 
visibly proud as he talked about his acceptance into a doctoral program. David had a 
reason to be proud of his educational accomplishments, as he recalls many years of 
struggle in school. Telling me stories of suspensions and failing grades, he is proud that 
he has succeeded as ―an underdog.‖ David‘s experience in his schools was that being a 
racial minority meant getting picked on to the point of physical fights. One episode was 
so violent, it ended in a multi-week suspension. At the same time, David‘s immigrant 
status rendered him invisible when it came to his school‘s attention and institutional 
support.  
Asked to describe his childhood, David defined his hometown as ―mostly 
Caucasian. Everyone has a profession.‖ This predominantly upper-middle class white 
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setting was the source of much discomfort, particularly when David started school: a 
native Korean speaker, he struggled with English, was teased by other students, and 
brushed off by teachers. He recalled:  
I was labeled a lot as a slow learner, and I was placed into a lot of these 
classes where they categorized me as [slow] and whatnot. And I remember 







 grade. And I think it had some sort of 
trauma on me too, you know, like lower self-esteem. So elementary school 
was a time when I felt really out of place. And Junior High School was 
exactly the same, except maybe possibly even worse…. I remember I used 
to be teased a lot, and I got into a lot of fights. 
David‘s academics continued to falter as fights in school got worse; multiple times, he 
recalls, the school threatened to hold him back a grade. Eventually, David was placed in a 
high school for low achievers. He thinks he was ―the first Korean student‖ that school 
had seen. 
In his new school, the student demographic shifted from mostly white students to 
mostly black students, and David found himself amidst ―Latin Kings, Bloods, Crips, real 
gang members.‖ Here, he had a genuine fear for his personal safety and, on his father‘s 
advice, ignored taunts and avoided fighting by turning to his schoolwork. This 
introversion was difficult for David, who labels his high school years as a period of 
depression. Unable to fight back when teased, David said, ―I felt very insecure with my 
identity… I just felt vulnerable.‖ Because of racial, class, language, and social 
differences, David felt out of place and unhappy, until he got to college. David described 
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his college experience: ―College has been one of the best times… I think I really met 
genuine friends for the first time…I have a pretty Asian crowd [and] I feel like I‘ve been 
more accepted for who I am.‖ 
David‘s history reveals a level of institutional bias that often affects minority 
students. Linguistic difficulties made him a ―slow‖ learner because his school lacked an 
adequate program for English as a Second Language (ESL) students. This ―remedial‖ 
designation made socialization difficult for David in school. Notably, his story lends 
support to research on the psychological effects of stereotypes—even the supposed, 
positive model minority stereotype
89
—on Asian American and other minority students. 
For David, knowledge of the model minority stereotype made his academic struggles 
seem like even larger failures, and depressed him even more. David linked the feeling of 
always being watched, and the pressure of needing to perform well, to a media 
representation he remembered from childhood: 
We‘re treated in some sense like a Pokémon. (Laughs) The concept is that 
we‘re put in this arena, and we‘re expected to, like these little Japanese 
animated creatures, expected to duke it out using these mystical abilities. 
This ―Pokémon‖ experience was most noticeable to David in elementary and middle 
school, where he felt he was expected to perform as a ―model minority.‖ In a low-
achieving high school with a different racial breakdown, this was much less the case.  
While David laughed at his Pokémon comparison, but other interviewees see truth 
in what he says. Young Min told me that ―as soon as he walks into a classroom,‖ 
                                                 
89 For a discussion of how the model minority stereotype is linked to issues of class and ethnicity, see Grace 
Kao, ―Asian Americans as Model Minorities? A Look at Their Academic Performance,‖ Journal of 
Education 103.2 (1995): 121-159. See also Siyon Rhee, Janet Chang and Jessica Rhee, ―Acculturation, 
Communication Patterns and Self-Esteem among Asian and Caucasian American Adolescents,‖ 
Adolescence 38 (2003): 749-768; and Lee, Unraveling the “Model Minority” Stereotype. 
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someone will ask him for help on a math problem. The irony, he pointed out, is that he‘s 
not even good at math. In this light, Asian Americans‘ engagement in making their own 
racial jokes about model minorities and Asians reflects what is referred to as gallows 
humor. Adopting the rhetoric invoking these stereotypes can bolster resistance among 
those who are subordinated by that very same rhetoric.
90
 Across the board, interviewees 
told me how they were constantly aware of the model minority stereotype in school 
settings. This was usually accompanied by ambivalent shrugs and declarations of, ―you 
just have to put up with it.‖ The sense of emotional exhaustion and impatience 
accompanying these stories, however, also reflects how men feel this power dynamic that 
has yet to change. Humor thus becomes one of the ways men can cope with their visible 
difference. 
Another coping behavior, David acknowledged, was his turn to physical violence 
to make up for his marginal status. Indeed, other men who confronted racism in schools 
had stories of suspensions and academic probations as a result of fistfights and, in one 
case, a gang fight. These stories suggest that minority men may subscribe to dominant 
notions of strength and physicality in order to gain power as subordinated individuals. It 
is here that the intersection of masculinity and race/ethnicity begins to become 
particularly salient. Andrew, a Korean American who grew up in a diverse neighborhood, 
told me that he now feels a different dynamic at play in his mostly white university 
classes:  
I think for a lot of people in this school especially, they‘re not used to 
being with anyone other than white people, you know? So, I think that 
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might play a role in how they see me and then how I think how they see 
me…. Even now I think the only solution is to man up. 
When asked to explain what ―man up‖ meant, Andrew explained that Asian students are 
often overlooked in his college classes—they are expected to be nerdy, quiet students 
who keep to themselves. Many, unprompted, told me that they felt they needed to work 
hard at breaking the stereotypes of being socially awkward, diminutive, or excessively 
proficient in science or math classes. Andrew often makes himself visible by speaking 
English loudly and clearly, carrying himself with more confidence, and making a marked 
effort to work with other students in class. Andrew has noticed the reaction when he 
becomes visible in this way: often, he says, the reaction is, ―Oh! There‘s an Asian guy!‖  
 That this marking of physical space and performance of confidence is linked to 
the idea of ―manning up‖ brings us to how concepts of masculinity are implicated in 
being Asian American. When asked to define ―masculinity,‖ several men offered 
descriptions that supported definitions of hegemonic masculinity and its notions of 
strength in physical, social and economic dominance.
91
 Aaron pointed to the white figure 
of the Marlboro Man, an ―independent guy, he‘s rugged, he can cook, he can hunt, he can 
survive by himself in the wild… he‘s a self-assured person who knows what they want 
and knows how to get it.‖ Building on this ideal, Randy added, 
It‘s telling someone that you‘re the best, that you can do something the 
best, and then doing it. [In the past,] I feel like I told myself to man up 
every day…. Just not cry. Not be a baby. Not whine. … I say what I want 
to say, as long as I get the point across, I don‘t care about the tone, I don‘t 
care about how I seem to be, my attitude, I don‘t give a shit. 
                                                 




He better be able to protect himself, or protect his loved ones. I don‘t like 
pansy guys, you know? I never let any of my friends be pansy guys.  
The descriptions of masculinity that emerged from these interviews help to explain some 
of the behaviors during interviewees‘ adolescence as they moved through predominantly 
white schools. The fights mentioned earlier were usually verbal and physical responses to 
racial jokes or comments, mostly about physical attributes such as eye shape, or ethnic 
slurs like ―Chink‖ and ―Jap.‖ David, for example, began to affiliate himself with Asian 
gang members who were physically larger than he at the time, in order to ―build his 
clout‖ as someone not to be teased. Jae-Sun recalled beating up a boy at school after 
being called a Chink. While he was proud of himself for standing up for his beliefs and 
for winning the fight, he remembers that the story around the school the next day was that 
he had actually lost the fight. That it was improbable for Jae-Sun to have been physically 
dominant made him realize that, in the dominant narrative of race and masculinity, 
―Asian Americans are actually inferior.‖ In another example, Jonathan recalled 
confronting a girl in front of his entire school music ensemble when she declared, ―all 
Asians looked the same.‖ 
 In this sense, we can see how dominant ideals of masculinity have been embodied 
by a group of Asian American men who find themselves subordinated by racial and 
gender dynamics within their social settings. Similarly, these dominant ideals are 
embraced in situations when first impressions, or interpretations, abound – such as on the 
dating scene. Hugh shared: 
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I get really bothered by those guys who just look like the stereotype, the 
guys who wear glasses, their hair is everywhere. I try to keep myself well-
groomed when I go out, I do my hair. So it annoys me when I see guys 
who look like that [stereotype].  
Hugh‘s disdain for Asians who ―look like the stereotype‖ again suggests an intimate 
knowledge of dominant narratives regarding Asian Americans and masculinity. He 
moves to actively dis-identify himself from being seen as an unstylish, perhaps socially 
clueless ―FOB‖ as well as a nerdy model minority. While he knows that Asian American 
men are not seen as powerful—or even seen at all, for that matter—as white or black men 
as sexually attractive, maintaining his appearance helps his ―performance‖ of Asian 




For many of these men, athletics seemed to be a way in which dominant 
masculine ideals could be embraced, but also subverted. For Korean American Alex, his 
athletic abilities as a weight lifter allow him to assert dominance over other, less 
physically built Asians but also subvert the expectations of the other, mostly white weight 
lifters he meets. Tom, also Korean American, said that ―most people expect me to play 
tennis,‖ and openly delighted in sharing that instead, he was on the rugby and wrestling 
teams in high school. Despite these successes, these men find that their participation in 
sports creates cognitive dissonance in other players. Aware of the stereotype that Asians 
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cannot play sports, Asian athletes find themselves marked merely because of their racial 
identity. Yet, some take pleasure in defying expectations with their athletic skills.  
While these athletes take pleasure in subverting expectations as visible Asians on 
the court or field, there is also a desire to have their difference be invisible – to reach a 
point where Asian American participation does not subvert expectations at all. Hugh, 
who played basketball in high school, recalled how he ―would just be stereotyped and 
called Yao Ming, or something stupid like that.‖ In retrospect, Hugh believed this had a 
negative effect on him. ―It was sort of demeaning to me,‖ he said, ―because I felt people 
weren‘t judging me based on how I was playing. Because even if I played well, it was 
always like, ‗you‘re playing like [Yao Ming].‖ In these situations, Hugh finds that the 
visibility of an Asian NBA player like Yao Ming is actually detrimental to his identity as 




For Jae-Sun, consistently told by his white teammates that Asians could not 
perform well in sports, a potential breakthrough was the success of Asian American men 
in recent sporting events—South Koreans in the World Cup, and an Asian American 
winner of 2006‘s Survivor: Cook Islands. When he pointed this out to his white 
teammates, however, they labeled the examples as exceptions and did not change their 
attitudes. These stories suggest the power of stereotypes in limiting how Asian American 
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 Another theme that emerges from David‘s story, reflected in other interviews, is 
his turn to surrounding himself with mostly Asian friends in college. This is, for David, a 
result of not having an Asian support group growing up. Men are aware of how they are 
consumed by another audience that has the power to define them, whether it is 
schoolmates, other Asians, or even institutions. They find themselves moving in and out 
of invisibility. This reflects the racial position of Asian America ―in between‖ black and 
white, discussed at length in Asian American literature.
95
 To be visible as an Asian, 
American, or Asian American is a complex struggle.  
Randy: “I’m Just Asian American.” 
Randy, a member of an Asian American fraternity, was one of the most outspoken 
and passionate—―bitter,‖ he called it—men that I met. An example of this came out early 
in the interview when he shared that he was in the Midwest only because his first choice 
college rejected him. Born in a large cosmopolitan city and raised by Japanese 
professionals, Randy was sent to a high-profile magnet school where he made friends 
with many Asian American teenagers involved in helping organize youth conferences on 
Asian American issues.  
Randy remembered attending Japanese camp during many of his childhood 
summers. He described the camp for me: 
Straight everything‘s in Japanese. It was a little intense for me, but I had a 
lot of fun there. That was actually where I started to develop my own 
voice, because the other times of the year I was in this private school, and 
I was really unhappy and I hated everyone – I just wasn‘t very content. I 
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couldn‘t socialize with all the white people…. I just didn‘t make any 
meaningful friends. And at Japanese camp was really where I noticed that, 
you know, I‘m different from all these other Japanese kids that are very 
reserved. Because most of them are recently immigrated, and they‘re 
struggling with everything at school, and if anything this Japanese camp 
was their salvation, their summer vacation where they can finally be at 
home somewhere. 
While Randy saw that summer camps were a haven for Japanese immigrants, he realized 
that he did not have the same experience of ―salvation‖ that these campers felt. As a 
Japanese student who had not recently immigrated, Randy did not feel that he was not a 
part of the ―Asian‖ community at summer camp. What summer camp eventually made 
stand out the most to Randy was that he did not feel ―at home‖ amongst other Japanese 
children. Because of this, Randy told me, he identifies as more Asian American than 
Japanese American.  
Many others who went to ethnic camps and schools experienced this sense of not 
fitting in with other ethnic students. ―It didn‘t help me at all,‖ Chinese American Nick 
told me of his Saturday Chinese school. This was mostly because none of his other, white 
friends in school could understand why he had to go to an extra school on the weekends. 
Avery‘s Chinese school only highlighted how invisible he was as a Chinese American in 
his predominantly white neighborhood. In order to better serve the very small, sparsely 
located Chinese community, his weekend school received children from many towns. ―I 
never built a strong connection [with any other students],‖ he told me, ―because they 
weren‘t from my hometown.‖ Unable to form any lasting relationships, Avery‘s 
 
 77 
immersion into Chinese classes each Saturday only made him feel even more out of place 
as he returned to ―normal‖ school during the week. 
Randy described his sense of self as being ―in-between‖ being Japanese and being 
Americanized. By the end of our interview, he told me that he identifies more as an Asian 
American rather than a Japanese American, particularly because his experiences of being 
an outsider at Japanese camp made him feel like he could not identify with Japanese 
culture. However, as Randy defines ―American‖ in this context as being racially white, he 
self-identifies as Asian American in order to allow for his racial difference. Since ―white 
people don‘t delineate between [ethnicities],‖ Randy knows that he is viewed, and 
therefore identifies more as, ―Asian American.‖  
While racial difference may determine which societal norms and codes must be 
navigated, interviewees also found that classed distinctions—such as upward mobility, 
educational aspirations, and English acquisition linked to the model minority 
stereotype—define Asian Americans for Americans and Asians alike. Partha explained: 
It‘s someone who lives two lives. One life is out in society, in the 
American society, and the other life is at home. You know, with parents 
that are from a different country, with different values. And I think these 
people, they function very well in American society, because they‘re 
usually very educationally-motivated and they focus on school, and 
they‘re not criminals or anything like that. You know? And to be 
educationally successful also requires social interactions, leadership, those 
types of things. Things that are more valued. You know, like the model 
minority kind of thing. 
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For Partha, the model minority stereotype shapes the category of Asian American in a 
particular way that combines race, culture, and class. Gary defined something similar: 
Asian American is anyone whom…their parents emigrated from an Asian 
country, who has some kind of an Asian culture back home, mixed with 
the American culture outside. And even sometimes blended in with the 
family, like celebrating American holidays. 
Both of these constructions exemplify a recurring theme from interviews, as this rhetoric 
of ―two lives‖ persisted. None of the interviewees could name a site in which the 
negotiations between home and public life were depicted, suggesting that they were left 
to their own devices to find help with being ―in between.‖ 
The idea that men negotiate two worlds, an inner and outer, private (family) and 
public (friends), is brought out in experiences like Randy‘s. His bitterness is rooted in the 
fact that he still can‘t ―socialize with all the white people,‖ but also feels out of place and 
―less Asian,‖ like he did in his Japanese camp. Many other men felt the same difficulties 
with socializing among whites. Nick, for example, told me that he pledged with a white 
fraternity on campus but then moved to an Asian American fraternity. For him, ―the 
Asian American frat had a lot more meaning… [in the white frat], the brotherhood is not 
as close as the Asian American one. [There,] everyone knows each other.‖ I asked if he 
still remained friends with brothers from the fraternity he left, and he said that while he 
could, he didn‘t want to, because he felt more comfortable with Asians. Later, he 
described that there was a ―barrier‖ between him and whites: 
It‘s my self-conscious. Hanging out with Asian people is, for me, more at 
ease. I guess [in high school,] that‘s when I developed my sense of 
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identity for hanging out with Asian people over white people. And I still 
behave that way. Like, I don‘t hang out with my white friends anymore. 
Indian American Fred built on this when he explained how he first began to socialize in 
college: 
You can connect with [other Asian Americans] easier because have the 
same beliefs, generally. You‘re brought up pretty much the same way. But 
then, you start to meet more people. And then you see, like, OK, non-
Indian people are into pretty much the same thing as me. You know what 
I‘m saying? So, at first, it‘s like a comfort zone, I guess, you could say, is 
within your racial group.  
These comments mirror David‘s move to find Asian American friends once he came to 
college. For interviewees, an Asian American social circle is a support group of others 
who share similar experiences, can help negotiate the experiences of being Asian and 
American, and most importantly, where the ―barrier‖ of being racially different is erased 
due to racial homogeneity.  
Despite the degree to which these men feel they are a part of and contributors to 
American, ―whitewashed‖ culture, this feeling is continually threatened by moments in 
which their racial difference is made overt. For some, the biological experience of being 
Asian is something that prevents full entry into American culture. For bi-ethnic Asian 
American Ben, his race keeps him rooted in Asian culture. He recalls being embraced by 
a local Asian community group: ―You are interpreted by others based on how you look. 
Even in ethnic communities it‘s like a one-drop rule – if you have a bit in you, you‘re one 
of them.‖ While this is positive for Ben, who actively sought out an Asian community in 
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the college town, the ―one-drop rule‖ has, for others, made racial identity a constant 
reminder of difference. 
Situational Asian America 
Randy senses that whites see him as an ―invisible‖ man interchangeable with 
other Asians, and Oliver contends that his sense of self is dependent on how others—
particularly whites, have defined, currently define, and will define him. These stories and 
comments offer many different contexts in which dual consciousness seems prevalent, 
and point to an acute awareness of the self, of the other, and the interaction between self 
and other.  
Just who is the ―other‖ in these conversations? In most of the interviews, the 
standard against which Asian American performances are based, defined and judged is 
whiteness and the related presumptions of race and masculinity. As illustrated above, the 
answers interviewees provided about what constitutes ―Asian American‖ involved their 
own insights, but also how their personal definitions are shaped by white standards—or, 
more interestingly, their perceptions of white standards. Recollections of childhood 
histories reveal that the standards of whiteness were pervasive in the social circles, 
neighborhoods, and institutions in which these men were raised. As shown in Randy‘s 
story, interactions in ethnic schools and summer camps, as well as with other immigrants, 
has created ―Asian‖ as another standard of comparison. In these situations, Asian 
Americans adopt white standards of defining ―foreign‖ in their attempt to distinguish 
between ―Asian‖ and ―Asian American.‖  
The shifting definitions of ―Asian American‖ suggests that what it means to be 
Asian American involves complex, situational negotiations depending on social context. 
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Narratives of what is ―Asian,‖ rather than what is ―Asian American,‖ inform interviewees 
from one situation to another. With a lack of an identifiable narrative of what it means to 
be ―Asian American,‖ men must instead negotiate the definitions of ―Asianness‖ that 
their racial difference signifies. This is in part due to the under-representation of Asian 
Americans in the media, and the immense visibility of whiteness and Asian stereotypes 
that shaped interviewees‘ media experiences.  
What the conversations in this chapter point to are varied and nuanced contexts in 
which multiple points of double consciousness strategically come into play, forming a 
vast repertoire of Asian American performances. While often discussed in purely racial 
terms and dismissed for its vague and classed assumptions about the project of black 
identity, W.E.B. Du Bois‘ concept of double consciousness remains helpful in 
understanding the nuances of racial/ethnic experiences.
96
 Du Bois defines double 
consciousness as the ―the inability to recognize one‘s black self other than through the 
mediated veil of the unacknowledging white gaze.‖
97
 This is highlighted in the work of 
race scholars, most notably Frantz Fanon‘s assertion that a racial subject—in his work, 
the black colonial subject—―does not possess a personal value of his own and is always 
dependent on the presence of ‗the Other‘.‖
98
 If we are to build on this notion, we can see 
from interviewees that the personal sense of being Asian American is informed not only 
by whites as a generalized other, but also the presence of ―the Asian‖ as ―the Other.‖ 
Without a clearly defined sense of being Asian American, men feel that they are instead 
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distinguished against ―Asian.‖ In other words, to be ―Asian American‖ is to be identified 
as ―not-Asian.‖  
While Du Bois writes of the benefits of mutual recognition between blacks, it is 
not necessarily the case for Asian Americans. Not merely finding themselves situated 
between Asian and white, interviewees also find themselves between Asian and Asian 
American, as seen in ―American-Born-Chinese‖ experiences or encounters with ethnic-
language speaking ―FOBs.‖ Marginalized in these moments, Asian Americans find that 
there is no guarantee of recognition or solidarity based purely on race. Cultural 
definitions of ―Asian American‖ are most helpful here, as men told me of the distinct 
boundaries between ―FOB‖ and Asian American social circles. 
While the concept of double consciousness is rarely used in the context of Asian 
American identity, it is surely seen at work in Asian American studies positioning Asians 
as ―honorary whites‖ or pointing to racial triangulation theory to explain the tenuous 
position of Asians in American racial discourse. Beyond race, however, there are other 
ways in which this dual-layered consciousness—the awareness of the self, of the other, 
and the interaction between self and other—is evident. It opens up space for individuals 
to create multiple points of reference called upon depending on contexts and situational 
others. Asian Americans use different points of ‗doubleness‘ to add to their complex 
repertoire of racial, ethnic, classed, and gendered performance depending on their 
contexts.  
These negotiations of assimilations/acculturation suggest a way for us to 
understand what scholars, in discussing paths to assimilation, describe as self-
Otherization. Mia Tuan, for example, finds that Asian American college students tend to 
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segregate themselves from students of other races. Indeed, the Asian Americans I 
interviewed admitted to selecting social groups where ethnic interchangeability and 
cultural differences were less likely to occur; mainly, these groups consisted of other 
Asian Americans. Some had joined Asian American organizations like interest groups, 
cultural performance groups, or fraternities on campus. Others mentioned attending 
predominantly Asian American church groups. Those who kept a more diverse array of 
friends still expressed gratitude over finding more Asian Americans to befriend in 
college, a reprieve from their predominantly white high schools and hometowns.  
While groups of racially homogenous students on campuses may make 
segregation a visible issue, these men find their social circles of Asian Americans 
psychologically soothing due to the fact that, in this setting, racial issues are invisible. 
Chinese American Francis, one of the last men I interviewed, agreed with this theme: 
It is tiring. I mean, I have to look at who I‘m talking to, and then I have to 
adjust myself. Whereas if the population is homogeneous, then I just do 
whatever I want.  
At the core of these statements is that ideas and expressions of ―Asian American‖ depend 
in part on cultural options and understandings that are available within a particular 
context; these men, then, have a repertoire of ―Asian American‖ performances that can be 
strategically enacted in particular situations, albeit shaped by societal norms and codes. 
As Jonathan stated: 
It‘s just like, your surroundings. If I was with a bunch of my white friends 
or something, I would be a lot more whitewashed. And if I‘m with my 
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family or a bunch of other Asians or Vietnamese people, I would feel like 
that. 
Hugh added: 
It‘s more about adapting. Sometimes you are more whitewashed to fit in, 
and you‘re probably more Asian at other times. 
Asian American identity is thus presented as a collective construction. It is a performance 
based on social interactions, and one that involves marking the boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion in particular situations and to positions of power. Jonathan‘s identity is in 
part defined in reaction to those around him, based on the norms and expectations of his 
situational partners. Depending on his audience and their expectations, he is more 
―Asian‖ or more ―whitewashed.‖  
Beyond Race: Asian American as Global Competency 
Perhaps the most interesting insights into distinguishing ―Asian American‖ are the 
comments from men who moved to the U.S. in search of work or education opportunities. 
These men considered themselves Asian American despite their accents or style of dress; 
for other respondents born in the U.S., these interviewees may be considered ―FOBby.‖ 
In these instances, the concept of Asian American meant more than being Westernized, 
and offers a new site for understanding ―Asian American‖ in an era of global flows. 
For Ekram, a key move to becoming Asian American meant distancing himself 
from other ―FOB‖ Indians who, in his recollections, were actually quite ―exploitative‖ 
once he arrived in America. When he first came to graduate school, he decided to live in 
an apartment, ―a self-proclaimed ‗Indian ghetto‘,‖ with other recent immigrants from 
India. Ekram‘s decision to do this was largely based on his concerns about socialization:  
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What if I d[id] something embarrassing? Somehow I felt that if that 
happened with Indians, it would be somehow less traumatic, less 
humiliating, than it would be with Americans. 
Yet, Ekram found living with other Indians to be stifling because of particular social 
obligations in the immigrant community. Taking advantage of his naivety, his Indian 
flatmates placed him in a room with a man no one else wanted to room with. Assuming 
that Ekram owed them something for connecting him with the Indian community, they 
also continually asked Ekram for help on their homework and other favors. Now, Ekram 
feels Asian American precisely because of his desire to disconnect from this community 
and to remake his life in the United States as an American (he is looking forward to 
taking the test for citizenship).  
Francis, who moved to Michigan for college, feels the same way, telling me that 
he feels Asian American because he has a ―different way of thinking‖ from the Asians in 
his home country. Across interviews, Asians were understood to be less cosmopolitan, 
transnational, or global as Asian Americans. For Francis, being Asian American is to 
embrace a particular mindset that values globalization, transnationalism, and travel. 
Asians, on the other hand, are generally thought of as migratory individuals ―stuck‖ in 
their home culture—seen for example, in ―FOBs‖‘ desire to speak their native languages 
with others on campus. In this sense, American/Western identity is linked to upward 
mobility and travel, with the social and cultural capital to interact seamlessly from place 
to place. A college senior who has traveled to many different countries, Francis claims, ―I 
find myself behaving Asian American when I‘m out of America,‖ to maximize his social 
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capital with foreigners he encounters. This is also something that Partha has done in his 
travels to Europe; ―just to take sure people know I‘m not, you know, Asian, from Asia.‖  
In this context, the concept of being Asian American is linked with feelings of 
pride or even superiority over both Americans and Asians who hold ―local‖ mindsets. 
Here, the internalized notion of ―FOB‖ extends beyond the American experience. In these 
contexts, Asian American is an identity performed to mark class, global stature, and a 
particular cultural competency not associated with merely ―Asian‖ or ―American.‖ In this 
formulation, Americans are conceived of as local and small-minded, as the source of 
discrimination and ignorance interviewees experienced as children. In this sense, Asian 
Americans truly occupy a space in between the perceived provinciality of Americans and 
Asians who cannot understand or appreciate the position of Asian Americans. Francis‘ 
travels home and abroad require him to redefine his level of Asian American-ness, at 
times changing his clothes and mannerisms to fit in to a crowd.  
We can understand the styles of dress, confidence and other dis-identifying 
markers as markers of symbolic ethnicity used to counter stereotypes. Studies of 
immigrants suggest that ethnics take on symbols of their own ethnic culture—Irish 
Americans ―choose to be Irish on St. Patrick‘s Day, for instance.‖
99
 While these 
approaches may provide insight into the identity formation of white ethnics, this idea of 
―choice‖ eclipses the structural, political, and representational forces that control the 
ways in which the ethnic body can move and perform identity.
100
 Indeed, the position of 
Asian Americans as both racial and ethnic prevents them from exercising the same 
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Herbert Gans‘ notion of symbolic ethnicity suggests that it is a leisure activity, 
and that ethnic can ignore or refuse to adopt symbols that ―require…an arduous or time-
consuming commitment.‖
102
 Interviewees suggested that they do, indeed, avoid 
performances of ethnicity that are somehow draining or tiring—however, contrary to 
white immigrants, the symbols they avoid are those from both Asia (e.g., participating in 
ethnic holidays) and America (e.g., constantly proving they can speak English). Men like 
Randy enjoy the vagueness of the term ―Asian American‖ in its pan-ethnic reach. The 
category allows them to identify with one another on the basis of race, but avoid 
performances that may be difficult, such as speaking their parents‘ native language or 
countering expected stereotypes. 
Conclusion 
These men find themselves at the intersections of multiple sites of 
marginalization, negotiating consistent and often contradictory stereotypes of masculinity 
and race. For interviewees, forming a sense of Asian American masculinity is done in the 
context of other racialized masculinities. When asked to explain why he believed Asian 
men on screens are so marginalized, Brad concluded, ―Maybe, genetically, Asian 
American men don‘t fit some of the Western values for male attractiveness. Like hairy, or 
tall, muscular or something.‖ Building on their discussion of gender inequality at the start 
on the chapter, men believe that positive masculine types do not exist for Asian 
Americans. Oliver lamented that ―Asian guys always lose, or they get beaten by a white 
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protagonist, or they‘re the side kick….they‘re—emasculated, is generally the term.‖ 
Partha stated, ―They‘re not the guys with manly qualities.‖ This simple statement, agreed 
upon by many others, suggests that the project of defining Asian American manhood is a 
project of identifying what Asian American is not. This helps to explain why, beyond the 
examples of stereotypes, functional roles, and the occasional stand-out film, interviewees 
had difficulty naming any other Asian people, characters, or media texts that stood out to 
them as important. Men felt that Asian stereotypes were unrealistic and therefore 
irrelevant to their personal sense of self; however, they are still aware that these 
representations constitute the cultural knowledge of others with whom they interact. 
In part, the prevalence of these stereotypes is linked to the invisibility of Asian 
Americans not only in these men‘s social situations, but also in the media. See my 
interaction with Josh, as he imagined how media, gender, and race intersect to create and 
delimit Asian American masculinity: 
The ideal man, I guess, would be manly, rugged, but gentlemanly, and not 
a meathead… Smart, suave. Kind. Compassionate, that sort of thing.  
Do you find this sort of image with Asian men in media? 
Um, no! (Laughs) 
As will be discussed in the following chapters, manhood and Asian American ideals 
inform how these men think they are represented in the media. Many acknowledge that 
their concepts of masculinity are indeed ideals, and that the media is ―just the media‖ – to 
an extent, merely representations and not reflections of reality. However, there is a 
general belief that others, especially white men, have more options in the media and can 
embody more facets of masculinity than others. 
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When Randy explained how he is viewed as an Asian American, the reaction 
against stereotypes becomes clear: ―Looking at me, you‘re obviously going to stray away 
from certain stereotypes, right? Like being a nerd, or being metrosexual…. You‘re not 
going to think those things looking at me. So what stereotype does come up then, for 
me?‖ Randy‘s performance of his own masculinity seems to be, in part, a reaction to the 
Asian stereotypes that he believes have become ingrained in how Asian Americans—and 
his own self—are understood. Being unable to perceive of oneself outside of the ―Asian‖ 
narrative, or having to think of oneself in relation to the stereotypes it prompts, was 
common across the men who talked with me.  
In this light, stereotypes have become the common-sense identity categories 
interviewees have had to move in and out of throughout their lives. These men have 
integrated them into their lives—sometimes willingly, sometimes not. Their histories 
show how their racial difference makes them visible as non-white, but also how the 
understanding of Asian American as racially ―Asian‖ makes their ethnicities invisible. 
Overall, their negotiations of what it means to be Asian American involve a complex 
strategy of defining themselves as ―not-Asian,‖ using the distinctions of class, language, 
or culture. The next chapter investigates this linkage further, looking at: 1) the rhetoric of 
―Asian‖ in news media discourses, 2) how Asian American interviewees negotiate these 
portrayals, and 3) how they feel these larger concepts of ―Asian‖ inform larger cultural 
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―The differentiation of Asian immigrants from the national citizenry is marked not only 
politically but culturally as well: refracted through images, memories, and narratives—





―The United States does not seek to contain China.‖ – United States President Barack 





On August 8, 2008, an estimated 65 million U.S. home viewers
105
 tuned in to 
NBC for the Opening Ceremonies of the 29
th
 International Olympic Games in Beijing, 
China.
106
 Regarded by many as China‘s global debut as a modern nation, the broadcast of 
its own image to the world symbolized the end of a history of closed borders.
107
 With 
thousands of men on the floor of the stadium, concert pianist Lang Lang performing, and 
gymnast Li Ning running up the stadium‘s walls to light the Olympic cauldron, the image 
of China was undeniably masculine. In the American display of the 2008 Olympics, the 
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massive specter of China was inevitably managed, for viewers, by the interpretations of 
white male news anchors. For American audiences, the image of China‘s masculinity was 
negotiated with the help of NBC anchors Jim Lampley, Tom Brokaw, Matt Lauer, Bob 
Costas and Joshua Cooper Ramo—white men helping viewers interpret the Chinese 
images on screen. When 2,008 Chinese men, with matching grey and red uniforms and 
red marks on their foreheads filled the floor of the Bird‘s Nest Stadium to drum and shout 
in synchronization, Matt Lauer remarked: ―A nation of 1.3 billion people putting on a 
show like this, and people at home are not alone if they‘re saying this is both awe 
inspiring and perhaps a little intimidating.‖ 
The comments of NBC anchors throughout this performance reveal some of the 
complexities in how Asia is understood in the American imaginary. At one point 
describing the ―massive scope‖ of these performances as ―intimidating,‖ and as almost 
militaristic displays of ―minute‖ and ―fierce precision,‖ anchors Bob Costas and Matt 
Lauer later shared, ―To a Western audience, looking at a bunch of guys basically doing 
karate…must be very confusing.‖ In front of a national audience, the anchormen 
conflated Japanese and Chinese martial arts. The anchors continued on to essentialize the 
performance: discussing how the basic principles of tai chi ―came naturally‖ assumed that 
it was somehow an inherited skill, or that the performers had practiced tai chi throughout 
their lives; they also focused on the fact that standing in perfect circles, ―not the tai chi 
part,‖ was the choreographic difficulty. The array of interpretations, ranging from fearful, 
to confused, to dismissive, point to the ways in which Western media consumers have 
been prompted to stereotype or categorize Asians. 
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In this chapter, I explore how mainstream American news rhetoric contextualizes 
the Asian American experience by lending to the national discourse that shapes how we 
think of Asia, Asians, and Asian Americans. I contend that the rhetoric of 
Asian/American found in these news texts reifies some of the stereotypes of ―Asia‖ 
interviewees alluded to in the previous chapter. This chapter uses interview responses to 
point to case examples of how anti-Chinese rhetoric reflected anxieties over the global 
economy. This rhetoric worked by painting China as a monstrosity, a predator, and a 
contagion, with language inciting panic over China‘s size and painting America as an 
innocent victim. Largely drawing from newspaper and newsmagazine material, the 
chapter also uses CNN‘s Lou Dobbs Tonight as a case study, due to the show‘s 
prominence and role as perhaps the most vitriolic of news texts reflecting and lending to 
the rhetorical moves discussed.  
The Role of News and National Discourse 
 A major contribution of this dissertation is an investigation into how news 
narratives, along with entertainment narratives, form a network of meanings that shape 
how individuals feel they are perceived. As racial and ethnic minorities, Asian American 
male interviewees felt implicated in narratives perpetuated by the American mainstream 
mediascape as a whole, as they contended with stereotypes and prejudices that resulted 
from the dialogic interplay between media texts and lived experience. As seen in the 
previous chapter, interviewees‘ concept of society writ large is that of a white culture 
defining, interpreting, and negotiating Asian American men.  
For interviewees, the importance of news narratives in shaping their social 
categories is linked to the invisibility of Asia in the American contexts in which they 
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grew up. Brad, for example, described the sense of absence he felt as he grew up in a 
predominantly white suburb and school system: ―There‘s not enough about Asia in 
American education. In my whole 12 years of schooling, I didn‘t learn a thing about 
China.‖ Brad felt that rather than learning about Asia and Asian culture, he only learned 
things ―as they pertained to Western history.‖ To Jonathan, the invisibility of Asian 
histories, geographies and cultures is linked to his own sense of ethnic marginalization as 
a Vietnamese American – despite the fact that his parents came to the U.S. during the 
Vietnam War, he feels that contemporary U.S.-foreign relations work to shape how Asian 
Americans are defined in America. He explained, ―I have to educate people on Vietnam 
and the fact that I‘m Vietnamese because Vietnam and the U.S. don‘t really interact. Not 
like China and the U.S., or Japan and the U.S.‖ While most interviewees believed that 
Asia was absent from larger national discourses writ large, Jonathan also points to how 
some ethnicities are privileged over others when Asia does become visible.  
The ethnic representations of Asians in American popular culture, as Darrell 
Hamamoto points out, have shifted based on the foreign policies and main events of the 
time. In Monitored Peril, Hamamoto links media representations of ―bachelor fathers‖— 
stock Chinese characters performing as traditional domestic servants, often for white 
families—and ―rising sons‖—Japanese characters always presented as recent immigrants 
and thus always alien—to sentiments surrounding WWII, the Korean War, the Vietnam 
war, and other national engagements. Narratives have fluctuated between depicting 
Asians as overt terrors and subordinate underlings, and this dichotomy reflects how 
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 For interviewees examining their current situation, ―the Orient‖ was made visible 
through major news events concerning China. When asked to recall news stories that 
shaped understandings of ―Asian‖ in America, interviewees of all ethnic backgrounds 
pointed to news about China: product safety recalls, bird flu, and the 2008 Olympics. 
Brad, who felt that Asia was invisible in his school, now feels that ―with the rise of 
China, maybe Chinese culture will start appearing more and having more appeal.‖ Media 
narratives thus become prime sites where Asian Americans can see Asia become visible. 
Alex says, ―People are easily influenced… media can really change a person‘s mind.‖ 
Those I interviewed, however, seemed to conclude that media influenced people to feel 
negatively about Asians. For example, Alex shared, ―I walked into a bar one time and this 
guy looked at me and said, ‗I don‘t like your kind.‘‖ In a follow-up conversation, Alex 
clarified that he felt that media narratives about Asia often served to reify the concept of 
the Oriental Asian – in this situation, ―his kind‖ referred to Asians as a homogeneous 
population, rather than those who shared his Korean background. As a racial minority, 
interviewees feel part of a pan-ethnic, homogenized ―Asian‖ racial category indelibly 
linked to the discourse of ―Asia‖ abroad. Despite being American, these men negotiate a 
racial identity which—to use their term—―for better or worse,‖ has been made visible in 
very particular ways.  
 Hugh built on this concept: ―Stories shape how Americans think of China as the 
Orient, the Far East. They shape or confirm stereotypes. People come up with their own 
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conclusions about the news stories they see.‖ Following this with examples of arguments 
he has gotten into with his white roommate about China and cultural differences between 
Chinese and white Americans, Hugh confirmed his feeling that the conclusions he felt 
that others drew from news stories about China were mostly negative. Upon deeper 
reflection interviewees shared that they, as Asian American men, felt implicated in the 
discourse of Asia. For example, Korean American Tom discussed how foreign relations 
during war-time affected Asian Americans: 
In World War II, everybody thought that we were Japanese, and they 
wanted us out of the country…. Now that the world is more international 
and Internet is all over the place… now we know, well, Asian people 
aren‘t always like this. But in the end, they still keep that stereotype. 
Despite also pointing to the role that global media flows and increased channels of 
information play in combating stereotypes, Tom‘s statement suggests an entrenched 
stereotyped narrative that still exists. Chinese American Bobby identifies this narrative as 
one linked with terror: ―The history of [Asian stereotypes] is a lot of times, they were 
portrayed as evil, back in the day. Have you heard of, like, Dr. Fu Manchu?‖ 
Across the board, interviewees offered that Asian Americans‘ racial status as non-
white minorities in America is coupled with particular, lasting, representations of Asia. 
Some representations of Asian men have had immense staying power; the ―insidious‖ Dr. 
Fu Manchu, a product of the anti-Chinese fears from the 1920s, is still remembered by 
Bobby, in 2010. Indian American Ekram explained how he felt characters like Fu 
Manchu reflected Orientalist discourse: 
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Oriental-looking people are almost sinister…. I think that part of is that, 
historically, China has been an enemy. In the 1970s, 1980s, Japan was a 
competitor, so Japanese Americans… the second World War, of course, 
another big piece of history. So you go to the battlefield and fight the men. 
And that may partly have to do with them being coded as sinister.  
Most recently, Yunte Huang‘s (2010) investigation into the origins of fictional detective 
Charlie Chan links the character to Fu Manchu. Huang cites Asian American scholar 
Frank Chin: ―Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan are the two Chinese icons of the same myth 
brewed up in the subconscious region of the white Christian‘s racial wet dream—devil 
and angel.‖ While Fu ―offended white manhood‖ with his feline demeanor and 




Survey research has confirmed that some of the stereotypes and prejudices 
interviewees identify are a reality for Asian Americans. The Committee of 100 (C-100), a 
national, non-partisan committee of Chinese American leaders that has conducted 
opinion surveys throughout the 2000s, has consistently found links between thoughts 
about China and attitudes toward Asian Americans. In 2005, a C-100 report found that 68 
percent of the general population believed China to be a significant threat to the United 
States.
112
 Surveys from both 2001 and 2009 found that perceiving China as a threat is 
highly correlated to having unfavorable impressions of Chinese people and a higher 
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degree of prejudice toward Chinese and Asian Americans.
113
 As Helen Zia writes in the 
C-100‘s 2009 report, ―the lack of basic knowledge does not prevent people from offering 
firm opinions about Asian Americans—whether they are loyal or dangerous.‖
114
 Some 
interviewees were acutely aware of the role such suspicious attitudes plays in 
constructing Asians in America, and how they lend to a rhetoric that is ambivalent as well 
as contradictory. Alex explained: 
I talk to my friends… and they say they can‘t trust Chinese people. Some 
of [my friends] are nice but they say they can never trust a Chinese person.  
  Even if it‟s a Chinese American person? 
  Yeah. And the media plays a huge role [in that]. 
The re-emergence of anti-Chinese rhetoric in mainstream American media in the 2000s 
points to a moment of political foment during which national white identity was 
consolidated in opposition to the creation of a Chinese Other.
115
 
 Indeed, interviewees saw the economic crisis that shaped much of the news in the 
early 2000s as connected to attitudes about Asian Americans and Asia. Filipino American 
Dean tried to summarize the contemporary narrative: ―The story is that Asians are taking 
jobs away from Americans… so now we‘re seeing this anti-Asian autoworker type of 
story. The economy has a big part in defining how people look at Asian Americans, or 
Asians in general.‖ At the time of writing, fears of America‘s diminished role as a global 
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superpower were compounded by the loss of American jobs due to multinational business 
practices of offshoring and outsourcing, practices continued since the 1980s.
116
 White 
America has not only seen expanded free trade policies and consumer desire for cheap 
imports lead to an increasing amount of corporate outsourcing of manufacturing jobs, but 
has also seen information technology jobs provide opportunities for H1-B visa holders 
from abroad.
117
 The Economic Policy Institute reports that approximately 1.8 million 
American jobs have been displaced since China‘s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001, and links these job losses to growing trade deficits with 
China.
118
 At the same time, China‘s economy has continued to grow at a rapid pace, with 
the country hailing the largest year-on-year rise figures on the globe and attracting far 
more foreign investments than any other developing country.
119
 With an increasing trade 
deficit with China, the Sino-American market is ―by far the United States‘ most 
imbalanced trading relationship.‖
120
 Free trade has been lauded by some U.S. business 
elites, economists and neoliberals as benefiting American multinational corporations. 
However, the media narrative in the lead-up to 2008 suggested that American workers, 
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particularly white American men—the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that men have 
consistently led women in unemployment
121
—were the victims of globalization.  
The anxiety over the decline of the American middle-class, inherent in the 
discourse around China‘s rise and growth, is thus a classed anxiety that intersects with 
America‘s racial anxieties. In situating contemporary discourse within this historical 
context, we can see how contemporary narratives of anxiety and threat work to create a 
spectacle of China controlled and contained by American media. Ben, who is a bi-ethnic 
Asian American, described a complex interplay between America‘s relationship with 
China and how it implicates Asian Americans:  
I just feel like that [China‘s] challenge to [Americans‘] nationality, that‘s 
going to be developing specifically against Chinese Americans, and that‘s 
a compromising situation to be in… 
Can you elaborate a little bit?  
Mainly just because of the providence of China and how that‘s threatening 
American hegemony…. Well, we‘re not going to be number one anymore, 
right? And that seems to really threaten people and their egos. 
For Ben, news narratives lend to the ―general xenophobia‖ he feels is growing in the 
United States. Despite linking America‘s anxiety to Chinese Americans specifically, Ben 
still feels that economic fears over job losses affects how Asian Americans are seen as a 
whole. He added, ―People might see us as more competitive in terms of jobs. It might 
awaken nationalist fears of, ‗We gotta keep jobs for Americans.‘‖  
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Working with a concept of ―Asian America‖ that is inextricably linked to 
narratives of ―Asia,‖ Asian Americans find themselves shaped as a threat subject to ―both 
willful blindness and hysterical concern,‖
122
 the ―raced, classed, and gendered 
embodiment of contradiction itself.‖
123
 This has resulted in a history of representations 
perpetuating long-lasting yet incongruous stereotypes of Asian men. Huang describes 
Charlie Chan as ―the hackneyed symbolism of Chinatown and the clichéd notion of 
Chinese inscrutability….an American stereotype of the Chinaman,‖
124
 a product of 
―racial bias and cultural fantasy.‖
125
 The contradictions of fantasy and fright, fun and 
fundamentalist, for scholars like Vijay Prashad, Victor Bascara, and Wendy Brown 
(2006), are linked to globalization and its accompanying discourse of multiculturalism.
126
 
In this context, America embraces that which can be contained, consumed, or 
appropriated; simultaneously, it fears what positions America as feminine, what defies 
norms, encroaches upon borders, and is too foreign to be adaptable.
127
 One can see the 
continued embodiment of such anxieties same in other ―Oriental‖ portrayals, regardless 
of ethnicity: Fu Manchu, Sixteen Candles‘ Long Duk Dong (Gedde Watanabe, 1984) or 
The Karate Kid‘s Mr. Miyagi (Pat Morita, 1984). To understand the staying power of 
these representations, we must first begin with America‘s contradictory relationship with 
Chinatowns and its men.  
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Before looking at the stories and sources with which interviewees were familiar, it 
is important to note that anti-Chinese rhetoric is not new to Americans, and has worked to 
bolster white identity with narratives highlighting the difference of racial minorities. 
Contextualizing the contemporary narratives discussed in this chapter, the intersections of 
race, gender and class in the past help us understand the politics of containment in the 
present.  
 Chinatowns and Chinamen: The Origins of Yellow Peril 
The contemporary discourse surrounding China can be traced to 19
th
 century 
America. While China itself was not a threat, its men were perceived to be, as global 
trade networks enabled the entry of a migrant workforce of merchants and laborers 
leaving poverty-stricken South China in search of profit in the United States. An Asian 
workforce largely comprised of Chinese men provided a cheap alternative to slave labor 
in a post-emancipation industrial economy. Anti-Chinese sentiment was fueled by the 
influx of Chinese immigrants and anxieties over the preservation of white male 
dominance in America‘s public sphere. As Lisa Lowe‘s (1996) quote at the start of this 
chapter indicates, foreign policies and anxieties over the immigrant presence in America 
have shaped geographical spaces, the foreigners contained within those spaces, and the 
vocabulary used to describe them. Historically, the concept of a wholly inassimilable, 
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From the start, the Chinese male was something to be contained. California‘s gold 
rush encouraged a major wave of immigrant laborers from China, and the new territory 
provided ample work that Chinese men were eager to do. The work in the West was so 
readily available that in just thirty years (1852-1882), anywhere from 300,000 to 500,000 
Chinese entered the United States. By the 1860s, roughly 80 percent of the Central 
Pacific Railroad‘s workforce was made up of Chinese laborers.
129
 Much of the literature 
on Asian Americans discusses the policies and immigration laws enacted to prevent the 
spread of Chinese labor. Despite their role in the workforce, Chinese men were excluded 
from unions and workers‘ organizations that coalesced in the mid- to late-19
th
 century. As 
white industrial laborers found themselves competing with Chinese men the stereotype of 
the ―coolie‖ worker, originally used to describe post-emancipation Chinese labor on 
sugar plantations,
130
 was used to construct the Chinese workforce, seen as a competitive 
threat.  
Fearing the loss of white jobs, California‘s legislature passed the 1852 Foreign 
Miner‘s Tax, requiring Chinese miners to pay a hefty fee. Other restrictions included 
higher laundry licensing fees for Chinese launderers, and legislation preventing Chinese 
from testifying against whites and from gaining citizenship. Restrictive immigration 
policies like 1882‘s Chinese Exclusion Act—America‘s first immigration policy actively 
targeting a single population—and anti-miscegenation laws actively limited men‘s 
reproductive choices.
131
 Preventing women and family members from joining male 
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laborers desexualized a working population, effectively ―castrating‖ Chinese men.
132
 The 
results were visible: by the 1920s, the Chinese population in San Francisco was over 90 
percent male, confined to ―bachelor societies‖ of single men. By the 1880s, a singular 
narrative of what President Rutherford B. Hayes described ―the Chinese invasion‖ had 
formed,
133
 as containing the ―yellow terror‖ or ―yellow peril‖ became a national issue. 
The face of yellow terror was undeniably male, mostly due to the scarcity of 
Asian women in America at the time. As Lisa Lowe aptly points out, the extension of 
citizenship to the Chinese legally presumed the ―Chinese immigrant‖ to be male, as 
female immigrants were not included in citizenship discussions during the 1940s.
134
 
Bachelor societies eventually turned into Chinese enclaves or Chinatowns, which became 
key in the narrative construction of Asian masculinity.
135
 As scholars of 19
th
 century 
America have discussed, the active containment, discursively and geographically, of 
Chinese in America have helped to define America as a modern space and make Western 
difference desirable.
136
 As Nayan Shah (2001) explains, the San Francisco the Board of 
Health long refused to consider Chinese San Franciscans as ―part of the city‘s ‗public‘; 
they were instead perceived as the antithesis of ‗civilized citizens‘.‖
137
 Alien populations 
were confined to Chinatowns, which were understood as morally depraved, uncivilized 
spaces of gamblers and opium dealers. Huang describes the role of Chinatown in 
American narratives of the time: 
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The mere mention of ―Chinatown‖ immediately calls up images of 
pestilential slums, opium dens, filthy brothels, and gambling parlors, all 




Images, stereotypes, and policies worked to reify Chinese men as non-Christian,
139
 
lascivious predators of white women,
140
 or evil masterminds with devoted followers.
141
 
Establishing Chinatown in this way created a new racialized urban modernity to 
juxtapose the superiority of white labor, culture and society.  
The potential threat of Chinese men‘s economic and geographical mobility led to 
the concept of the Chinese as carriers of disease, and this was also transposed onto the 
products they produced. In San Francisco, smallpox and syphilis were traced to incoming 
Chinese immigrants and the squalid environment of Chinatown.
142
 The Chinese were 
deemed a volatile threat to the entire city‘s health, and public health and urban planning 
decisions marginalized Chinatown as a ―cesspool.‖
143
 These narratives of disease and 
contamination were also gendered, with Chinese laundrymen, servants, and other man-
made products portrayed as the potential source of ―domestic contamination for the 
middle-class white family.‖
144
 The discourse of contamination claimed domestic goods 
made by Chinese laborers as the source of multiple, incurable diseases. White consumers 
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would buy Chinese-made products at their own risk, if they decided not to follow the 
protectionist impulses of American workers: as early as 1874, unions embarked on a 





 century saw the beginnings of a discourse of monstrosity as 
Chinatowns—sprawling and filthy—and Chinamen—depraved and ruthless, became 
spectacles for consumption. As Ronald Zboray and Mary Zboray (2004) show in their 
analysis of late 19
th
 century representations of China in Boston‘s Chinese Museum, 
Chinese-ness and Asian-ness have long occupied a gray space between civilization and 
barbarism, easily sensationalized into spectacle for white audiences as a result of 
consumer culture and global commerce.
146
 In New York, ―rubbernecking‖ tours enabled 
whites to enter Chinatown to see firsthand the inassimilable differences, monstrous, and 
dangerous qualities of Chinese culture, bodies, and products.
147
 The fascination over 
Chinese spectacle was also reflected in popular culture texts aimed at a wider, more 
mainstream audience than those with direct experience with Chinatowns. These mediated 
representations often presented the Asian male as a grotesque, such as Thomas Edison‘s 
Dancing Chinamen (1898), featuring marionettes with ―strangely multijointed 
bod[ies]…. ‗foreign,‘ coded as ‗Chinese,‘ and….aggressively handled.‖
148
 Other films 
from the era focused on storylines in which Chinese men, no matter how Westernized, 
preyed on white women and ultimately revert back to their inherently foreign ways, 
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inseparable from the dark underbelly of Chinatown.
149
 Haenni writes of the racializing 
process of mapping ―fears of Chinese fluidity and mobility‖ onto the Chinese, evacuating 
―any sense of Chinese humanity, subjectivity or spectatorship.‖
150
 Her work explains how 
Asian America‘s threat to American cities, sense of civilization and rationality, became 
spectacularized as their inability and/or refusal to assimilate,
151
 and that such racializing 
narratives were thus tools to (re)secure American nationalist fears.
152
 The transfer of 
cultural, political, and economic anxieties onto Asian spaces and Asian men was 
commoditized for audiences across the United States, reinforcing the notion of a 
dehumanized Asian threat. 
Sample and Methods 
Similar to Herman Gray‘s (1995) attempt to map representations and negotiations 
of televised blackness as ―the centerpiece of manufactured resentments, moral panics, 
and fears that appealed to white working- and middle-class insecurity‖ during the 1980s, 
this chapter looks at the ways in which images of Asians on screen have ―mark[ed], 
locate[d], and then naturalize[d]‖ particular threats of Asian America in contemporary 
American popular media.
153
 I explore the anti-Chinese rhetoric that proliferated in the 
news media during the mid-2000s, culminating in coverage of the 2008 Olympics. These 
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stories reflected anxieties about China and used Orientalist strategies to mark China as 
inherently different and antithetical to American values.  
Locating discursive trends in the news lends tremendous insight into how realities 
are presented for audiences and how a ―common sense‖ is formed to think about those 
realities. As Todd Gitlin (1980) writes, ―[News organizations] normally and regularly 
combine to select certain versions of reality over others…. [to] define ‗the story,‘ identify 
the protagonists and the issues, and suggest appropriate attitudes.‖
154
 Using particular 
points of emphasis and presentation styles, news media help contribute to ―little tacit 
theories‖ about what is important and why.
155
 As interview responses showed, men were 
able to at least acknowledge the existence of the ―little tacit theories‖ that shaped the 
Asian American experience. 
Interviewees were asked what news texts informed their sense of national and 
global events, and were then asked to recall any specific stories or events about Asia and 
whether or not they thought these stories affected Asian Americans in any way.
156
‖ Time 
and Newsweek ranked as the two most popular magazines covering political and news 
events.
157
 While BusinessWeek has had a much smaller circulation in comparison, several 
men recalled reading the magazine for high school classes or with their families, so it was 
included in the analysis as well. Newspapers included two of the nation‘s highest 
circulating newspapers, USA Today and The New York Times. USA Today and The New 
York Times cover a fairly broad spectrum of the news mediascape; for example, USA 
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Today claims a readership that is 64% male and 45% college educated,
158
 while the New 
York Times lays claim to ―affluent, educated professionals,‖ over half of whom earn over 
$100,000 a year and 88% of whom are college educated.
159
 According to a reader survey 
in 2009, NYT readership is fairly evenly split in terms of gender.
160
 While The Wall Street 
Journal also ranks in the top three, none of the interviewees identified it as a consistent 
news source.  
Despite not being mentioned by any interviewees, I also provide examples from 
CNN‘s Lou Dobbs Tonight.
161
 The show serves as a prime example of how white male 
anxieties are reflected in the discourse over China and globalization. Lou Dobbs was 
perhaps one of the loudest and most insistent voices expressing concerns over China 
during the 2000s. As a self-identified ―independent populist,‖ he claimed to be an 
advocate for ―working men and women, their families, [the] middle class and the 
American way of life.‖
162
 During his time on air, Dobbs held such vehement opinions on 
China and its looming threats that he was often viewed as the exemplar of anti-Chinese 
sentiment. At one point, a USA Today writer called for readers to look beyond the 
influence of ―television polemicists such as CNN‘s Lou Dobbs [who] fulminate about the 
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evils of ‗Communist China.‘‖
163
 Dobbs has sparked controversy with claims linking 
illegal immigrants to leprosy,
164
 and has been a target of Hispanic groups calling for his 
resignation. Despite or perhaps because of this, LDT was the second most viewed 
program on CNN by 2007, bringing the network close to 900,000 viewers in its 
primetime slot.
165
 The Cable television Advertising Bureau (CAB) described Lou Dobbs‘ 
reach to a predominantly white and middle-aged audience as being an ―important 
observer of power and the powerful, tell[ing] you who has it, who wants it and why you 
should care.‖
166
 Dobbs‘ rhetoric and the use of the similar themes and images in 
mainstream media texts that are ostensibly more objective than Dobbs‘, culminate in a 
larger, general mediascape that shapes China as a threat.
167
  
 LDT consisted of several ―special issues‖ reports featuring CNN correspondents, 
special guest interviews, and Dobbs‘ own commentary.
168
 ―Red Storm Rising‖ began to 
air on CNN‘s LDT in 2005, as a recurring segment of the show‘s ―special reports.‖ The 
segment was at times referred to as ―Red Star Rising,‖ until the title ―Red Storm Rising‖ 
solidified in mid-2005 when Dobbs declared, ―Administration officials won‘t even talk 
                                                 
163 David J. Lynch, ―Oracle Bones: China Revealed.‖ USA Today, April 27, 2006. 
164 Leonhardt, David. ―Truth, Fiction and Lou Dobbs,‖ New York Times, Business Section, May 30, 2007, 
C1. 
165 The Project for Excellence in Journalism, ―Cable TV.‖ The State of the News Media: An Annual Report 
on American Journalism, 2008, accessed February 29, 2011, 
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2008/narrative_cabletv_audience.php?cat=2&media=7. 
166 Cable television Advertising Bureau, ―2008 Network Profiles,‖ 92, accessed December 10, 2010, 
http://www.thecab.tv/php/networkprofiles/08profileData/08_pdfs/CNN.pdf.  
167 At one point, USA Today writer David J. Lynch called for readers to recognize Lou Dobbs as the 
exemplar of ―television polemicists…who fulminate about the evils of ‗Communist China,;‖ ―Oracle 
Bones‖. 
168 Some of these segments included: ―Broken Borders,‖ focusing on the damage illegal immigration 
allegedly inflicts on America‘s culture, economy, health care and environment; ―Exporting America,‖ 
featuring stories on the continued outsourcing of jobs to other countries and the import of cheap goods 
made outside of the United States; ―What Foreign Policy,‖ highlighting ―fragmented policies that damage 
[American] military and trade advantage and prestige overseas;‖168 and ―Homeland Insecurity,‖ focusing 




on the record about the red storm that is hitting our shores.‖
169
 The title of the segment, 
paralleling the 1986 Tom Clancy novel of the same name, links China‘s rise to the Soviet 
threat of the Cold War. Focusing on the rise of China‘s global economic and political 
power, its increased military spending and the link to the continued loss of American 
jobs, the segment continued to run until Dobbs left CNN in November of 2009. In ―Red 
Storm Rising‖ segments, Dobbs continually referred to China as ―Communist China,‖ 
condemning American ―corporate supremacists‖ and politicians for supporting the free 
trade policies behind America‘s trade deficit and China‘s growth.  
LexisNexis searches for printed news sources from 2000 through 2008 revealed 
that stories on China began to proliferate roughly in 2004 and 2005. Using interview 
recollections of news stories as a guide, I ran searches in the LexisNexis database using 
keywords for China, flu, security, recall, and Olympics. This resulted in 223 New York 
Times articles and 81 USA Today articles. Accessing back issues of newsmagazines on 
microfilm, I looked through each issue of Time, Newsweek, and BusinessWeek from 2000 
onward for cover stories, special reports, and articles on China. All articles were read and 
coded thematically. For LDT, LexisNexis transcripts of episodes containing the ―Red 
Storm Rising‖ segment and references to ―communist China‖ from 2005 through 2008 
were read and coded, a total of 280 episodes. 
Mediated Panic and the Rhetoric of Containment 
In 2005 and 2006 Time, Newsweek, and BusinessWeek each printed numerous 
special reports or devoted special issues to China. PBS‘s NewsHour with Jim Lehrer 
produced a seven-part series, ―China on the Rise,‖ described by PBS as ―a seven-part 
series on the Asian nation‘s rise as a global economic contender and America‘s anxieties 
                                                 
169 June 27, 2005.  
 
 111 





texts were followed by continued special issues and reports in other media outlets, 
including National Geographic
171
 and the New York Times, during the lead-up to the 
2008 Beijing Olympics. In the span of three years, these reports, stories or programs 
functioned as special outlets of information: to explain the factors—open trade policies, 
undervalued currency, a massive, upwardly mobile population—behind China‘s rise, as 
warnings over the ways in which China has developed (too fast, too unchecked), and to 
criticize and critique America‘s own trade policies that have fostered China‘s success.  
As news about China proliferated in the years leading up to the Beijing Olympics, 
news texts took on instructive tones over the issues China faced.
172
 Producing economic 
projections, growth models, and predicting China‘s obstacles on the path to 
modernization, news media provided critiques of China‘s environment, political climate, 
financial concerns, and public health issues. By establishing a privileged distance 
between America and China, American news reports consistently shaped China as an 
inexperienced and pre-modern country, but also as an encroaching force that challenged 
America‘s economic dominance, political power, and civility. These narrative 
frameworks placed Americans in a position to critique and strategize, while containing 
threat and managing anxieties through discussions of China‘s inability to meet Western 
standards on broad issues like ―health‖ and ―the environment.‖ 
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It is, of course, a fact that China has a large and growing population, and a history 
of corrupt regulatory officials and human rights offenses. Its political and regulatory 
failures were, indeed, genuine concerns. Yet, in a follow-up interview, Chinese American 
Aaron explained why the news rhetoric about China is still important to understand, and 
how he feels it implicates Asian Americans: 
Yes, there is a basis in reality. The regulation there is a lot more lax…. But 
at the same time, the popular opinion has tended to drift far more into the, 
―Chinese people in Chinese factories are crazy, they‘re misbegotten, third-
world pariahs,‖ almost. Just the idea that there‘s someone else threatening 
Americans being number one. The idea that someone else is economically 
opposing…America makes it a lot easier to go to broad stereotypes. 
Alex continued on this theme, focusing mostly on the use of ―broad stereotypes‖ to 
explain the dynamic between the U.S. and China: 
I mean, take…newsmagazines. They view China as a threat rather than, 
―Oh, another country is getting bigger.‖ They always have like, this 
dragon, fighting with U.S. symbols. 
What these men implied was that, instead of focusing on the challenges—diseases, 
regulations, labor laws—that most developing countries face (the United States included), 
ostensibly objective news sources presented narratives that interviewees could identify as 
generalizations and speculations. Aaron and Alex have an acute sense that news 
narratives do more than just present facts. Rather, news stories‘ focus on nationalism and 
threats to global dominance lend to a larger national discourse that transforms China into 
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a generalized ―Asia,‖ promoting ―broad stereotypes‖ which then become troubling for 
Asian Americans contending as racial minorities within a contradictory mediascape.  
 Interviewees‘ lists of news events generated an abundance of news items and 
articles to analyze. Follow-up interviews and discussions with peer debriefers helped 
clear themes emerge. These themes, prevalent and intertwined, formed a contemporary 
anti-Chinese narrative that reflected the anxieties borne out of 19
th
 century Chinese 
presence and Chinatowns in America. These themes promote a narrative of Orientalism 
writ large, as a way for the West to dominate, restructure, and have authority over the 
East.
173
 The major themes that continually repeated themselves were:  
 Monstrosity (or, ―the octopus‖; emphasizing the image of China as growing yet 
machine-like, monstrous organism, determined and all-encompassing);  
 Emphasis on predatory behavior (related to the theme of monstrosity, this 
focuses on shaping China as having predatory qualities, such as ruthlessness, 
amorality, irrationality);  
 Contagion (using language that identifies China as a source of contagion, whether 
biological or philosophical);  
 Panic of scale (emphasizing China‘s large population in terms of disproportionate 
growth, unstoppable expansion, and sheer enormity);  
 American vulnerability (positioning America as a victim unable to defend itself 
from China).  
In the years leading up to the 2008 Olympics, these themes were often intertwined and 
presented as subtle variations on the other.  
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While studies such as Gitlin‘s have followed the trajectory of news themes based 
on their chronological development, I choose instead to organize this chapter by news 
event. This is primarily due to the organic nature in which interviewees recalled the news. 
All naturally turned to memorable news events, rather than identifying particular themes 
or narrative techniques used to describe those events. By following interviewees‘ 
recollections of the years leading up to the Olympics, we can see just how diffuse the 
themes about China are, how repetitive they are, and how they constitute a larger national 
narrative that shapes understandings of Asians and their relationship with America. 
“Spreading its Tentacles”: The Looming Specter of China 
By far, one of the most frequently discussed news items regarding Asia was 
China‘s growing economy, particularly in the context of America‘s economic woes. As 
Chinese American Francis explained, ―[What‘s going on in Asia] is driving the face of 
America now. Because of the rise of China.‖ Interestingly, multiple interviewees 
discussed China‘s economic developments in the context of its military growth. Chinese 
American Avery described what he felt to be the climate of news coverage as well as 
national sentiment: ―We‘re at the point with China where we‘re not openly warring with 
them, but we feel very anxious about them and their growth.‖ While the link between 
economic and military build-up may not have seemed entirely logical at the time of my 
interviews, my thematic analyses confirmed that these issues were indeed linked in the 
news. Mentions of China‘s rise included hyperbolic references to China‘s size, depictions 
of China as a monstrosity, and were often linked to discussions of military build-up and 
America‘s national security concerns. 
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In a May 3, 2005 special issue of Newsweek entitled ―China‘s Century,‖ a feature 
report discussed America‘s key concerns over China‘s rise, while announcing the country 
as ―the powerful new force on the global scene.‖ Much of the news in 2005 seemed to 
pivot on determining just what shape China‘s force would take. In June 2005, a special 
issue of Time featured a portrait of Chairman Mao on the cover, wearing a mandarin-
collar shirt stamped with Louis Vuitton logos, ―CHINA‘S NEW REVOLUTION‖ 
emblazoned across his chest in large, capital letters. Inside, the accompanying photo 
essay explained, ―A New China Rises.‖ This singular image encapsulated what Juan 
Williams, at the time a political analyst for National Public Radio, called ―the global 
disconnect,‖ or ―the two faces of China.‖
174
 Writing of his first trip to China, Williams 
mused on ―cornerstone[s] of Chinese communism next to glossy shrines to capitalism‖ 
and the lack of a free press to explain how China was at odds with his Western 
sensibilities as a journalist and an American.  
The first inklings of news concerning China‘s growth point to a number of 
converging themes that shape China as, literally, a sizable threat. Using hyperbolic 
language, news texts took on a tone of alarm regarding China‘s size and growth; focusing 
on the ―global disconnect,‖ texts shaped China as philosophically and militaristically 
opposed to American values; these themes combine to create an image of China as a 
massive, monstrous octopus taking over the globe. The June 27, 2005 issue of Time 
devoted a section to ―China by the Numbers,‖ in which a series of statistics detailed the 
size and scale of China‘s influence. With some lighthearted facts—China consumed 20 
percent of the world‘s ice cream, had 350 million smokers (larger than America‘s entire 
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population), 500 million estimated rural Chinese who have never brushed their teeth—
others were more ominous: China was responsible for 66 percent of America‘s 
counterfeit imports and had 700 ballistic missiles pointed at Taiwan. Facts related to the 
size of China‘s military, as well as the rapid expansion of its construction efforts, linked 
China‘s threat to the size of its population. 
In trying to determine what China‘s revolution actually was, news tended to focus 
on China‘s military expansion. This was seen most prominently on LDT‘s ―Red Storm 
Rising‖ reports. On LDT, China‘s military was discussed using discourses of monstrous 
enormity, as Dobbs described the ―massive military buildup now underway in 
Communist China,‖ its ―massive ongoing joint military exercises with Russia,‖
175
 and the 
fact that ―China‘s army stands at 2.3 million,‖
176
 for American audiences. Dobbs featured 
stories on China purchasing Israeli weapons
177
 and Russian submarines,
178
 citing China‘s 
escalating nuclear capacity as ―a threat to hundreds of American cities.‖
179
 In these 
stories, the biggest threat of China‘s military was its sheer size, accompanied by the 
notion of an army of devotees to China‘s communist—and thus inherently anti-
American—philosophies. As CNN correspondent Christine Romans told Dobbs: ― 
[China] is a country, Lou, that has an unwavering commitment to the national Chinese 
agenda.‖
180
 For Dobbs, the Chinese nation was unfit to be a player on the world stage: 
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playing by different rules it was, inherently and by choice, ―an obstacle to U.S. and 
international efforts to enforce norms of acceptable behavior.‖
181
  
Bi-ethnic Ben, musing about the types of stories he saw in the news, linked 
China‘s economic growth, American anxieties, and the military, in a few sentences:  
China‘s economic developments, and how they‘re the downfall of the 
United States, the perceived military build-up of China; and they‘re just a 
huge influence. I think it‘s really just a concern of who‘s in control… this 
concept of going to war with China. 
While Ben felt that military engagements or an ―all-out war‖ with China was untenable, 
he still felt that the news presented the possibility of China as a military threat. The 
general xenophobic culture that Ben felt surrounded by is linked to personal experiences 
that suggest a national discourse preoccupied with American defense tactics and overseas 
military threats. He shared: ―Some people ask, ‗If we went to war with Korea, who would 
you fight for?‘ [It] always pisses me off. People ask, ‗North or South?‘ Yes. I‘m a 
fucking sleeper spy from North Korea, and I‘m going to tell you that.‖ Despite being a 
U.S. citizen and highly patriotic, Ben feels that larger national discourses about foreign 
threats shape how he is seen in America. Korean American Tom, for example, described 
a fight with a fellow classmate after Korean American Seung-Hui Cho went on a 
shooting rampage at Virginia Tech University: ―One guy asked, ‗Are you going to shoot 
me now? Are you going to kill me now? Are you going to kill everyone?‘‖ For Tom and 
other interviewees, these reactions to large national news events shows how easy it is for 
generalizations and stereotypes to emerge. Tom explained what he perceived to be the 
stream of consciousness that shapes how people read him: ―It just dwells inside them: 
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‗Oh, this guy‘s Korean. Korea, North Korean, North Korea, Korean War, Kim Jong-Il, 
nuclear bombs.‘‖ Overall, informants felt that the new stories in the years leading up to 
their years in college created the same climate of suspicion, fear and anxiety, but with a 
focus on China. 
The news sources in this chapter, then, suggest that news media work to define 
the social categories in which Asian Americans find themselves situated. In the 2000s 
and in the context of multiple stories focused on China, series like LDT‘s ―Red Storm 
Rising‖ helped to perpetuate a Manichaean division of world powers. LDT shaped China 
as oppositional to the Western image of international diplomacy and democracy, by 
referring to its actions as self-serving, aggressive, and suspicious. Casting China as a 
monolithic, rigid and determined country ignoring the rest of the world‘s rules, 
correspondent Romans reported that China is a land with ―no rule of law,‖
182
 and ―its 
own definition of democracy.‖
183
 In addition, On June 27, 2005 LDT ran a special report 
on the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)‘s bid for American energy 
company Unocal, describing China‘s ostensibly sudden burst of competitiveness as ―an 
aggressive grab‖ for ―a Chinese takeover.‖ Peter Leitner, from the Center of Advanced 
Defense Studies called the bid a move toward ―world domination, or at least domination 
over the United States.‖
184
 In an interview with Richard D‘Amato of the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, Dobbs asked the rhetorical question, ―Their 
policy makers, leaders, are strategic in terms of economics, politics and military. They 
see little distinction amongst those three elements of their strategy, correct?‖ Continuing 
with a discussion of China‘s ―seamless patchwork‖ of economic, political and military 
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needs and growth, Dobbs and his guests shaped Chinese leaders as cunning strategists 
using American companies for personal gain. R. James Woolsey, former head of the CIA, 
at a Congressional hearing on the matter a month later, furthered the formulation of 
China as untrustworthy. Woolsey named China the ―worst of the worst‖ of the remaining 
world dictatorships, not to be trusted since it ―more or less invented strategy some 
thousands of years ago.‖
185
  
By referring to China‘s bid for Unocal and other oil companies as an ―energy 
assault,‖
186
 its ―aggressive attempt to take control‖
187
 and ―aggressive nationalistic energy 
policy,‖
188
 as well as a communist government that would ―do anything to suit its 
needs,‖
189
 ―Red Storm Rising‖ presented China as an aggressor of nonconsensual 
brutality. Constant references to an incessant need for energy to fuel growth imbued 
China‘s activities with biological imagery.
190
 This was fully realized in an interview with 
U.S. Representative Chris Smith (R-New Jersey), who opined:  
In an octopus-like way, China is spreading its tentacles and forging 
friendship where they ask no questions about human rights, but then take 
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References to China‘s ―voracious appetite for weaponry,‖
192
 and to ―the Middle 
Kingdom‘s thirst for energy‖
193
 not only continued Orientalist discourse but imbued 
China with a biological yet also machine-like imagery, dehumanizing it to a living, 
growing, expanding organism, a threat easy for all to identify.
194
  
In constant references to China‘s size and its needs for everything from oil to ice 
cream, news reports described China as—to use a term from BusinessWeek, ―a big, dirty 
growth engine.‖
195
 In Newsweek, Fareed Zakaria warned readers, ―You cannot switch it 
[China] off.‖
196
 This threat was reinforced by a hyperbolic panic of scale, as seen in 
Zakaria‘s descriptions of China‘s size: ―It is a country whose scale dwarfs the United 
States…. Now the very size and scale that seemed so alluring is beginning to look 
ominous.‖
197
 The New York Times wrote of the dangers of an ―emerging dragon,‖
198
 
while USA Today compared the country to a ―sleeping giant:‖ 
[The] sleeping giant now is wide awake…. The Chinese are coming on 
strong. Their economy has been the fastest growing in the world during 
the past decade. Their population is 4.5 times ours. Their military is by far 
the world‘s biggest. Just last week, they put a man in space, something we 
no longer are able to do unless we hitchhike on a Russian ship.
199
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The language in these texts discussed China‘s surge toward modernization juxtaposed 
against a stagnant America. China became an unstoppable, encroaching force threatening 
the boundaries of American logic and standards.  
“Learning How to Make Itself More Infectious”: H5N1, SARS, and the Boundaries 
of Sickness 
Outbreak 
Also threatening American boundaries in the 2000s was the emergence of avian 
influenza (H5N1). The major news cycle for avian influenza began in July of 2005, 
prompting concerns of a global, viral pandemic.
200
 As the virus took hold in China, 
Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia, health officials from the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) began to show concern about animal-
to-human contact and the role of migratory birds in spreading the disease to Western 
countries: first Europe, then potentially America. Filipino American Dean did not name 
avian flu as a memorable news event at first, but immediately jumped—literally, almost 
jumped out of his chair—to it when I asked if he thought news events abroad influenced 
how people viewed Asians in the U.S. 
Yes! One that I didn‘t mention was the avian flu. This supposedly started 
because of how people think Asians are unclean in other countries. 
Because [Asians] live with livestock, and partly what comes from people 
living on top of each other, how things spread. So that had a big sense of 
what I think people view Asian Americans as. 
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Pointing to ―how people think Asians are unclean,‖ Dean provided an example of how he 
felt the news shaped Asians as culturally different from Americans. Other interviewees 
linked news on H5N1 to stereotypes of Asian exoticism; it became clear that for this 
news event, the paradox of a modern yet backwards China—diseased yet linked in to a 
global network—rose to the forefront. 
While the first outbreaks of H5N1 were reported in Vietnam and Thailand,
201
 the 
first mention of avian flu on LDT was part of a ―Red Storm Rising‖ segment on a 
mysterious pig disease that had resulted in human deaths.
202
 Correspondent Kitty Pilgrim 
explained to Americans, ―the disease comes from eating or slaughtering sick pigs, which 
is commonly done in rural China. No news sources discussed the fact that developing 
countries, including the United States, have contended with outbreaks of disease, ranging 
from tuberculosis to syphilis. Rather, Pilgrim‘s report on a disease (eventually found to 
be unrelated to H5N1) that came from ―common‖ rural practices constructed China, and 
its people, as naturally unclean and uncivilized.  
China‘s health problems were also amplified by linkages to previous China-
related illnesses, as a WHO spokesman interviewed on LDT related: ―I think the first 
thing that pops into everyone‘s mind is avian influenza, and then comes SARS.‖
203
 
Referring to the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was a 
widespread tactic in news reports, as critiques of China‘s handling of SARS in 2003 
informed critiques of H5N1 in 2005. Constant references to China‘s attempts at cover-
ups rampant during the SARS outbreak in 2003, were at the forefront of H5N1 
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discussions. The New York Times wrote about the first suspected cases of avian flu in late 
October 2005, and China reported its first official cases of the disease a few weeks later 
on November 16, 2005. The newspaper labeled China‘s report as a ―potentially far-
reaching change in how China handles the emergence of new diseases,‖ contrasting the 
country‘s information-sharing to the tight-lipped secrecy with which it handled SARS in 
2003.
204
 With WHO officials stating that the low number of reported Chinese cases was 
more likely due to inadequate rural health care reporting rather than a propaganda effort 
of the Chinese government,
205
 alarmist news was not as dominant as it was with SARS.  
The linkages made between avian flu and SARS were more prevalent in 
magazines, which published special reports and columns with hypothetical scenarios of a 
global virus. On May 5, 2003, Time magazine devoted a special issue entirely to SARS. 
In it, writers focused on the severe global impact of the SARS outbreak, which would 
later prime health officials and politicians to voice concerns over the economic 
implications of an H5N1 pandemic. The magazine compared China, the source of the 
outbreak, to Toronto, the first non-Asian city to report cases SARS. A self-proclaimed 
―investigation into what went wrong,‖ the article presented the China and Toronto cases 
in a point-counterpoint comparison style. Author Steven Frank wrote, ―bad luck explains 
most of Toronto‘s tale, but not all of it.‖
206
 With a superficial description of how a 
Chinese hospital patient infected a neighboring patient who then went on to spread 
SARS, Frank declared that ―most‖ of Toronto‘s SARS experience was a result of mere 
misfortune. By relegating the sickness and its spread to chance encounters and bad 
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timing, this narrative relieves Toronto officials and medical practitioners from any failure 
in oversight or agency. 
Romesh Ratnesar and Hannah Beech‘s story on China, on the other hand, was 
more detailed than Frank‘s, with quotes from various sources and a tone of suspicion that 
shaped China as an untrustworthy harbinger of disease and deception. The juxtaposition 
of these stories identified Chinese negligence and the self-serving interests of the 
Communist party—rather than the ―bad luck‖ of Toronto‘s officials—as the reason 
behind the SARS epidemic set the stage for discussions of avian flu only a few years 
later. Ratnesar and Beech described China as ―scenes of calm mask[ing] a quiet frenzy,‖ 
and government officials‘ ―stonewalling,‖
207
 attempts to ―preserve [Shanghai‘s] ‗SARS-
free‘ reputation at any cost,‖
208
 and ―spreading false assurances.‖
209
 References to 
Chinese deception were echoed in emphasis throughout the magazine: for example, in his 
letter to readers, managing editor James Kelley relayed the story of how 31 infected 
hospital workers were ―loaded into ambulances and driven around until inspectors 
left.‖
210
 On LDT, CNN correspondents reported on bodies cremated before adequate 
samples could be taken,
211
 and interviewees suggested that China‘s number of reported 
cases was suspiciously low.
212
 
While these events may certainly have occurred, the juxtaposition of China (East) 
and Canada (West) highlighted China‘s deception as antithetical to the rest of the world‘s 
standards of cooperation, transparency, and public health. Readers of The New York 
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Times were led to remember China‘s deceptive government in an article on avian flu, 
which recalled how China hid knowledge of SARS for four months, until it became an 
epidemic.
213
 A 2003 article on SARS highlighting China‘s shameful behavior detailed 
how CDC officials were invited to China only to be denied access to patients and 
information. ―It was the Asian cultural thing of not wanting to say no,‖ a CDC 
spokesman declared. ―Chinese leaders are so obsessed with maintaining social order,‖ 
Newsweek wrote, ―that they may opt to sacrifice transparency for the sake of keeping 
citizens blissfully in the dark.‖ Dobbs used the H5N1 outbreak to reiterate that China did 
not play by the world‘s rules: ―As the world prepares for the possibility of a bird flu 
epidemic, there is one country holding out vital cooperation, globally, on bird flu. The 
country is, of course, China.‖
214
 That Dobbs suggests that China is ―of course‖ the usual 
suspect reconfirms China‘s position as a natural enemy from whom America needs to be 
shielded, something increasingly difficult in a global era. 
As the mobility of avian flu became increasingly possible, the news narrative 
became one of spread and containment. Tom, recalling this moment in the news, 
explained the concerns over the mobility of people and diseases:  
Because it originated from there, and in Asia, if you‘re from Hong Kong, 
then Hong Kong is so dense, it goes everywhere in Asia. Then it‘s bound 
to spread very quickly. And from there, obviously, it was spread from 
there to another country. So in the end, back then [Americans] thought that 
we were kind of dangerous. They wouldn‘t really want to interact with 
us…. [But] they aren‘t as paranoid as they were back then. I mean, they 
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still – it was kind of like one of those thoughts that lasted there for maybe 
about ten minutes when they saw me.  
Even Tom, whose academic interests in health care helped him understand the spread of 
outbreaks, still felt implicated by the discourses surrounding H5N1. In news sources, the 
impact of these diseases was inherently linked to the global(ized) mobility of diseased 
Chinese to other countries—namely, America.  
In these contexts, the viral pandemic was a threat to America‘s public health as 
well as its corporate and economic security. The rhetoric of containment was deployed in 
two ways throughout media stories: to handle the spread of the disease and people, and to 
paint the pandemic as a national security issue. Discussions of China‘s 
interconnectedness in a global economy linked the narrative of disease to the discourses 
of globalization and potential contamination by a consistently growing, mobile 
population. As Time‘s Bryan Walsh recounted: 
Chances are your shirt, your pants and your underwear all came from 
southern China, the new manufacturing center of the world. Add one more 
export: your flu virus. With its dense populations of people and animals 
trading germs back and forth, southern China has been the traditional 
birthplace of influenza, including the nasty strain of H5N1 bird flu that's 
keeping public-health officials awake at night.
215
 
Here, global trade networks were presented as vulnerable to the flow of germs and 
tainted people. The inflated, sensationalized panic over globalization and diseases 
implied that Americans could get the flu simply by buying something made in China; it 
                                                 




was a small chance, but a chance nonetheless, that the ―new manufacturing center of the 
world‖ could also manufacture a disease of epic proportions. For Japanese American 
Randy, the presumed fears about the spread of H5N1 from products also extended to 
fears about Asians and Asian Americans: 
I remember how people were afraid of Asians, were afraid of them 
spreading it. Or like, just looking at how people viewed me… they were 
scared of Asians having the bird flu.  
In detailing H5N1‘s global threat, Newsweek interviewed the author of An Investor‟s 
Guide to the Avian Flu who declared, ―Now, because of global supply chains, even 
people who are nowhere near being infected are going to suffer.‖ By detailing the threat 
to Americans who ―are nowhere near being infected‖—whether this means they are not 
global travelers, or live in all-white areas, was not specified—news sources played to 
hypothetical fears of contaminated people and products coming into the U.S.: Americans 
did not need to seek out the virus; it would seek out them. As LDT‘s Kitty Pilgrim 




In imagining the extent of devastation such a pandemic would cause, Time 
propagated hyper-inflated speculation by likening the potential disaster to Hurricane 
Katrina on a national level. The magazine warned that the flu could possibly make one 
third of the world‘s population sick at one time;
217
 in a similar move to quantify the 
potential deadliness of the disease, Newsweek wrote that avian flu ―could, in the worst 
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case, kill as many people in a few months as AIDS has done in two decades,‖
218
 and that 
it could decimate ―2.5 percent of the world‘s population—in a matter of months.‖
219
 
Linking the disease to a war on America‘s health, avian flu was described as ―the threat 
that knows no boundaries.‖ America was presented as a victim as Time‘s mention of the 




The Hot Zone 
China was described as not only politically responsible for the spread of disease, 
but also its origins: in this discourse, news texts continually named China was the natural 
birthplace for disease. Newsweek‘s Zakaria explained, ―China is the natural habitat of the 
influenza virus.... Across thousands of homes in China every day, chickens are 
slaughtered in highly unhygienic ways.‖
221
 Similarly, a New York Times article claimed 
that ―China is known as an incubator for diseases,‖ with no explanation as to why.
222
 
These moves make a commonsense narrative of China as provincial, unhygienic, and 
naturally contaminated: a ―natural‖ incubator of disease.  
In one early Time report, protectionist impulses went so far as to use the language 
of miscegenation, detailing the hypothetical threat of ―mixing‖ Chinese germs and 
Western bodies: 
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…the risk to Westerners who do not come into direct contact with Asian 
birds is infinitesimal, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease control. 
But the farther the virus spreads, and the more people who become 
infected with it, the greater the risk…. The resulting hybrid could be both 




Despite highlighting the ―infinitesimal‖ chance of coming into contact with H5N1, the 
article focused instead on presumed infection. The potential damages of a global 
pandemic became increasingly conjectural and hyperbolic as articles began to detail the 
possibility and consequences of a global pandemic, as well as how to contain it. The 
presumption about contamination and the hyperbole surrounding the affects of H5N1 was 
also reflected in the gallows humor and social experiences of Asian American 
interviewees. Nick shared, ―I guess [whites] were scared of Asians having the bird flu. 
My friends used to joke with each other about it, like, ‗You‘ve got bird flu!‘ It was a 
joke…but I guess also rooted in reality.‖ These types of jokes were common amongst 
several interviewees and their Asian American peers; these recollections suggest how 
diffuse the fears pervading the stories around H5N1 became, and how Asian American 
men, while joking about the possibility of being carriers, knew it was how they were read 
by others they met.  
That H5N1 could infiltrate America‘s borders at any time prompted a call for 
America to shift from being a passive victim to a pro-active defender. China was 
described in connection with an agentive, determined virus ―learning how to make itself 
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 which not only anthropomorphized the virus but also reinforced the 
image of China as an organic, biological, growing threat too large to comprehend. 
Claiming to know ―the TRUTH about SARS,‖ Time explained, ―the deadly respiratory 
illness may have started in a rural province of China, but its impact—economic and 
otherwise—is rippling around the world, spreading even faster than the virus that causes 
it.‖
225
 In these anxieties over global impact, one might imagine that H5N1 became 
interchangeable with China itself, as a country learning to become more competitive and 
spreading influence across the globe. 
In reports on the United States‘ readiness for an avian flu outbreak, America‘s 
medical infrastructure and emergency preparedness system was discussed in military 
terms; at its head, Commander in Chief George W. Bush. The President‘s report on 
handling the outbreak detailed a national strategy involving ―surveillance and detection,‖ 
and ―response and containment.‖
226
 Ultimately, these narratives aimed to protect 
America‘s borders and workers by containing China‘s mobility and global reach. 
Framing H5N1 as a national security issue threat—as seen in Fareed Zakaria‘s move to 
claim the disease as ―a threat worse than terror‖—allowed for discussions to move into 
the realm of national security and protectionist efforts. The threatening combination of 
Chinese germs in Western spaces bodies led to the call to close borders and promoted a 
trend of ―staying local.‖ 
“Where Do You Draw the Line Between Cautionary and Crazy?”: Product Recalls 
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In 2007, toy company Mattell conducted the largest recall in its history.
227
 The 
company recalled 83 types of toys including remote airplanes, easy bake ovens, toy grills, 
and a line of Thomas the Tank Engine trains.
228
 This was accompanied by a surge of 
news articles on other contaminated Chinese products—recalls had been called on 
everything from pet food and tires,
229
 to children‘s jewelry and toothpaste
230
— as well as 
consumer anxieties and reactions including purchasing lead-testing kits for home use.
231
 
―No one wants to be a paranoid parent,‖ a concerned mother told the New York Times. 
―But,‖ she added, ―Where do you draw the line between cautionary and crazy?‖
232
  
These news stories again used the converging themes of contagion and panic of 
scale, as well as an innocent America, to support protectionist policies. Rather than 
discussing the consequences of un- or under-regulated industries, the major theme in 
most news stories surrounding these issues tended to focus on China as an intentionally 
lawless place. The construction of America as a victim depended on the subsequent 
construction of China as irresponsible, reckless, and ruthless.  
For Chinese American Jimmy, the coverage of China‘s massive product recalls 
reinforced a connotative link between contamination and ―Orientals‖:  
[These stories] definitely impact how non-Asian Americans, and arguably 
some Asian Americans, view China and the untrustworthiness of its 
products. I do believe that it distinguishes some people‘s analysis of how 
Asians are viewed in America. 
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Indian American Partha, thinking through the meanings and narratives he saw in the 
news, elaborated on this point: ―People might – maybe falsely—think that Chinese 
people may have some of the qualities of the Chinese government, Chinese society. They 
might think, ‗Maybe they like to be more this way because China‘s like this way, or that 
way.‘ They might associate the two.‖ Coverage on China‘s practices did not merely hinge 
on a distrust of China; as Partha and Jimmy identify, the perceived suspicion and blame 
from these stories could extend to Asian Americans as a whole.  
Combined, narratives of product recalls and H5N1 bolstered the call for 
protectionism as not only matters of national security, but also patriotism. Products 
tainted by chemicals, imported to America and bought for American homes and children, 
elevated the ―innocent American‖ theme and spurred an intense backlash to the ―Made in 
China‖ label. The focus on a ―buy local‖ movement, which newspapers mostly depicted 
through interviews with consumers, empowered patriotic consumers to protect American 
families and workers. USA Today, for example, interviewed Sara Bongiomi, whose book 
A Year Without „Made in China‟ detailed her family‘s year-long boycott of Chinese 
goods. In the same article, consumers declared, ―I am finding it hard to trust China,‖ and, 
―If I can, I‘d prefer to buy American to support workers here.‖
233
 While more moderate 
interviewees for The New York Times were less concerned over the quality of Chinese 
goods, one buyer explained the difficulties of finding American-made products: ―I bought 
a drill press. I decided to buy American. So I bought the Craftsman label and when I got 
home I saw on the box it was made in China.‖ Another in declared that, ―With cars and 
things that cost a lot, I prefer to buy American-made.‖
234
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With buyers ―scrutinizing labels to ensure that what they [bought was] not 
produced in China,‖
235
 products ―Not Made in China‖
236
 gained legitimacy—American-
made products were cast as superior (read: cleaner) products. This clean/unclean 
dichotomy was seen when the move to ―Buy American‖ reached its peak in the 2007 
holiday season, where reports suggested that recalls would leave ―the safest,‖
 237
 
American-made toys in stores. Despite this, USA Today declared, ―The ‗anti-China 
Christmas‘ didn‘t come to pass…. Recalls have had virtually no effect on toy sales.‖
238
 In 
this context, the even the most ardent, patriotic American consumer could not escape the 
grip China had on the American market. Indeed, the wide-reaching recall brought to light 
China‘s hold on the world‘s manufacturing, with a June 19, 2007 New York Times article 
reporting that ―China is responsible for about 60 percent of all product recalls, compared 
with 36 percent in 2000.‖
239
 In focusing on the size and influence of China‘s 
manufacturing system, news stories on the massive toy recall framed China as a threat 
that could not be contained. ―Toys made in China make up 70 to 80 percent of the toys 
sold in the country,‖ the New York Times declared.
240
 Newsweek referred to China as ―the 
workshop of the world,‖
241
 BusinessWeek ―the global factory,‖
242
 and the New York 
Times ―the world‘s toy chest.‖
243
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Within these depictions of China‘s global reach was the discussion of China‘s 
loose safety standards, a combination against which the Americans could not defend 
themselves. Also adding to a discourse of an innocent America, seen above, was the 
prominent focus on American families and safety. In an October 19 special report on the 
decline of American manufacturing jobs, correspondent Kitty Pilgrim walked through an 
American house, telling viewers: 
In a typical American home, nearly everything is made in China. 
Everything on this table, in the kitchen, accessories, home office: 
Americans are increasingly addicted to Chinese products. The greatest 
irony? This ―Made in America‖ sign was made in China. 
The ubiquity of Chinese-made products also lent to a certain degree of visibility for Asian 
Americans like Young Min. A Korean American, Young Min shared numerous instances 
of when he had been mistaken as Chinese. He attributes this to the fact that ―it‘s kind of 
true that there‘s so many more Chinese people in the United States [than before]…and 
because everything is now made in China.‖ Young Min‘s rationalization suggests how 
global flows of labor and manufacturing affect how he is viewed, and why he thinks he is 
viewed that way. Feeling that China-made products are everywhere, Young Min believes 
that the same logic is applied to Asians in America: that the assumption is that they, too, 
are ―Made in China.‖ 
―Red Storm Rising‖ combined the image of Chinese manufacturers sneaking their 
way in to American homes with that of contaminated and diseased, or counterfeit, 
products.
244
 On LDT, Dobbs and his various correspondents referred to Chinese imports 
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as a ―flood,‖ but also applied the contagion theme by calling Chinese goods ―an 
epidemic,‖
245
 and ―an addiction.‖
246
 Introducing a segment on the decline of American-
made products, Dobbs lamented over ―America‘s dangerous addiction to cheap Chinese 
goods. From textiles to electronics, American consumers want them and China is more 
than willing to sell them.‖
247
 Here, the rhetorical turn cast America as an addict. Some 
news sources explained the presence of contaminated goods in American stores as 
America‘s own fault, due to a self-policed toy industry,
248
 outdated safety policies,
249
 and 
consumers‘ and corporations‘ desire for cheap goods. However, self-critique never lasted 
long, with news texts describing America‘s role as consumer as a position of 
vulnerability and innocence; the teenage drug addict who just didn‘t know any better. As 




Summing up his thoughts on these news events, Chinese American Bobby 
confirmed the sense of feeling conscribed by discourses of ruthlessness and panic in the 
news: 
When people have a specific thing like, ―Things from this country aren‘t 
good,‖ then it might sometimes be, ―Well, the only reason they‘re not 
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good is because the people who made them aren‘t good,‖ you know? So 
then it might be, ―Oh, well, Chinese people aren‘t very careful with 
making their toys or careful in evaluating what they put in their toys.‖ So, 
you can see how that could affect me negatively. 
Here, Bobby anticipated that some of the descriptions found in the news would affect 
how he would be interpreted as an Asian in America. Indeed, more in-depth reporting on 
a Chinese government ―inured to reports of official venality,‖
251
 a business community of 
―unscrupulous producers,‖
 252
 and manufacturers ―uninhibited by regulation [or] 
lawsuits.‖
253
 This language often absolved Americans from any blame surrounding the 
purchase of tainted goods by focusing instead on the ruthless competition and amoral 
practices of the Chinese. 
 “The Big Red Machine”: China and the Olympics 
The Olympic Games were also framed as somehow tainted or counterfeit. By 
2008, what USA Today described as ―a growing United States populist mood against 
China‖ had made the themes of China as a massive, monstrous, contaminated threat part 
of a common-sense narrative. Even Brad discussed the Olympics in terms of the ―two 
faces‖ of China that Juan Williams discovered upon his visit to the country. Describing 
coverage of the Olympic host, Brad identified two dominant images he encountered: 
―One of China putting on a very spectacular Olympic event, being a very advanced, 
industrialized nation, and then on the flip side, being kind of backwards and corrupt, and 
not being able to regulate itself.‖ When asked to elaborate upon these images, Brad tied it 
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all together: he felt that the coverage surrounding avian flu and product recalls presented 
a ―backwards and corrupt‖ China, while the focus on its military and economic growth, 
as well as its key place in global networks, presented an ―advanced, industrialized 
nation.‖ Given the amount of news concerning China since 2005, the 2008 Olympics 




The 2008 Olympics were, by far, hailed as an unprecedented spectacle of China, 
its build-up and unveiling broadcast around the world. News sources discussed China‘s 
rapid preparations for the Olympic Games as a metaphor for the country‘s rise in the 
global economy; as NBC China analyst Joshua Cooper Ramo explained to television 
audiences before the ceremony, ―Some of the energy we feel here tonight is the 
nervousness of a nation about to put a match to the fuse of a rocket.‖
255
 As interviewees‘ 
conversations turned to the Olympic games, it was clear that the interpretations of China 
and the symbolism of the Olympics as a media event were still vexed. Chinese American 
Hugh told me that he juggled two perspectives: 
There are two views. The Olympics brought into mind that Asians can do 
great things. But I think it also reinforced some stereotypes. Like when 
you had all these thousands of men [in the Opening Ceremony], they were 
just submissive men in exotic costumes, going in unison, with no 
individuality. I think it demeaned their specific roles.  
Chinese American Hugh offered an interpretation of the thousands of performers during 
the Olympic Opening Ceremony that was reflected in the newspaper coverage of the 
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Games. ―China and the Olympics were actually made for each other,‖ The New York 
Times offered. ―There may not be much left of the ideological aspects of communism, but 
mass mobilization and control are still very much Chinese specialties.‖
256
 Seen in the 
NBC commentary that began this chapter, NBC anchors noted the choreography of the 
Opening Ceremonies, but consistently marveled at the display of discipline and control of 
dancers who could move in precision without the aid of a director on the stadium floor.  
 ―Obviously, they‘re not going to put together something crappy,‖ Chinese 
American Avery mused, as he recalled the Olympics. While more ambivalent toward the 
Olympics coverage, Avery shared how his mother believed that the ceremonies were 
designed ―to show the world that China is a strong, new nation.‖ Avery‘s mother was not 
the only one to see the political posturing. The New York Times also labeled the opening 
ceremonies as the ultimate display of ―maximalist preparations‖ to showcase the nation‘s 
unity, seen in its performers‘ movements, and prosperity, seen in the modern buildings 
constructed for the Olympics.
257
 Korean American Phil saw the same message in the 
opening ceremonies as the New York Times: ―I think people were surprised, how much 
[China] advanced as a country. And how much of a powerhouse they‘ve become. They 
are just as competitive, wealthy, and powerful as America.‖ Francis agreed, concluding, 
―China wouldn‘t have made it such an elaborate event if not for the economic crisis, and 
knowing there‘s a lot of uncertainty, in America.‖ 
Continuing to juxtapose the image of an advanced nation and its global rise, news 
sources focused on images and language to shape China as completely antithetical to 
America. In the lead-up to and coverage of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, news media 
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shaped China‘s Olympic preparations and goals as again ruthless and aggressive. Most 
notably, USA Today appealed to American nationalist sentiment by alluding to national 
conflicts like the Cold War and WWII. A series of articles compared and conflated China 
with Nazi Germany, and promoted imagery of China‘s authoritarian capitalism: 
describing the scene at the Beijing torch relay, USA Today wrote of a ―sea of red Chinese 
flags and plenty of red Coca-Cola flags, too.‖
258
 USA Today took the lead in covering the 
debate over whether or not the U.S. should boycott the Opening Ceremonies, quickly 
linking 2008 Games to the 1936 Berlin Olympics and the Chinese to the Nazis. 
In a blatant move, USA Today published a letter written by U.S. Representative 
Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) calling for a boycott of the Opening Ceremony: 
In 1936, the world made the mistake of providing Adolf Hitler with a 
global platform to showcase his fascist propaganda by participating in the 
Olympics hosted by Nazi Germany. It was wrong to support the Olympic 
venue then, and it's wrong for the United States to support this prestigious 
event being held in a similarly fascist regime in 2008.
259
  
The comparisons of these ―similarly fascist regimes‖ were even reinforced in moments of 
ostensible objectivity. The day before the Games began, USA Today printed a back-and-
forth between conservative and liberal columnists. Discussing China‘s move to censor 
international journalists at the Olympics, they eventually came together to agree that, 
―Like the Nazis, the Communist Chinese lie to preserve their power and privilege.‖
260
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One article deferred the Nazi comparisons to ―critics of China‖ who saw China‘s 
human rights practices ―echo[ing] those of the Nazi regime.‖
261
 Olympic historian David 
Wallechinsky claimed that the Olympics would serve as a way for China to legitimize the 
Communist Party within its borders, similar to the Nazi Party‘s goals with the Berlin 
games.
262
 References to Soviet era administrations were also rife, to the point that a New 
York Times critique of Olympics coverage complained of the ―the tendency to see 
Potemkinism‖ in China‘s Olympic aspirations.
263
 Building on the notion that the 
preparation for Games exposed politics and ideologies, the Beijing Olympics were seen 
as a potential, ―galvanizing Sputnik moment‖ that would hopefully spur America to 
realize that ―China will be a formidable competitor, and not just in the athletic arena,‖ 
and ―a challenge that the U.S. dare not avoid.‖
264
 A USA Today article containing Nazi 
references later claimed that China could win the gold medal count, a feat no nation 
―other than the USA or the Soviet Union‖ had accomplished since Germany in 1936. 
Again using mechanistic, inhuman descriptors, the athletic prowess of China‘s athletes 
was woven in to the stories of China‘s monstrosity: describing the rigorous training of 
Chinese children, USA Today labeled China‘s athletic system a ―Big Red machine.‖
265
  
As USA Today described, this Chinese training machine was contaminated in its 
own way. Articles focused on abusive Chinese trainers, and their philosophy of discipline 
far removed from America‘s celebratory athletic culture. This discussion combined 
human rights discourse, already at the forefront of China‘s problems, with descriptions of 
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Chinese athletes and the ―iron hand‖ of China‘s training system.
266
 USA Today wrote that 
while abuse was not condoned in children‘s training schools, a trainer diplomatically 
declared, ―the concept of beating and abuse are different in different cultures and 
countries,‖
267
 and the New York Times ran an article on the intense pressure placed on 
athletes in the push for medals, despite—or in spite—of athletes‘ health and safety. 
In recalling these stories, Avery shared the belief that negative reporting is 
common during the Olympics, but that it reached a new level because of America‘s 
stance toward China:  
People view the Olympics as a source of national pride, and expect the 
U.S. to succeed at everything. Anyone that would‘ve beaten us would‘ve 
gotten some dirt flung at their face. But, in addition to being Asian and 
exotic, because they are also our rivals, people felt the need to say 
something even dirtier.  
It was clear that, by the 2008 Olympics, most interviewees had a clear understanding of 
the negative stereotypes perpetuated in news texts, and how the shape of news narratives 
structured Orientalist discourses writ large. Hugh, for example, recalled a specific news 
event and, in imagining perceived reactions to the event, extrapolated the sentiment: 
And the little girl who sang, that they replaced with a different girl 
because she was cuter? I guess that just showed how far China would go 
to perpetuate its image... But it also can link to these ideas that Asians are 
backstabbers, really competitive. 
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At the core of these interview responses is a series of layered readings. Asian American 
men not only saw how China was presented in the news, but also imagined how others 
would react to those presentations, and how those reactions would implicate them as 
Asians in America. 
 One interesting theme that emerged from news on the Olympics was small yet 
noticeable, and highlighted the complex role of the media in framing countries and 
politics to audiences. Some news sources focused on Beijing‘s ―Manners Movement,‖ a 
top-down and sometimes grassroots, ostensibly backwards attempt to teach Chinese 
citizens manners, courtesies, and even English to help with the Olympic Games. This 
movement garnered much attention from reporters and even documentary filmmakers.
268
 
In one article‘s interview with different Beijing citizens learning English, it became clear 
that the manners movement was an attempt to pre-empt Western (read: American) 
stereotypes about China: 
―I hope U.S. visitors will see China as a normal country, friendly with 
good manners, good hosts,‖ [Beijing resident] Wang says. ―China always 
seems so far away and mysterious. When I meet people who are on their 
first trip to China, they always say, ‗It's so different from what I had read 
about or seen on TV.‘ That's what I am hoping for.‖
269
 
This Beijing resident‘s familiarity with China‘s (mis)representations in the West, which 
he readily identifies as the United States, shows how American formulations of China are 
visible and interpreted not only by American audiences, but by Chinese audiences as 
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well. Wang declared a desire for China to be seen as a ―normal‖ country, a theme 
reflected in Asian American interviewees‘ declarations of just wanting to be seen as ―a 
normal guy‖ in the United States. These similarities suggest just how diffuse the 
stereotypes and narratives of whiteness are, in America and beyond. 
Conclusion 
Interviewees of all ethnicities felt implicated in the news discourses surrounding 
China in the 2000s. They acknowledged the conflation of China-as-Asia, as well as a 
larger racial discourse that conflates their own ethnicities into a larger category of 
―Oriental.‖ In this context, news on China is believed to inform larger understandings of 
America and its attitudes toward Asia, and lends to the complex matrix within which 
interviewees negotiate their own identities as Asian American men.  
Just as Partha felt that some ―might think that Chinese people may have some of 
the qualities of the Chinese government,‖ interviewees agreed that the timbre of news 
stories shaped fears and anxieties not only of China as a country, but the Chinese as a 
people—and by association, Asian Americans. A story picked up by The New York Times 
revealed how pervasive this anti-Chinese sentiment had become. Chinese leaders 
demanded an apology from CNN commentator Jack Cafferty, who had shared some 
personal opinions on The Situation Room during a conversation about Chinese imports. 
―We continue to import their junk with the lead paint on them,‖ Cafferty ranted. ―They‘re 
basically the same bunch of goons and thugs they‘ve been for the last 50 years.‖ That 
Cafferty had to explain that he meant ―China‘s government, not its people‖ to his 




In news from 2003-2008, themes of monstrosity, predatory behavior, contagion, 
panic of scale and American innocence converged to form a common-sense narrative of 
Chinese difference as a threat. By tracing the history of anti-Chinese sentiment in 
America, we can locate these themes as part of racial, classed, and gendered discourses 
rooted in 19
th
 century American anxieties over globalization. As America sensed a shift 
in its power over global flows of products and people, news in the 2000s revitalized 
Orientalist themes to help manage fears of China‘s rise. Taken as a whole, this anti-
Chinese rhetoric worked by galvanizing an American national identity in opposition to 
Oriental difference. As such, managing U.S. anxiety was in part a project of bolstering 
the white male American citizen as the norm. Interviewees‘ sense of the diffuse standards 
of white masculinity carried through to news stories, as national audiences saw white 
anchormen on ABC and CNN confirm and affirm stereotypes of Asia. This complex 
mediascape highlights, for interviewees, the annoyingly important role that attitudes 









Viewing Asian Americans 
 
The last two chapters, ―Visibly Invisible: Exploring Asian America‖ and 
―Managing the Octopus: 21
st
 Century Yellow Peril,‖ have shown how to be ―Asian 
American‖ is to negotiate both ―Asian,‖ and ―American‖ narratives, in part due to the 
prominent role discourses of Asia play in defining Asian American, and in part due to the 
lack of any identifiable Asian American narrative in popular discourse. For interviewees, 
Asian American identity is a complex negotiation of visibility and invisibility. This 
chapter turns its lens of analysis to burgeoning representations of Asian Americans as 
visible, major characters in American popular media texts. At the very moment anti-
Chinese rhetoric was feeding anxieties in the news, Asian American men were making 
gains in the entertainment industry. In 2004, ABC presented primetime viewers with the 
multicultural cast of Lost, which featured Korean American Daniel Dae Kim as a Korean 
survivor of the Oceanic 815 crash; in 2006, NBC‘s Heroes offered Japanese American 
Masi Oka as a Japanese man with heroic impulses and the powers of time travel, as well 
as his friend Ando, played by Korean American James Kyson Lee. In 2009, the short-
lived CBS hospital drama Three Rivers featured Korean American David Lee as a 
transplant surgeon; ABC‘s FlashForward starred Korean American John Cho as FBI 
agent Demetri Noh. 
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 The stars from these programs have increased the visibility of Asian American 
men in American popular culture. They have also lent to the gradual shift toward the 
concept of the sexually viable Asian American man, a concept interviewees declared 
nonexistent earlier on. In 2005, Daniel Dae Kim was featured as one of People 
magazine‘s ―Sexiest Men Alive,‖ and John Cho was featured on the list twice, first in 
2006 and then in 2009. While Masi Oka did not make the official list, he was featured as 
a ―Chic Geek‖ in People‘s 2006 ―Sexiest Men Alive‖ issue.
270
 While People is certainly 
not the gold standard of popularity in American culture, the inclusion of these Asian 
Americans among its rankings of sexy male celebrities does show that Asian Americans 
have gained access to a predominantly white arena. The rise of sexy Asian American men 
points to an unprecedented era of multiculturalism in the media, and a shift in how 
politics of difference are portrayed on screen. Understanding how narratives promote or 
deny identification with particular characters, and how they marginalize or focalize 
minority characters, gives insight into the context in which communities are imagined. It 




Media representations of minorities, particularly during the period in which 
interviewees grew up, contribute to their sense of marginalization and invisibility. During 
their teens, media presented bimodal images of Asian American communities; either 
integrated, model minority Asian sidekicks or fresh-off-the-boat, street car-racing, 
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immigrant gangsters. However, the last decade has seen interest groups and film and 
television studios making conscious attempts to increase diversity in the entertainment 
industry. In the late 1990s, the dearth of minority representations led to actions by the 
NAACP, as well as the National Council of La Raza, to protest the ―whiteout‖ practices 
of mainstream media and to call for more diversity in front of and behind cameras. 
Studios instituted diversity initiatives to increase the number of minorities on casts and 
crews.
272
 In 2009, the television season presented audiences with more multicultural 
ensemble casts and Asian American lead actors than ever before.
273
  
 This chapter asks how interviewees, having grown up in an era of absence, react 
to and understand a small but increasingly visible cadre of Asian American actors on 
screen. In discussing who they thought represented Asian America, interviewees 
provided insight into how their own understandings of self and those who define them 
implicate negotiations of race on screens. Lastly, a reading of the multicultural narratives 
of television shows like Lost and Heroes reveals ways in which Asian Americans are 
treated in relation to other races and ethnicities. Ultimately, interviewees negotiate 
contemporary representations of Asian American men using their personal experiences of 
race and ethnicity, and may incorporate these negotiations into expectations of others, 
and performances of self. 
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people of color in 2007. Writers Guild of America, West. ―Rewriting an All-Too Familiar Story? 2009 
Hollywood Writers Report,‖ (Los Angeles, CA: 2009). 
273 See Mary Beltran. ―Meaningful Diversity: Exploring Questions of Equitable Representation on Diverse 




 As we saw in Chapter 1, conversations with each of the men began with stories 
about childhood and growing up as Asian American and male in the United States. When 
the interview questions turned to the issue of Asian American representation in American 
popular media, men immediately began to discuss film and television, with more of a 
focus on television. Based on the interviews and a search of popular American films and 
television shows since 2000, I compiled a series of photographs of major Asian male 
leads. This resulted in four, 8x10-inch color images: Jackie Chan, with Chris Tucker in a 
promotional image from Rush Hour 3 (2007); John Cho and Kal Penn in a promotional 
image for Harold and Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay (2008); Masi Oka in a still 
from the NBC television show Heroes; and Daniel Dae Kim in a promotional photograph 
from ABC‘s Lost. Interviewees were asked if they would add or subtract anyone from 
this offering. While Jet Li was discussed by a few of the interviewees, he was generally 
acknowledged as an actor who no longer produced American texts with as much 
frequency as the four presented. Before discussing these actors, interviewees shared their 
thoughts on the media industry and its approach to racial minorities. 
“You’ll Never See a Movie Called Saving Private Kim!”: Negotiating Mediated 
Whiteness 
Most interviewees had a clear idea that, through images and stories, media 
networks have the power to create common points of reference and shared cultural 
narratives, and that normative behaviors and identities in the popular imaginary are 
influenced by dominant media representations of race and gender.
274
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274 This is the basic premise informing the works of Gray, Watching Race; Stuart Hall, ―Notes on 
Deconstructing ‗the Popular‘,‖ in People‟s History and Socialist Theory, ed. R. Samuel (Boston, MA: 
Routledge, 1981); Kato, From Kung Fu to Hip Hop; Ong, ―Cultural Citizenship.‖ 
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Partha‘s explanation of media content, which under-represents Asians, includes how he 
thinks of the media as a cultural force: 
I think media is kind of a good gauge as what people accept and what 
people are used to. I can‘t explain exactly why. Maybe it‘s because that‘s 
what the producers of that media think people are used to or maybe that‘s 
what the people call for so the producers – like, which came first? I don‘t 
know. Or maybe, the producers have an agenda. 
None of the interviewees held the belief that there was an active, conspiratorial agenda to 
bar Asian Americans from screens. However, the majority believed that Hollywood is 
understood to be a space predominantly for white men, and that racialized images are part 
and parcel of an entertainment industry that has generally not included minorities in its 
creative ranks.  
One of the most noticeable, major themes that emerged from interviews was the 
idea that media representations have powerful effects on, but are also a product of, the 
arena of daily social relations in which these men find themselves. In other words, the 
media industry and its representations work to define the boundaries of whiteness against 
which these men have reacted to in their daily lives. Korean American Josh, for example, 
expressed dissatisfaction over Asians being presented as foreign and unassimilated. In a 
follow-up, I asked if he thought these images influenced how other people understood 
him as an Asian American. Josh replied emphatically: 
Yeah, yeah! The people that don‘t really hang out with all sorts of Asian 
people, that only know one kind of Asian, a lot of the movies definitely 
just kind of narrows down their perceptions of Asians.  
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Later, he explained the link between growing up in a predominantly white neighborhood 
and within a predominantly white media environment: 
Asians don‘t really go into the media, proportionally. And there‘s 
no…Asians in the neighborhood, so Caucasians don‘t really get to know 
them. Some of my really suburban white friends, they‘re like ―Oh, all 
Asians are good at math, they‘re just nerdy kids, blah blah blah,‖ because 
that‘s all they see. And those are the kinds of [Asians] that are in the 
media. 
In Chinese American Avery‘s view, an Asian American character is readily identified by 
the stereotypes they embody. 
For some people, it‘s hard to see an Asian person without some kind of 
brilliance, or without some kind of Kung Fu ability. So, for them, the 
character might exist less real-y[sic] if those things weren‘t there. But 
that‘s just because that‘s the only thing they‘ve been exposed to for all this 
time.  
Avery points to particular markers or signifiers of ―Asian American‖—in this case, 
model minority intelligence or Kung Fu skills—used to package the Asian American 
body into digestible representations to those who see Asians on screen, or in person. 
These stereotypes provide fodder for interviewees‘ experiences of having to react to 
assumed math proficiency or, as Korean American Stephen shared, his ability to trick 
friends that he is related to Jet Li. 
The general consensus among all interviewees was that there is little to no room 
for Asians in the media. Even when given room on screens, Partha described, ―Usually an 
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Asian would play a very diminutive role…in which they don‘t make decisions.‖ Many 
thought of Asians as sidekicks or as mere extras. Japanese American Randy could barely 
contain his anger over two-dimensional, marginal roles: 
Asian American people are playing tools.… they‘re utility roles. They‘re 
not really people. That‘s not how – I don‘t view them as people.  
Asian portrayals were seen as homogeneous and dehumanized: Korean American David 
described Asians portrayed as ―a pack of people,‖ Japanese American Hiroki as ―just 
filling space.‖ For Korean American Young Min, these portrayals are linked to Asian 
Americans‘ lived experience in a society that views Asians and Asian Americans as 
ethnically and culturally homogeneous. ―It kind of represents the society right now in the 
United States,‖ he mused, ―that all Asian Americans are the same.‖  
Several men pointed to Justin Lin‘s film Better Luck Tomorrow (2002) as a 
groundbreaking example of Asian American representation. Chinese American Aaron 
was ―shell-shocked that there were Asians on a movie screen,‖ and others expressed 
similar reactions to the film. The surprise an Asian American cast created was based on 
interviewees‘ sense that major players in the entertainment industry, those who ―make the 
decisions‖ both on and off screen, are white men. To Chinese American Nick, this is a 
straightforward power dynamic: ―[Asians] don‘t have the roles that…white people have. 
The main roles.‖ Korean American Alex believed wholeheartedly that ―people who work 
in Hollywood prefer white actors.‖ Building on this, David offered an example: ―You 
don‘t see an Asian soldier in a movie like Saving Private Ryan. You‘ll never see a movie 
called Saving Private Kim!‖ In this way, Asian American men begin to see themselves as 
undesired not only by Hollywood, but also by audiences who approve Hollywood‘s 
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choices through consumption. The lack of adequate Asian American representation, for 
these men, is in part due to the fact that images are driven by the demands of the industry 
in which they are found. The story of Asian American men that seems to pervade is one 
of abjection
275
: in social situations, public discourse, market segments, and mediated 
spaces. 
The invisibility of an Asian American narrative again became evident as men 
thought about how media texts are marketed to a mainstream audience. The sharp 
perception of a white-oriented market was linked to the shared feeling that Asian 
American media marginalization is a result of an industry headed by a white political 
economy. As bi-ethnic Ben stated, ―Opportunity [for Asian Americans]… doesn‘t exist 
on television, remotely, other than Margaret Cho and that TV show for a little bit,
276
 and 
she still had to do some pandering, obviously.‖ The structure of the television industry is 
seen as a major factor in a power dynamic that is biased against Asian Americans– it is 
an industry that ―obviously‖ requires special exceptions to be made for racial minorities. 
Nick assigns this to the fact that ―TV has a broader audience. A more narrow-minded 
audience.‖ In this formulation, Nick conceives of a mainstream audience for whom 
Asians are not acceptable. The men I interviewed feel that Asian American men are 
denied opportunities, pushed aside for more marketable, profitable/valuable performers. 
Simply put by Chinese American Oliver, ―Asian men don‘t get a lot of love in the 
media.‖  
                                                 
275 Shimakawa, National Abjection. 
276 Ben refers to the short-lived ABC series All-American Girl, a 30-minute serial sitcom based on Margaret 
Cho‘s stand-up comedy and featuring a Korean family‘s relationships. The series only lasted 19 episodes. 
Cho describes the tensions of being an Asian American on screen: ―Hollywood thought I was too Asian, 
and Asians thought I wasn‘t Asian enough.‖ Mireya Navarro, ―Returning in Her Favorite Role, Herself.‖ 




The Brad Pitt phenomenon  
Defining ―masculinity,‖ similar to defining ―Asian American,‖ is just as much 
shaped by media narratives as it is by everyday experiences. Given the modal age of 
interviewees, it was no surprise that actor Brad Pitt was frequently named as an example 
of a man who set the standard for masculinity in U.S. mass media. Pitt belongs to a class 
of white actors—George Clooney, Matt Damon, and Russell Crowe were also named—or 
heroes on screen against whom Asian Americans could not compete. When I asked 
Chinese American Francis if there was a man in the media he admired he rather 
sheepishly admitted:  
When I was young, I liked Brad Pitt and all those [actors].  
What did you like about Brad Pitt? 
He‘s cool, strong, and muscular. (Laughing) He gets all the girls. 
What Francis was getting at, he later told me, was that Brad Pitt exemplified American 
(white) masculinity. When I asked him to define it for me more explicitly, he explained, 
―I think it‘s still very much based on what Hollywood portrays it. Physical masculinity.‖ 
Francis joins many other interviewees in admiration of ―all those‖ men, white actors 
playing characters who embody ideal American masculinities. While personal definitions 
of masculinity were richer and more complex than the ―physical masculinity‖ portrayed 
by actors like Russell Crowe or Gerard Butler, there was also a sense of admiration for 
these actors precisely because they are given the chance to embody and perpetuate this 
gendered media narrative. As an audience, the men I talked with have been presented 
with a variety of White actors, ranging from Robert Redford and Clint Eastwood to Ryan 
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Reynolds and Paul Rudd,
277
 embodying a wide variety of roles from heroes and villains 
to heartbreakers and guys-next-door.  
Given the ratio of white to minority actors on screen, Chinese American Gary 
finds that there are simply more options for identification: ―I‘m pretty sure you can find 
any, like, white person, they can find some character in a movie or TV show that pretty 
much embodies their life…. So it‘s hard for Asians because there‘s not that many to pick 
from and not that may storylines that they play along with.‖ While many interviewees 
were critical of Hollywood‘s white ranks, they still found pleasure in white-oriented texts 
and the white men within them. Nadia Kim labels this a form of ―racial imperialism,‖ a 
term coined to describe how Koreans she interviewed in Seoul learned to adopt 
hegemonic racial biases (preference for whites and disdain for blacks) through the 
consumption of U.S. military propaganda. Explaining that ―South Korean women have 
long expressed favor toward White Western men or, more accurately, the hegemonic 
masculinity that defines them,‖
278
 Kim places the dominance of U.S. superiority at the 
heart of this racial narrative. Kim identifies several common-sense narratives— America 
is white, America is a land of riches, Americans are good looking, white men are 
superior—found in U.S.-based media that work to uphold this hegemonic ideal. 
Despite the continued prevalence of white masculine types in the media, the rise 
of multicultural ensemble casts in primetime television suggests entrance into an era in 
which Asian men do seem to be ―getting (some) love.‖ The rise of actors like John Cho 
and Daniel Dae Kim in the American cultural mediascape points to a new, potentially 
positive narrative for Asian American men to incorporate into their self-concepts, beyond 
                                                 
277 Also actors listed by interviewees as admirable men. 
278 Kim, Imperial Citizens, 64. 
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the ―Asian‖ narratives that have long formulated ―Asian American‖ in the United States. 
As such, how might they be making sense of these narratives, and how do they 
contextualize them? In discussing Asians and Asian American men on screen, 
interviewees brought their demarcations of Asian/American to their negotiations of 
characters and actors.  
The Asian/American Spectrum 
Exit the Dragon: Jackie Chan 
All of the interviewees cited Hong Kong-born and raised martial arts actor Jackie 
Chan as the first and most memorable Asian they recalled seeing on screen, often citing 
Rush Hour. Jackie Chan entered the Hong Kong film industry as a stuntman and, 
eventually, began to star in his own films. After some failed attempts to break into the 
American market, Rumble in the Bronx (1995) was met with success, and eventually led 
to the Rush Hour (1998, 2001, 2007) and Shanghai Noon (2000, 2003) films.
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 Given 
the demographic of my interviewees, most were about 10 or 11 when the first Rush Hour 
film was released; they have thus followed Jackie Chan‘s major American successes 
through adolescence and into college. When shown a picture of the actor, many 
interviewees groaned, laughed, or sighed as if expecting to be asked, and tired of 
speaking about, Jackie Chan. It seemed generally accepted that some of the stereotypes 
Asian Americans complained about find their roots in Jackie Chan performances. 
Chinese American Edison described Chan as, ―for better or worse,‖ a core point 
of reference for understanding Asians in America. As Korean American Tom put it, 
―He‘s the reason why…everybody thinks that we do kung fu. People actually came up to 
                                                 




me and asked me if I know how to do kung fu.‖ Despite being Korean American, Tom 
acknowledges that his identity as an Asian American in the United States is tied to the 
prominence of Jackie Chan in American popular culture. ―It fits the public‘s stereotype 
[of Asian Americans],‖ Indian American Fred explained to me. ―You take Rush Hour or 
something –Jackie Chan is Asian. That‘s why kung fu is associated with [being Asian].‖ 
Tom and Fred do not share Chan‘s ethnic background, but acknowledge that his presence 
in American popular culture has indelibly linked him to a racial stereotype that implicates 
how they, and the concept of Asian American, are understood in their daily lives. 
Edison told me that he believed America is moving toward new characters, 
beyond ―older media like Rush Hour.‖ The idea of moving beyond Jackie Chan was a 
common theme: while Chan was named without prompt, he was often deemed irrelevant 
to contemporary Asian America. As Filipino American Dean explained: ―Jackie, in 
particular, he‘s maybe the last line of some of the older archetypes of his generation, like 
Bruce Lee, Jet Li, Jackie Chan. You know, from the older kung fu movies.‖ By 
associating Jackie Chan with a specific cohort of actors, Dean suggests a generational 
definition of ―Asian American.‖ While much import has been placed on Bruce Lee as an 
icon of his time,
280
 only Dean named him as a memorable Asian figure from his 
childhood. One of the older interviewees, Dean recalls growing up in a racially 
segregated city during the 1970s; from this context, he shares a reading of Bruce Lee‘s 
symbolic import as an anti-authority figure during a time of racial tension.  
While Asian Americans of an older generation may have admired Bruce Lee and 
Jackie Chan, this generation of interviewees saw Chan as a spectacle for entertainment. 
                                                 
280 A body of scholarship has flourished based on readings of Bruce Lee as the embodiment of racial 
politics and the struggle against authority. See, for example, Kato, From Kung Fu to Hip Hop, 41. 
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Randy agreed with Edison that Chan is ―ridiculous‖: ―He‘s defined himself in his own 
way, he‘s that comedic kind of—still like a monkey, kind of thing.‖ Thinking of all 
Chan‘s characters, Ben declared, ―He‘s the same guy in every movie.‖ In these 
interpretations, Chan was seen as a figure for mass-market consumption. By being the 
―same guy‖ in every movie, he has become so uniquely identifiable that he represents 
nothing but a brand. Avery explains: 
Jackie Chan, I guess is sort of an odd exception because even though he is 
Asian and he is extremely Asian—to a lot of people, he is the embodiment 
of, say, China—but we‘ve become so used to him because he‘s been 
around so long. When Jackie Chan does something funny, it‘s not like, 
―That‘s so Asian.‖ It‘s like, ―That‘s so Jackie Chan.‖  
I contend that, by focusing on Chan as a brand, Asian Americans develop a strategy that 
enables them to dismiss him as a representative of race or ethnicity. By developing a 
―That‘s so Jackie Chan‖ approach allows them, in a nuanced way, to position him as a 
figure who no longer represents Asians in a specific context, but rather as an, albeit 




Figure 1: Jackie Chan and Chris Tucker in Rush Hour 3 (2007). 
 
Despite Chan‘s global status and symbolism, another strategy was to interpret the 
actor as purely Asian. For Japanese American Hiroki, the global flow of Jackie Chan‘s 
texts was an important factor in how he interpreted the actor. Hiroki described Chan as no 
longer ―really Chinese‖ and instead more ―Asian American‖ due to his status as a global 
commodity and his pervasiveness in American popular culture. However, Hiroki stood 
alone in this interpretation. Responding to Hiroki, Partha firmly stated, ―Sure, he‘s in the 
mainstream but…. He‘s an Asian guy.‖ Most emphatic in his disagreement was Ben: ―I 
guess you could go with media power. But he‘s not [Asian American]. He‘s a Chinese 
national. I‘m not saying that to any level of detriment, but I mean, for me…. I make that 
exclusion.‖  
Ben‘s definition of ―Asian American,‖ based on his experiences as a child of 
parents in the U.S. military, shapes his attitudes of who is relevant to his racial 
identification and who is not. Other responses reflected a dis-identification with Chan 
based on their own definitions of Asian America. For Oliver, Chan is Asian not only as 
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someone who engages in Asian performance, but who is also widely interpreted as Asian: 
―He‘s always been more associated with China, and not just himself being that way, [it‘s 
also] perceptions of him.‖ Francis could only find the words ―very Asian‖ to describe 
Chan‘s acting and mannerisms. Descriptions of Chan ultimately mirrored how men 
described ―FOBs‖ on the college campus. Said Chinese American Brad, ―There‘s always 
this thing where he‘s foreign… people don‘t really accept him as American. People 
accept him as the Chinese guy.‖ In these conversations, Asian Americans understood 
Chan as a foreigner unable to fit into American social settings; he represents the ―FOB‖ 
image that they, as Asian Americans, identify against. 
 Korean American Jae-Sun‘s belief that media representations and audiences are 
moving beyond Jackie Chan is confirmed by the recent rise of younger Asian American 
lead actors in primetime television: John Cho, Masi Oka, and Daniel Dae Kim. While 
other Asian leads can be found before and during these actors‘ careers, these three actors 
were the most commonly named and frequently discussed by participants before photos 
were shown in the interviews. For Dean, Jackie Chan led the generation of kung fu 
fighters from the 1980s through the 1990s, and John Cho leads this new slate of actors: 
―[John Cho] kind of represents the newer generation of not only Asian Americans in this 
country, but also Asian American characters in the media.‖ If Jackie Chan symbolizes, or 
makes visible, the prominence of an Asian narrative and the lack of an Asian American 
narrative, how might the visibility of new Asians signal a new narrative? How have we 
moved beyond Jackie Chan? 
Entering the White Castle: From Jackie Chan to John Cho 
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Interviewees felt that Korean American John Cho stood in distinct opposition to 
Jackie Chan. Born in Korea and raised in Los Angeles, Cho was the other actor most 
recalled as a memorable Asian in the media. He was remembered by some for a small 
role in the American Pie films, as well as a larger part in 2002‘s Better Luck Tomorrow. 
Some were aware of his crossover success in more mainstream fare, such as his role as 
Sulu in 2009‘s Star Trek and as FBI special agent Demetri Noh in ABC‘s FlashForward. 
However, most recalled his debut to fame in Harold and Kumar Go to White Castle 
(2004) and its sequel, Harold and Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay.
281
  
Harold and Kumar Go to White Castle follows the adventures of second-
generation Korean American Harold Lee (John Cho) and his roommate, Indian American 
Kumar Patel (Kal Penn). Harold is an investment banker whose White co-workers take 
advantage of his quiet demeanor by giving him the work they don‘t want to do; Kumar is 
in the process of applying to medical school to follow in the footsteps of his father and 
brother. Both men feel dissatisfied with their professional lives and feel trapped by the 
model minority stereotypes that define them. The film takes place over the course of one 
night, when Harold and Kumar see an advertisement for White Castle on television while 
high on marijuana. Their adventures to buy more drugs and find the restaurant place them 
in a variety of situations, confronting ―stereotypical‖ Korean students at Princeton, 
skinheads, a racist white policeman, and actor Neil Patrick Harris. In the sequel, Harold 
and Kumar board a flight to follow Harold‘s love interest to Amsterdam; when Kumar 
brings out a bong, a white passenger believes it to be a bomb and claims that Kumar is a 
terrorist. Believing that Harold and Kumar are North Korean and Al-Qaeda terrorists, 
                                                 




respectively, U.S. Homeland Security sends them to Guantanamo Bay. The rest of the 
film follows Harold and Kumar escaping the island, finding their way back to the 
mainland, and Kumar trying to stop his ex-girlfriend from marrying a college friend.  
 The Harold and Kumar films have been prominent, mainstream (albeit tongue-in-
cheek, crass humor) texts that interviewees followed through high school and college. 
Like TV‘s South Park, a program popular among most interviewees, Harold and Kumar 
provided a space for Asian Americans to engage in racial discourse, owning some 
stereotypes, rejecting others, and bringing some of the tensions of the Asian American 
experience to light. Here, gallows humor is given space on the big screen: interviewees 
shared that the films‘ Asian Americans characters made them more valuable resources for 
reclaiming racial marginalization than the white male characters on South Park. Fred 
found that the racial jokes in Harold and Kumar actually worked to take the focus away 
from Asian Americans; instead, the films mocked those who made the jokes as racially 
and culturally ignorant. In this way, Asian American viewers can identify tiresome 
stereotypes and, following Harold and Kumar, confront the white mainstream culture that 
shapes those stereotypes. More generally, Nick labeled the marijuana, party culture of 
Harold and Kumar as ―teenager culture,‖ and Ben agreed: ―it‘s pretty clear that you don‘t 
have to be Asian American to enjoy watching [Harold and Kumar].‖ Gary felt that the 
culture presented in the films was more generally American than Asian: 
Eating White Castle… the sexual jokes he makes and the people he hangs 
out with, you know, doing drugs and alcohol…he more portrays himself 
toward Americans than he does towards Asians. 
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 While Gary uses ―American‖ and ―Asian‖ to describe these differences, his focus on 
cultural discrepancies makes Cho less distinctly Asian than Jackie Chan‘s inherent 
―Asianness‖ in his films. For Young Min the similarity with Cho, and his character 
Harold, is strong: ―He‘s kind of my age, and he‘s grown up in the U.S., too. And he kind 
of portrays…myself.‖ Josh explained his admiration for the film, as well as John Cho, in 
the context of the films‘ humor: 
He‘s kind of just like a regular guy in his movies. I mean… the humor 
behind it is that he‘s actually pretty American, but everyone that the two 
confront in the movie goes, you know, ―Ching chong, ching chong, your 
dad runs a gas station,‖ that‘s the whole humor behind it.  
For Josh and many others, the films highlight issues that they have each confronted in 
their lives as Asian Americans, such as being confused for other ethnicities, negotiating 
their own biases against ―FOBs,‖ and battling misperceptions whites have about Asians.  
One key element in Josh‘s explanation above is that he calls John Cho ―a regular 
guy.‖ This theme of ―just being a guy‖ was echoed over and over again as interviewees 
discussed John Cho, his characters, and his career. Brad felt, ― [Harold is] more of a fun-
loving, regular American kind of guy;‖ Alex added, ―these guys are just regular guys. 
Nothing special. Just, stuff happens to them and they react to it.‖ Partha also expressed 
something similar: 
He was Sulu in Star Trek. And that wasn‘t really like, an Asian-ified role. 
Because Sulu was—Sulu was always kind of Asianized in the old days. 
But like, now, you know, modern times, he‘s more the action guy. He can 
fight, you know? He‘s just like one of the other guys. He‘s just a dude!  
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Also building on Harold as ―just a dude,‖ Aaron summed up: ―He‘s cool, he‘s just 
another guy, he just happens to be Asian.‖ When I asked Aaron if being a ―guy [who] just 
happens to be Asian‖ is something with which he identifies, he emphatically agreed: ―I 
want to avoid it having it be like, ‗This is the Asian guy,‘…. I don‘t want it to be 
something that makes me stand out.‖ This is Aaron‘s ideal: to be seen first and foremost 
as someone whose racial identity is not the first marker—just a regular guy with many 
qualities, including a racial designation. 
These men thus read Cho‘s performance on and off screen as American, not 
necessarily rooted to his Korean heritage. In this way, the idea of being racially invisible 
began to emerge as an ideal, if not key, component of being Asian American. Hiroki 
agreed that John Cho was an exemplary Asian American, claiming that the actor is 
―definitely more assimilated to the American culture.‖ Chinese American Jimmy brought 
his concept ―Asian American‖ to understanding the success of Harold and Kumar: 
I think these characters are fairly representative of a middle-class, easily 
consumable by White culture, reality of many educated second-generation 
Asian Americans.  
The Asian American representations in Harold and Kumar thus, in a way, represent 
Jimmy‘s reality, but also reinforce the sense that identities are consumed by audiences 
and are influenced by narrative heuristics. Interviewees define their racialized identities 
through performance and appearance, but also by how this performance is consumed and 
re-interpreted by others. Comparing the opinions about Jackie Chan to John Cho, these 
negotiations also highlighted the role of class in these men‘s definitions of Asian 
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American: second-generation, assimilated Asians in America are more easily acceptable 
for consumption than a ―FOB.‖  
For some, Harold and Kumar films are beyond race, as they focus on cultural 
differences and misperceptions rather than on race.  
 
Figure 2: John Cho and Kal Penn in Harold and Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay (2008). 
 
While interviewees agreed that the Harold and Kumar films were entertaining, 
some chose to critique Cho‘s performance of Harold. These critiques paralleled earlier 
descriptions of Asian American identity, showing how men brought their negotiations of 
their own minority position to reading minority characters. Interviewees like Avery felt 
that Harold perpetuated narratives of ―typical‖ Asian Americans in the United States: 
He‘s sort of what people stereotype Asian Americans as. He‘s sort like 
this overly hard-working guy who‘s underappreciated and sort of goes 
unnoticed by everyone. And he has these fantasies in his head, but they 
don‘t really matter because he‘s just the quiet Asian worker. In the movie, 
in the end, he breaks free of that. But the entire movie is impressing upon 
us that he‘s this stereotypical Asian guy. 
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Cho‘s character thus highlights for Avery the difficulties Asian Americans feel as 
stereotyped model minorities and interchangeable, generalized Asians. Korean American 
Andrew complained, ―He‘s just not a risk taker at all,‖ and Hugh agreed: ―Harold, that 
really upset me a lot…he‘s some sort of investment banker, he‘s in finance, he gets 
picked on by his white bosses, and throughout the movie, he can‘t talk to a white girl.‖ 
For these interviewees, the comic adventures may show a different side of the nerdy 
stereotype, but are negated by the fact that Harold is still a model minority. 
 Interesting to note is that even though the image shown to men included both John 
Cho and Kal Penn, none of the interviewees talked about Kal Penn in the context of the 
films and Asian America. Some talked about the pair as a duo, such as when Alex called 
them both ―regular guys,‖ but overall, Asian Americans of every ethnicity focused only 
on Cho. At the end of his interview, Partha pointed to the image of Kal Penn and laughed, 
claiming, ―I forgot about this dude!‖ After this realization, however, his attention turned 
back to Cho and his success ―working his way through [Hollywood] in all the right ways. 
Being the leading man, winning women, white women.‖ I offer that this diligent focus on 
John Cho is a result of these men‘s ideas that Indian Americans, or those from South 
Asia, do not fit within the limits of ―Asian American.‖ 
 In general, interviewees cited John Cho as an Asian American breaking 
boundaries and increasing the visibility of Asian Americans. If Jackie Chan portrays the 
hyper-masculine, kung fu-fighting ―FOB,‖ John Cho portrays the modern-day, 
cosmopolitan Asian American. Cho embodies a more palatable commodity than Jackie 
Chan: there is never a doubt in any of his films that his characters are not at ease in 
American social settings or that his English is accented. Mulling about the differences 
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between the photos of actors, Hugh pointed to John Cho and stated, ―He even looks the 
most American.‖ The idea that an actor can ―look‖ American mirrors interviewees‘ 
definitions of Asian American as a performance of dress, mannerisms, and stature. Both 
Jackie Chan and John Cho portray characters in American situations, but Cho‘s 
unaccented English, as well as the fact that he portrays ―regular guys‖ marks him as 
Asian American, while Chan‘s broken English and portrayals as foreigners marks him as 
a ―FOB.‖ What then, to do with Asian American actors who play foreign nationals? 
From Zeroes to Heroes: Masi Oka and “Geek Chic” 
More popularly known as Masi Oka, Massayori Oka was born in Japan but moved 
to America at an early age. He is infamously known for being on the cover of Time 
magazine‘s issue on ―Those Asian-American Whiz Kids‖ in 1987, his work as a digital 
effects artist for George Lucas‘ Industrial Light and Magic, and his genius IQ.
282
 Oka 
rocketed to mainstream celebrity status in 2006, when NBC launched a new ensemble 
show featuring a global cast of characters discovering and coming to terms with 
superhuman abilities. In Heroes, the multi-layered storyline centered on the story of Hiro 
Nakamura, a Japanese man using his powers to transcend boundaries of time, space and 
geography to unite the rest of the show‘s characters in a mission to save the world.  
Most interviewees had heard of and knew about Heroes, but due to its relatively 
recent debut had not seen much of the show or any of its accompanying extra texts such 
as magazines, comic books, or web site. Despite not being regular viewers of the 
program, many were knowledgeable about Oka‘s character from having seen several 
episodes, talking with other viewers, or reading about the show in various other texts. 
                                                 




Even if interviewees were unfamiliar with the program, they commented on the image 
and what it meant to them. Compare Hugh‘s response to Masi Oka to his comment that 
John Cho ―looks‖ American: ―[Masi Oka] looks like one of my dad‘s friends! Again, the 
weak, small guy with the glasses and bad hair!‖ 
 
Figure 3: Masi Oka as Hiro Nakamura in Heroes (2006). 
 
Oka‘s portrayal of Hiro prompted the most, sometimes intensely negative 
comments. Much of the negativity built on Hugh‘s focus on Hiro‘s outward appearance. 
Josh labeled Hiro ―a token Asian….chirpy and small,‖ and, despite knowing that Hiro 
was an adult businessman on the show, both Vietnamese American Jonathan and Korean 
American Dan described his outfit as a ―Japanese schoolboy uniform.‖ For these men, the 
visibility of an Asian American male lead on television is complicated, even negated, by 
this stereotyped appearance. Brad expressed his dissatisfaction with the character: 
He just gives me that sense that he‘s that little, shrewd Asian who just 
works on his projects all day, doesn‘t mind anybody else‘s business, and 
just isn‘t very outspoken. I‘m sure he has those moments where he breaks 
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out of that stereotype, but just the mere fact that they show it to begin with 
is enough to say that they are perpetuating stereotypes.  
That Hiro‘s mere appearance could elicit such a specific stereotype and negative 
emotions for so many interviewees suggests just how much outward appearances are 
implicated in Asian American men‘s negotiations of race and performance.  
Ben, one of the men who watched Heroes the most, had the most nuanced 
negotiation of the character, bringing in his definitions of ―Asian American‖: 
Quite a few people don‘t like him because he kind of still plays the 
stereotypical Asian…. [But] he‘s Asian American….And he has to put the 
accent on and play all this game even though he‘s American. And it‘s 
slightly marginalized, but he has his own powers or whatever, however 
you want to put it. So, like, you know, it‘s not really any kind of awesome, 
positive portrayal that makes me want to watch the show, you know what I 
mean?  
Ben‘s knowledge that Oka is an Asian American seems to make the actor‘s portrayal of 
an Asian character particularly conspicuous. When it came to an Americanized actor 
playing a ―FOB,‖ interviewees seemed to experience more dissonance. Because of his 
performance, Masi Oka was most often compared to Jackie Chan and his films. 
While John Cho was understood as Asian American not only in real life but also 
on screen, Oka‘s Asian American background was negated by his performance as a 
Japanese man on Heroes. Aaron, another interviewee who followed the show, explained 
how he felt this stereotype overshadowed any other sign of representational progress. In 
this context, Asian American performances on screens can be viewed as political work. 
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Jackie Chan basically, for better or worse, is kind of perpetuating the 
popular idea of what Asian American is. And from Heroes…. The Asian 
male character [had] the romantic storyline. But for all the good that that 
was worth, it kind of detracted from the obvious fact that he basically 
encapsulates everything that Jackie Chan basically started. He is a short, 
nerdy, comic book geek who can‘t pronounce his R‘s right. 
For Aaron, Jackie Chan‘s visibility has played such an integral role in forming the 
―popular‖ idea of the Asian American-as-Oriental, and this Asian stereotype has become 
so pervasive, a character like Hiro cannot be separated from it. While Avery contends 
that Jackie Chan‘s accent and behavior has become a part of the Jackie Chan ―brand‖ 
could be dismissed, Hiro‘s foreign nature was more visible. He explained, ―The fact that 
he‘s Asian American doesn‘t really matter to most people because they see him and they 
just think, Asian.‖ Hiro‘s difference was a racial difference, in part highlighted by his 
inability to assimilate to the social contexts in Heroes.  
It follows, then, that interviewees‘ reactions to Hiro also involved how they 
believed others, particularly white viewers, saw the character. For Dean, Hiro was a 
problematic stereotype precisely because ―of the way he looks…and the way he fits into 
society and how people react to him. So, I guess my definition of Asian American is 
really based on how people react to us.‖ Tom saw the character slightly differently 
because he knew whites viewers who felt positively about Hiro: ―[they] think he‘s really 
cute in the way that he acts… I mean, these are white people that say this. So, that has a 
lasting impression.‖  
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 The issue of Asian American male attractiveness threaded through each of these 
conversations. When interviewees labeled an actor appealing, they used white standards 
of masculine attractiveness. Dan felt that a white actor‘s popularity is based on theatrical 
ability and looks, but that different standards apply to Asian American actors. The belief 
that Asian men are not good looking, he explained to me, is why ―they don‘t make it 
quite on top as the other actors who have both [good skills and attractiveness].‖ As an 
example, Dan pointed to the fact that while some might view Hiro as good looking—or, 
as People magazine would say, as ―geek chic‖—the character still could not compare to 
the attractiveness of the other, predominantly white, characters on the program, such as 
hero Peter Petrelli (played by Milo Ventimiglia) or even villain Sylar (played by Zachary 
Quinto). 
Discussions of attractiveness were also linked to narratives about romance and 
sexuality. Earlier, Aaron pointed to the romantic storyline given to Hiro in the show‘s 
second season. Subtly acknowledging the asexual/homosexual stereotype of Asian men, 
Aaron offered the Heroes narrative as a potentially groundbreaking moment for Asian 
representations in American popular culture. Given the seemingly contradictory positions 
Hiro occupied in the television show—marginalized minority or central hero, Asian 
stereotype or love interest—how might the narrative structure of the program, as well as 
Hiro‘s place within that narrative, suggest a preferred reading of this character? Looking 
at the first three seasons of the show, from its debut to the point of reference for most of 
these interviews, I argue that Hiro was presented in such a way as to promote the 
marginalization of Asians in relation to other ethnicities and races on the show.  
“We Are Not Special, We Are Japanese!” 
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In the first episode of Heroes, Hiro Nakamura, who has just discovered that he 
has the ability to stop time, debates with his friend Ando Masahashi in a Tokyo alleyway 
about the benefits of being special. Hiro has just asked Ando why he wants to be ―the 
same.‖ ―Because that‘s what I am,‖ Ando responds. ―The same. It‘s what we all are. 
Homogeneous. Yogurt.‖ ―I want to be special,‖ says Hiro. Ando retorts, ―We are not 
special! We are Japanese.‖ This is the basic framework of Heroes: characters coming to 
terms with superhuman abilities, struggling with the time-old superhero dilemma of 
―fitting in‖ versus ―saving the day.‖ Hiro feels that being homogeneous is something that 
Asian culture—signified by his corporate workspace and stoic father—stipulates. But, 
when Hiro teleports to New York, he finds that he can indeed be special: here, he can live 
up to his name and become a true hero.  
Hiro is placed on an equal playing field with men of all statures and races 
contending with their powers in the show. Yet, given the conventions of Western cinema, 
he is relegated to the margins, denied heroic status. Paul Smith contends, ―the pleasure of 
masculine representations is given as essentially and intrinsically bound up in [a] three 
stage shift from objectification to [masochism, to] empowerment.‖
283
 Heroes denies Hiro 
this most basic arc of heroic development, barring him from being objectified in any 
pleasurable way. Other characters on the show are gazed upon, either by the audience or 
other characters: When Indian geneticist Mohinder earns powers, his muscular body 
cannot stay clothed for long; even the more Westernized, cosmopolitan Japanese Ando is 
given well tailored Western suits and, in season three, a chick magnet motorcycle. Hiro, 
on the other hand, is described by a contributor to the New Demographic blog 
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Racialicious as ―an affable buffoon just a few steps from William Hung.‖
284
 Indeed, the 
show‘s constant and active refusal of a heroic, sexual body to Hiro Nakamura supports 
David Eng‘s contention that ―the Asian American male is both materially and psychically 
feminized within the context of a larger U.S. cultural imaginary.‖
285
 In this context, 
Heroes can be seen as a part of a dominant scopic regime that regulates the Asian male 
body by limiting its access to normative White American heterosexuality. 
A tension, then, exists surrounding Hiro‘s specialness, particularly as it intersects 
with his masculinity. In looking at formulations of Hiro Nakamura‘s masculinity in the 
television show, I argue that Heroes presents the character as special precisely because he 
is Japanese. He is a character vexed by his lack of Western machismo and also is 
staunchly rooted in Bushido, or the Japanese ―way of the warrior.‖ A large component of 
Hiro‘s masculinity in the first season of Heroes is his acquisition of a samurai sword 
shrouded in the myth of his childhood hero, samurai warrior Takezo Kensei. Hiro sees it 
as directly linked to his ability to become a hero, believing that ―the sword will fulfill 
[his] powers.‖
286
 In a narrative where heroic masculinity and performance is always at 
stake, it is no feat to identify the symbolism of this phallic weapon.  
Hiro does manage to obtain the sword, but his time with it is short-lived. 
Furthermore, his identity once he has acquired the sword remains defined by white 
characters. When an inexperienced Hiro attempts to use his sword in a fight against 
villain Sylar, his sword is no match for Sylar‘s physical powers. Hiro‘s only defense is to 
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teleport away– only to find his sword snapped in two.
287
 While Ando comments, ―It‘s 
still sharp,‖ Hiro laments, ―Even if the sword is still whole, I am not fit to wield it.‖
288
 In 
short, the show denies Hiro the ability to wield his phallus – he is unfit to use it, and 
unable to repair it without the aid of the elderly Mr. Claremont. Further access to his 
Bushido masculinity is only granted by permission from other male characters: Hiro can 
train in the ways of a warrior only after his father (George Takei) reveals himself to be a 
master swordsman willing to train his son. In a clichéd montage, Hiro‘s father dictates 
samurai folklore to help Hiro learn to use the sword. By embracing his Japanese ancestry 
and an Orientalist formulation of his masculinity, Hiro becomes more of a man.  
Yet, white masculinity even has a hold over Hiro‘s samurai history, as seen when 
Hiro teleports to feudal Japan in the second season. Here, his childhood hero Takezo 
Kensei is revealed to be Englishman Adam Monroe. Shocked that Kensei is actually a 
white, self-interested, womanizing drunkard, Hiro decides to stay in feudal Japan to help 
―turn [Monroe] into the man that history needs him to be.‖
289
 Hiro‘s competition with 
Adam‘s virility aside, the feudal Japan storyline provides Hiro a love interest in the form 
of Yaeko, a swordsmith‘s daughter. This moment allows Hiro to catch up to other 
characters on the show, as every lead character to this point—from teenage cheerleader 
Claire Bennett to villain Sylar—has had a sexual encounter; several with multiple 
partners. In season two, Hiro is finally granted a romantic scene, once Yaeko finds 
herself less physically attracted to Adam and more attracted to Hiro‘s personality.  
Viewers like Aaron can identify the progressive nature of showing an Asian 
romance, particularly when Asian masculinity competes with white masculinity and wins. 
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Yet, the narrative structure of the program works to suppress any real breakthrough, 
limiting the ways in which Hiro can access heroic status typically reserved for white men. 
Additionally, as some interviewees noticed, the show suggests that a romantic Hiro can 
only exist in the alternate reality of feudal Japan.
290
 When Hiro kisses Yaeko, he knows 
his romance will betray his friendship with Adam. Because of this, he cannot take 
pleasure in the act and even looks pained while doing so. Furthermore, this romantic 
action is not without its consequences: Adam‘s anger over seeing Hiro steal his love 
interest provokes a death wish upon Hiro and anything he loves.
291
 Hiro‘s move to 
(re)claim his sexuality thus has serious consequences, as Adam‘s revenge sets off a chain 
of events that eventually leads to the murder of Hiro‘s father, one of the key purveyors of 
Hiro‘s masculinity.  
Hiro‘s attempt to actively assert masculinity or heroism ends up threatening the 
safety of other characters or even the entire world of Heroes. In a double bind, his lack of 
masculinity also endangers a world structured on hegemonic masculine standards. In 
season three, matriarch Angela Petrelli tells Hiro that his father ―had faith you would 
grow up to be a great man, but he was mistaken, and his folly will be the downfall of us 
all.‖
292
 Angela is not alone in her estimation, as viewers continually see other characters 
doubt his ability to be a masculine hero. While these brief examples provide cinematic 
space for an Asian male character that has so far been unprecedented in primetime 
television, the narrative and visual representation of Hiro places him at the periphery, 
moving him in and out of stereotypes, ultimately rendering him subservient to, and 
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incapable of achieving, the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity. As interviewee Dan 
notes, Hiro can never be a Peter Petrelli, the rugged, broody, romantic hero. Instead, he 
remains the baby-faced comic foil, complete with comedic music in his slapstick scenes.  
In the context of a multicultural show and a narrative that spans the globe, Hiro is 
also the only lead character with real language barriers, reinforcing the ―FOB‖ stereotype 
that many interviewees identify against. Even Japanese friend Ando and season three‘s 
African seer Usutu can converse in English, and Indian-raised Mohinder has a sultry, 
colonial British accent. Hiro only speaks Americanized English in an alternate, future 
reality.
293
 Throughout the remainder of the seasons, however, Hiro remains in what men 
identified as ―schoolboy‖ dress with slacks and colorful cardigans. Furthering the ―FOB‖ 
stereotype, Hiro also finds himself with unique immigration difficulties when he 
teleports: when detained by New York police after teleporting from Tokyo, Hiro is 
caught with ―no English, no passport, no American money, [and] no ID.‖
294
 Lastly, the 
show uses Hiro‘s concept of heroic masculinity, informed by American media fare like 
Marvel comics and Star Trek, as comic relief. Unaware of many social cues in 
interactions with American characters, Hiro uses clichéd understandings of heroic 
masculinity to dictate his performance, such as ―a hero doesn‘t run away from his 
destiny,‖
295
 and ―A hero never has regrets. A hero never runs.‖
296
 
Heroes thus presented a somewhat progressive representations of Asian American 
masculinity, with an Asian playing a lead, heroic role and a love interest. However, 
interpreting Hiro in light of the show‘s narrative structure and in relation to the rest of the 
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show‘s characters reveals him to be marginalized in more ways than one. Even if 
interviewees were not reading the television show as closely, it is clear from their 
criticisms—Hiro‘s ―FOB‖ nature, his bumbling ways, his unattractiveness—that he is far 
from an adequate representation Asian American masculinity. 
Finding a Lost Masculinity: Daniel Dae Kim 
Similar to Oka, Daniel Dae Kim is an Asian American actor who plays a foreign 
national on a primetime, mainstream television show. With a career mostly on stage 
before parts in Spider Man 2 and Crash, the Korean American is mostly known for his 
work in ABC‘s Lost. Kim was also signed by CBS to star as Detective Chin Ho Kelly in 
the 2010 remake of the TV series Hawaii Five-O. Premiering in 2004, Lost quickly 
became a hit, immensely popular within the 18-49 year-old demographic and reeling in 
upwards of 18 million viewers after its first three episodes.
297 
The show was so popular 
that after its series finale, props from the show were auctioned off to fans, bringing in 
almost $2 million in bids.
298
 Lost presents the crash of Oceanic Airlines flight 815 over a 
mysterious island and the tale of the flight‘s 48 survivors. Known for its twisting 
plotlines and complicated story, the program focused on a primary cast of 13 characters 
at first struggling to stay alive on the island, later battling the island‘s prior inhabitants 
and unveiling the mysteries behind the island‘s mysterious elements. Lost provided 
viewers with flashbacks into characters‘ lives, each episode focusing on a different 
character or set of characters, the reasons why they were flying from Sydney to Los 
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Angeles. As the series progressed, flashbacks turned into ―sideflashes,‖ depicting parallel 
storylines in alternate realities. 
Interviewees rarely recalled Kim in their lists of Asian American actors, but had 
the most to say about his character on Lost, Jin Kwon. Randy identified Jin as a typically 
stoic, quiet, minor-role character on television; finding similarities with Hiro, many 
interviewees cited Jin‘s lack of English skills and the rigidity of his traditional Korean 
values. Yet, the negativity surrounding the portrayal of Hiro Nakamura from Heroes was 
not as readily expressed in discussions of Jin. The often intense dislike of Hiro as 
opposed to the respect for Jin may be rooted in the type of masculinity each actor reflects 
in his character: Daniel Dae Kim is muscular, toned and tan, offered as a sex symbol, 
while Masi Oka is baby-faced, pudgy, and a real-life computer geek with a genius IQ. In 
Heroes, Oka‘s performance is comedic, and centers on a meek demeanor, slapstick 
humor based on his small physical stature, and general awkwardness, all qualities that 
interviewees labeled as stereotypically Asian.  
I suggest that respondents admired Jin precisely because they could watch him 
break the traditional stereotype of the traditionally stoic, conservative Asian man to 
become the embodiment of a more assimilated masculine performance. Kim was 
consistently labeled as more Asian American than Oka; for example, Avery described 
him as ―Still foreign, but [with] a more American feel than Hiro.‖ Interviewees were 
quick to take on the task of identifying how he straddled the line between Asian and 
American. Ben described the image as ―not exceptional, [but] for media, yes.‖ In defining 
the image as unexceptional, Ben pointed to the myriad of Asian American body types he 
has seen, providing examples of ―dudes that are a bunch of meatheads that live in a gym.‖ 
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Yet, in pointing to the exceptional nature of such an Asian American figure in the media, 
Ben notes the representational bias in media that portrays emasculated, physically weak 
Asian American men. Indeed, Edison said the image was a new representation of Asian 
Americans being ―very manly.‖  
 
Figure 4: Daniel Dae Kim as Jin Kwon in Lost (2004). 
 
A major component of Kim‘s ―American feel‖ was the promotional photo from 
Lost featuring the actor leaning against a tree, shirt unbuttoned, and thumb tucked into a 
belt loop on a pair of ripped jeans. Interviewees felt that this image was truly exceptional, 
one of the first images of a muscular, Asian man that was not the hyper-muscular body of 
Bruce Lee or Jackie Chan. ―I‘ve never seen an Asian American portrayed like that 
before,‖ Brad told me, and then pointed to the photo: ―I‘m not used to seeing this.‖ 
Francis worked through the disjuncture of an Asian American in a white subject position:  
He looks semi-between Asian and American. 
Can you explain that? 
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I think it‘s an image you‘ll find in America, of portraying something 
Asian, but packaging it into an American product. 
Tom shared a similar thought. 
The body he has right now is not really the common Korean body… So 
he‘s not like the typical Korean. He‘s more American. 
A Korean in an American body? 
Yes, exactly. 
For interviewees, the image linked Kim to those typically given representational 
space, such as the white television drama hero whose shirtless poses have long graced the 
pin-up pages of magazines from Teen Beat to People. Indeed, several interviewees 
mentioned the model-like quality of Kim‘s pose and his ―American big muscles.‖ The 
image of Kim as a text itself, then, worked to signify American masculinity. Men were 
familiar with the composition of the image and the bodily signifiers of the subject, but 
experienced dissonance with the fact that the subject was Asian American rather than 
white.  
These responses suggest that, for these interviewees, masculinity is manifested in 
the American physical ideal. In saying that ―it‘s good to see the Asian American man as 
not so effeminate,‖ Jimmy points to an inherent binary that has positioned white as 
masculine and Asian as feminine. This is a stereotyped dynamic that he has long 
identified in media representations, and one that he thinks this image ruptures. ―It‘s not a 
very common portrayal,‖ Oliver mused, finally determining that ―it‘s kind of funny that 
objectifying him is positive.‖ Fitting the standards of Western masculine physique, 
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Daniel Dae Kim‘s body can be objectified and becomes pleasurable in a way that others 
are not.  
 In this way, similarities are drawn between Daniel Dae Kim and John Cho as two 
Asian Americans who have broken into a predominantly White industry. Both men are 
visible Asian Americans in popular culture and have multiple points of appeal to 
mainstream audiences: they have lead roles in popular mainstream texts and, in those 
texts, are marketed as sexually desirable. In a way, their racial difference is also rendered 
invisible as their performances become consumable.  
However, interviewees focused mostly on Jin, as the best example of ―Asian 
American‖ precisely because his racial difference was so visible at the beginning of the 
show. For Oliver, the narrative structure of Lost‘s flashbacks made it possible for a 
mainstream text to add depth to an Asian character. Because of this, he sees Jin as a 
complex character with a detailed past, and the amount of narrative focus places Jin on 
the same playing field as other characters. This allows viewers to judge him as a three-
dimensional character rather than a racial caricature. Says David, ―I could really trust this 
guy. He just does what he says. He‘s very humble…. Jin is the type of guy that helps, you 
know, while other guys hurt and complain…. He‘s a respectable character.‖  
 The visibility of Jin‘s story in the narrative, along with Daniel Dae Kim‘s 
visibility in Hollywood, lends to the credibility of his Asian American identity. Most of 
the men who talked with me spoke the most eloquently about Jin‘s story, his character 
development, and his role as an Asian character interacting with other Americanized 
characters. Josh called Jin ―really, really conservative Korean‖ who eventually learns 
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English. Along with Josh, others mentioned Jin‘s Korean ways as stoic, patriarchal, and 
insular. Andrew explained the character arc: 
He has a very strong Korean character, very stern. He begins to open up 
later, you see it in his relationship with his wife at the beginning, where 
he‘s very, like, ―You listen to me and me only, it‘s just me and you and 
we‘re gonna get off this island,‖ and stuff like that. But later he opens up 
and stuff, and he‘s like – actually I probably like his character the most, 
because he has a lot of honor, and I like that a lot. He has a lot of heart.  
Men of all backgrounds appreciated the depth of Jin‘s character and the transformations 
the character underwent on the show. Fred, who emigrated to the U.S. from India when 
he was five years old, found striking similarities to, and comfort in, Jin‘s story: 
I feel like he represents the general Asian population just because…he‘s 
trying to change from being Asian. Like, he tries to learn English and stuff 
like that. So, the small stuff he does, I can see his transformation. I can 
relate to him more, I‘ve seen him grow on the show. Because of his 
background, I can connect that to my background…. it‘s how he takes his 
background and uses it in a new setting, which is like what an Asian 
American pretty much has to do, when they come from whatever country 
to another country to live, how they change. I feel like Jin does that on the 
island, so you can connect to him a lot more, and gives a better 
representation of Asian Americans. 
For Asian American viewers, seeing Jin‘s personal history, his present situation, and the 
negotiations he must make to interact in a new social setting, provides a realistic account 
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of what it means to be a racial minority in white America. For those like Fred, Jin‘s story 
showed a pathway to assimilation and respect. For others like Dean, it enabled a sense of 
self-pride in being American but also Asian: ―[He‘s] the ideal Asian American because 
he is very unapologetic for who he is. He is very individual in the sense that he retains his 
traditions in spite of those around him or what may be going on around him.‖  
In the two-part pilot of Lost, Jin Kwon and his wife, Sun, huddle under a piece of 
fuselage from the plane as a storm hits the island. ―Don‘t worry about the others,‖ he tells 
his wife. ―We just need to stay together.‖
299
 A native Korean from Seoul, Jin seems to 
embody ―traditional‖ Asian culture through his conservative and patriarchal values. 
When Sun suggests that others on the beach might ignore them less if they tried to 
communicate, Jin tells her, ―We‘ll be fine. We don‘t need them. I will tell you what to 
do.‖
300
 Jin‘s determination to provide for and protect Sun is presented as stern and 
abusive. Throughout the pilot, Jin‘s interactions with Sun involve him either yelling at 
her or speaking to her in a patronizing manner. He slaps her hand away when she tries to 
help him gather food, orders her to button up her cardigan,
301
 and to wash up because she 
is ―filthy.‖
302
 Furthermore, Jin‘s cultural difference is highlighted in the reciprocal 
discomfort he and others feel toward each other. When pregnant Claire asks Jin to feel 
her baby kick, Jin is visibly awkward about this physical contact. Later, when Jin tries to 
venture out and share raw sea urchins with others on the beach, they find his suggestion 
wholly unappealing. ―I‘m starving,‖ says the overweight Hugo when Jin offers him a sea 
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urchin, ―but nowhere near that hungry.‖
303
 Jin is seen as a foreign Oriental, exoticized as 
a patriarchal tyrant who can catch fish with his hands, eats raw urchins, and is 
uncomfortable with Western women. 
Jin‘s alien nature is intensified by the numerous ethnicities white son the island 
use reference him: Hugo continually mistakes both Jin and his wife as Chinese,‖
304
 
Sawyer calls him ―Mr. Miyagi‖
305
 and even refers to him as Chewbacca from Star 
Wars.
306
 When discovered by the ―tailies‖ on the island, Bernard and Mr. Eko note that 
―he doesn‘t even speak English
307
 and is therefore not a threat. In relation to other 
ethnicities on the show, Jin is also positioned as inherently more foreign. Even ex-Iraqi 
Republican Guardsman, Sayid Jarrah, speaks English and embodies the hegemonic 
militaristic masculinity admired by even Whites. In a DVD commentary, Daniel Dae Kim 
explains the usefulness behind Jin‘s difference: ―I think the idea that you cannot 
understand what Jin and Sun are saying is a way of highlighting their Otherness on the 
show. And it allows people, and the other characters, to project what they think is going 
on with them, when they may not really know.‖ At first, viewers learn about Jin‘s 
character through how he comes across to the other characters on screen, a social 
experience similar to those explained by interviewees. 
However, the narrative structure of Lost allows Jin to become less foreign, 
literally and figuratively. As flashbacks reveal more of the history behind Jin and Sun‘s 
relationship, their story becomes less about an Asian couple and more of a love story. If 
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anything, the couple is placed at odds against Sun‘s ―stereotypical‖ Asian parents. Sun‘s 
mother believes that she should have found a husband instead of a college degree, and her 
father portrays the high-powered business executive and mob boss. We see both Jin and 
Sun defiant toward the traditions of this older generation: Sun learns English and wants to 
go to America, and Jin dismisses his roommate‘s premonition out of a Korean ―destiny 
book‖ that he will meet Sun. On the island, as Jin learns to be less stubborn, he admits 
that English would be helpful and that he needs the help of his wife. Through this in-
depth storytelling, Asian Americans are able to see the everyday story of ―just another 
guy‖: Jin shows vulnerability, determination, and sexual desire; Sun and Jin live a 
couple‘s life of kissing, crying, making love, and fighting just like any other Lost couple. 
Jin is also depicted as virile/fertile, being the only man on the island to sire a child. These 
narrative developments enable Asian Americans to look past Jin‘s race and view him as 
more of a ―normal‖ character, but also are evidence of the politics of difference found in 
multicultural narratives. 
Multicultural Television and the Invisibility of Difference 
Ultimately, interviewees‘ negotiations of these characters and texts reveal Asian 
American men‘s struggle for both visibility and invisibility within the American popular 
imaginary. Their interpretations of Asian American actors and characters suggest that the 
ideal Asian American portrayal is one that is simultaneously visible and invisible: they 
call for Asian Americans to be more visible in a predominantly white industry, but for 
narratives that render difference invisible by presenting an Asian American man as ―just 
another guy.‖ As I concluded my interviews, it seemed as if these ostensible ―post-racial‖ 
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ideals indicated an embrace of a multiculturalism that focuses on social/cultural, rather 
than racial, differences.  
This call for multiculturalism is something the industry seems to have embraced. 
As scholars have endeavored to make sense of the changing business models of the 
television industry (which I will discuss in the next chapter), such as the multitude of 
distribution channels and the niche markets they reach, the concept of ―least 
objectionable programming‖ has shifted to incorporate narratives and casts—least 
objectionable casts—that reach the widest possible audience. In 2006, Lost creator 
Damon Lindelof explained that while Lost was ―essentially a cult show in its design and 
its genre…what makes it accessible to a wider audience is that there is a character on the 
show who is like you, even if that character is Jin (a Korean who doesn‘t speak 
English).‖
308
 The use of ensemble casts has been a ―magic‖ formula for programs to 
incorporate minorities without it being a ―minority show;‖ a way for them to make 
differences visible yet invisible at the same time. 
Take, for example, FOX‘s hit show Glee, which debuted in 2009 and has been 
rewarded for its diverse cast by the Multicultural Motion Picture Association.
309
 In its 
first two seasons, the program tackled minority issues such as disabilities (one of their 
singers is confined to a wheelchair), coming out and dealing with homophobia, and teen 
pregnancy. Yet, others—mostly in the blogosphere—have criticized the program for its 
multi-tokenism, with the ultimate claim that the narrative of Glee promotes identification 
and support for mainly white, heterosexual, often male characters. As one blog put it, 
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Glee includes ―individuals from oppressed groups to make a TV show ‗feel‘ more 
inclusive…. nearly all the secondary characters are tokenized even as writers attempt to 
cover it up by ‗special episodes about –insert oppression here--‘.‖
310
 Such an approach 
allows for any accusations of tokenism, racism, or ignorance on the part of creators or 
characters to be eclipsed by larger concepts like humanity and citizenship. 
A strategy for these multicultural programs is that they promote narratives built 
on character relationships. Heroes also presented an ensemble cast and was praised by the 
NAACP Hollywood Bureau for casting actors of color.
311
 The show was lauded for 
featuring East and South Asian men in ―one of the most diverse casts in a primetime 
television show,‖
312
 earning nominations for the NAACP Image Award and winning a 
Multicultural Prism Award.
313
 With no overt focus on characters‘ racial or ethnic 
differences in the storylines, Heroes, was instead billed as a program where ―the story is 
king. People connect with one another at odd times and in unpredictable ways.‖
314
The 
reading of Hiro presented above suggests how, despite its multicultural colorblindness, 
Heroes still marginalizes the character in a way that privileges the white masculinity. 
While Hiro plays a key role in the overall story, the central figures of the narrative are 
white brothers Peter and Nathan Petrelli, and white villain Sylar. Despite the show‘s 
―human relationships,‖ its treatment of racial others can be read as supporting what 
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Heroes and Lost were both advertised as diverse, multicultural shows with 
intentionally international casts. Promotional pictures for each season of both shows 
involved ensemble images with characters of different races, ethnicities and genders in a 
group pose, promising narratives of inclusive communities and cultural representation. 
Yet, as Mary Beltran‘s (2010) analysis of promotional material suggests, ―the inclusion 
of actors and characters of color…is not necessarily tantamount to equitable 
representation.‖ Conducting a careful analysis of how diversity is presented in media 
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Beltran‘s approach to multicultural casts—she recommends asking, for example, ―Are 
characters of color fully realized individuals[, and] does the diversity of the cast appear 
natural?‖—suggests that seemingly ―diverse‖ shows can still work to privilege dominant, 
white characters in their narratives.
319
 In these moments of subtle marginalization, 
multicultural ensembles can be read, at best, as narratives of tolerance.
320
 
On Lost, for example, presenting human stories enabled racial or cultural conflicts 
to be described as differences of opinion. The trade press described Lost as a 
―relationship show‖
321
 about humanity, with ―people falling in love, people stabbing each 
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other in the back, people having differences of opinion,‖
322
 hailing it as an ―opulently 
produced adventure thriller,‖
323
 with some of ―the most innovative episodes of 
television…. With its sprawling characters and complex storytelling.‖
324
 It blazed a trail 
in 2004 when television was searching for a key drama - NBC‘s The Apprentice was the 
only other broadcast network show on Time‘s ―10 Best television shows‖ list of 2004.
325
 
Lost also won a Screen Actors Guild award for best drama ensemble.
326
 Despite the truly 
international cast of the show, its narrative became a project of colorblindness that 
relegated racial and cultural difference to individual choices and actions. In this context, 
For example, Jin‘s speaking Korean becomes a personal choice once he learns that his 
wife can speak English; even more illustrative is that other characters, particularly 
Michael and Hugo, seem to understand his Korean once they become friends with Jin.
327
 
Jin‘s inability to speak English is not linked to his linguistic abilities, but rather to his 
willingness to respect his wife and participate in the relationships on the island. In this 
context the premise of the show can be seen as a post-racial social project in which 
survivors must learn to live together and form a workable, liberal democracy on the 
island while they await rescue.
328
 
The narrative works to eliminate any sense of Otherness within the relationships 
on the beach, most overtly by creating an unknown-yet-barbaric group of natives, aptly 
named ―The Others,‖ on the island. By casting The Others as an external threat, the show 
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binds the survivors to each other in a common humanity, exemplified by their cautionary 
motto of ―live together, die alone.‖ Deviant acts among the survivors are easily dismissed 
by the narrative to ensure that ―The Others‖ remain literally intolerable. For example, in a 
climactic moment, Jin attacks Michael on the beach. Angry, Michael tells the others that 
Jin picked a fight because ―Koreans don‘t like Black people.‖ In the DVD commentary 
for this scene, writer Christian Taylor points to a ―racial can of worms that opens because 
it‘s a Korean man attacking a Black man, and in some places that doesn‘t mean 
anything—in the United States, in certain places in America, it means quite a bit.‖ Yet, 
this exhortation of racial difference is brushed aside when Michael tries to explain his 
comment to his son: ―I don‘t think like that, OK? I was just angry.‖
329
 That Michael 
personally doesn‘t ―think like that‖ renders claims of racism as an individual issue; by the 
next episode, Michael defends Jin by pointing out that he is Korean, not Chinese, to other 
survivors.
330
 In another example, after torturing a fellow survivor, Iraqi Sayid is quickly 
positioned as a fundamentalist extremist in comparison to the civilized rationality of Jack 
Shephard. In this case the only solution is Sayid‘s self-imposed exile to remove his 
intolerable actions.  
Conclusion 
For interviewees, the experience of invisibility and the lack of any distinct Asian 
American narrative provided them with an acute awareness of the ways in which popular 
media texts influence their larger social surroundings. While many interviewees did not 
watch TV in the traditional sense, they were certainly aware enough of the images that 
surround them to be able to comment, quite critically, on their existence. Even if not 
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actively engaged in consuming these Asian American men on screen, interviewees were 
still eager to offer—sometimes very emotional—critiques, bringing their own definitions 
of ―Asian American‖ to figures and also by thinking about how actors and characters are 
consumed by a larger audience that, in turn, defines Asian Americans.  
Interview responses also revealed a belief that under-representation of Asian 
Americans in Hollywood is in part due to the white institutional structure of the 
entertainment industry. It is seen as a system dominated by whites that caters to white 
audiences, and interviewees sense a dialogic relationship between social relations on the 
ground and social relations on the screen. These Asian Americans‘ negotiations of media 
representations, then, intersect with the unique positioning of Asian Americans in 
America‘s racial discourse. As some noted, while other racial minorities such as 
Hispanics and African Americans have to an extent managed to penetrate racial discourse 
in the United States, Asian Americans remain invisible.  
When it comes to seeing Asian men on screen, interviewees feel conscripted into 
limited roles: they have long been faced stereotypical characters—bachelor fathers, rising 
sons, evil masterminds, dutiful model minorities—with narrative options as limited as the 
ranks they can fill in the entertainment industry. Indeed, the prominence of white actors 
on screens, fulfilling a wide range of roles, provides a number of positive role models 
whose performances they can enjoy. In this way, Gladiator‘s Russell Crowe and others 
who fit the ―Brad Pitt type‖ work to uphold hegemonic ideals of masculinity, naturalizing 
them into the white male body.
331
 Only two interviewees named black actors among their 
favorites, and cited similar masculine traits such as physical stature as to why. 
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I hesitate to conclude that the admiration of white male actors is somehow 
indicative of self-denial or white idealization. I—and the interviewees—offer an 
alternative that situates Asian American men within a larger context of multicultural 
consumption. Given the wide range of masculine performances white men portray in 
popular media, these men have found salient aspects of these performances to inform 
their own sense of self. By being versed in the stereotypes of Asian men within 
mainstream white discourse, they have developed strategies to react against, or work 
with, these performances of white masculinity. Interviewees were acutely aware that a 
certain degree of their idealization was a product generated by the imbalanced power 
relationships of the entertainment industry. This by no means assumes a passive, 
―complicit‖ audience that some scholars of ―racial imperialism‖ claim; rather, it suggests 
that interviewees have found other facets of their identities, beyond race, to engage with 
when it comes to media representations. Interviewees also offered that they have found 
other media to engage with that may offer stronger racial models for them. Tom, for 
example, has found respectable, interesting and attractive Asian men from the Korean 
television shows and soap operas his family buys from Korea. While interviewees may 
not find much being offered to them as Asian American male viewers, they are aware of 
other characters, actors, or narratives that appeal to their status as men, regardless of race, 
in America. 
Men‘s negotiations of Asian American portrayals thus suggest an ideal of 
invisible visibility—being present, but not noticed as different. For example, they dislike 
Jackie Chan‘s visibility because he is a visible stereotype, but they enjoy John Cho‘s 
visibility because his difference is rendered invisible as he portrays ―just another guy.‖ 
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Based on the discussions in this chapter, interviewees enjoy roles that are accepted by 
others on screen, moving throughout white society without drawing attention to their 
racial difference. The appeal of Harold and Kumar for interviewees is that the films 
allow interviewees to see, in the managed arena of filmic narrative, the burden of racial 
difference played out. Interviewees suggest a desire to be seen, but not to have to carry 
the burden of their racial identities from one encounter to another. Their admiration of Jin 
from Lost allows interviewees to see an Asian American character, for the first time on 
prime time screens, learn how to balance his ―Asian‖ life with his ―American‖ life, 
becoming truly ―Asian American‖ in interviewees‘ eyes. 
Media representations matter, but in a very nuanced way. Interviewees saw media 
representations of Asian Americans as a matter of absence, focusing on the blank space 
of what was not there, or not portrayed. Similar to their everyday experience, this absence 
or invisibility becomes the structuring mechanism for their understanding of what it 
means to be Asian American. Their critique of the television industry, their belief that 
things would not change in the near future, and their open confessions that they have 
disengaged from media use suggest that these men have, in large part, given up on 
television. Indeed, what surprised me most from these discussions was the number of 
times a young man told me that they did not regularly watch television, choosing instead 
to sporadically download episodes or rent DVDs. These men did not count on television 
for positive portrayals, for power dynamics to shift, for television to provide them with an 
adequate lens or mirror into their perspective of genuine experience. Rather, for these 








Transmedia Narratives and Possibilities of Race and Gender 
 
Audiences are getting harder and harder to reach – they're fragmented in many different 
ways, and they‘re very rarely offline. They‘re almost always connected to some device, 
which means they can be reached on these other platforms. To get a really big audience, 
you need to be able to reach these people where they‘re connected. You're foolish if you 





As seen in the previous chapter, interviewees negotiated the increasing visibility 
of Asian American actors, particularly in shows such as Lost and Heroes, as a complex 
and contradictory move toward diversity on screens. Some actively dismissed actors such 
as Masi Oka in NBC‘s Heroes for perpetuating stereotypes; others saw Daniel Dae Kim 
from ABC‘s Lost as inhabiting a more realistic character but within a storyline still 
constrained by television‘s dominant, white ideological agenda. While Lost and Heroes 
have been lauded for their diverse casts and multicultural storylines, in-depth readings of 
the characters and their treatment within program narratives reveals the ways in which 
diversity can be celebrated yet undermined at the same time.  
Despite sharing opinions of these programs, few interviewees watched them—or 
even television, for that matter—on a regular basis. Indeed, interviewees recalled 
episodes viewed on DVDs, or downloaded on or streamed through computers. Their lack 
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of television viewing was explained by a variety of reasons, from high cable subscription 
prices and constrained viewing schedules, to a conscious rejection of racial biases in 
entertainment texts. While some may continue to watch television from their couches, 
many more have turned to computer screens to view selected texts at their own leisure. 
Whether using network studio sites, web-based clearinghouses such as Hulu.com, or 
peer-to-peer downloaded files, interviewees shared how they avoided fees and pricing 
schemes, long advertising breaks, and geographical or time constraints – they can watch 
anywhere, at any time. Indeed, these types of viewing habits signal a larger cultural 
moment in which television consumption is no longer tied to the actual television itself. 
As such, television production has had to respond to an audience that is increasingly 
difficult to pinpoint.
333
 As Heroes creator Tim Kring muses in the opening quote of this 
chapter, audiences are now constantly connected to content, but also more fragmented. 
This chapter continues to look at minority representation in the media, but turns 
its focus to the diversity of channels, texts, and audiences that have challenged the 
traditional business model of broadcast television. Work on the television industry in this 
―post-network‖ era has linked changes in political economy, financing and regulation to 
changes in both the style and content of television products, arguing that the economic 
processes of production are inseparable from the cultural contribution of narratives.
334
 
The more holistic approach of linking the multiple sites of production—the production of 
texts, distribution channels, narratives and meaning—moves beyond television studies 
that regard television texts as self-contained. By examining the additional texts 
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(paratexts) beyond the broadcast program, we can see how expanded narratives create 
new spaces to broaden articulations of race and gender.
335
 How have technological shifts 
changed the nature of broadcasting as well as the nature of audience consumption? How 
have television narratives changed to accommodate these shifts? And, if it is possible to 
conduct a close, textual analysis of multi-platform narratives in their complexity, might 
we see new spaces forming for new representations of race and gender beyond 
television?  
The call to look ―beyond television‖ does not deny the importance of televisual 
texts, but rather contextualizes television narratives within a new framework where the 
concepts of ―television‖ and its ―mass audience‖ are, from some perspectives, rendered 
obsolete. Television must be understood within a larger context in which production, 
dissemination and consumption now includes new technologies and multiple, fragmented 
audiences. Looking at the construction of these audiences and representations of Asian 
American masculinity, this chapter builds on the work of Amanda Lotz (2007, 2009), 
Henry Jenkins (2006), Jonathan Gray (2010), and others. It maps industrial shifts, the 
content these shifts produced, and where this content appeared, addressing the 
possibilities—yet to be fully realized—offered by a new business model that goes beyond 
television to build wider-reaching, multi-platform narratives. 
Taking examples from Lost and Heroes, this chapter discusses the potential for 
new technologies to extend television narratives and the representations within them. 
Two popular shows caught in the midst of contentious industrial shifts, both Lost and 
Heroes presented audiences with in-depth mythologies comprised of web-based 
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adventure games, graphic novels, novellas and more, in addition to the primetime 
broadcasts. After explaining the experimental production context in which these 
mythologies developed, I use Lost to illustrate how a mainstream text used alternative 
texts—specifically, Alternate Reality Games (ARGs)—to widen its audience reach. In 
looking at the types of audiences ARGs attract as well as the complex nature of ARG 
gameplay, Lost provides an example of the challenges transmedia projects face in 
generating new interest in audiences beyond television. I then follow with examples from 
Heroes to illuminate the possibilities niche graphic novels and novellas offered Masi 
Oka‘s character Hiro Nakamura. These texts offered new representations of Asian 
masculinity, but also revealed how genres shape content and how paratexts and their 
representations can be understood in the context of the mainstream text at the center of a 
narrative universe. 
Mapping Shifts in Television 
“Dollars for Downloads”: The Writers’ Strike 
 In 2007, mounting tensions in contract negotiations between the Writers‘ Guild of 
America (WGA) and television studios signaled a fundamental shift in the structure of 
the entertainment industry. Television writers felt cornered by an old contract that failed 
to compensate for content distributed beyond television.
336
 Networks were turning to new 
avenues of content distribution through studio web sites, DVD box sets, and even 
portable devices such as mobile phones. Industry reports called this shifting landscape a 
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―rapidly changing marketplace with no precedent,‖
337
 and noted that networks ―built on 
an old business model‖
338
 were at a ―digital crossroads.‖
339
 ―Television is dying,‖ Lost 
creator Damon Lindelof‘s opinion article in the New York Times began, as he went on to 
explain how writers received royalties from syndicated airings or DVD sales, but not 
from the Internet. He explained: 
My show, ―Lost,‖ has been streamed hundreds of millions of times since it 
was made available on ABC‘s web site. The downloads require the viewer 
to first watch an advertisement, from which the network obviously 
generates some income. The writers of the episodes get nothing. We‘re 




Seeing little to none of the residual pay from these new channels of distribution (―dollars 
for downloads,‖ as one picket sign demanded), the WGA responded to an impasse in 
contract negotiations with a strike that lasted from November 5, 2007 through February 
12, 2008.  
The strike forced all scripted Hollywood shows, including Lost and Heroes, to 
plan for stalled production by December of 2007.
341
 Some producers made settlements 
with show writers to keep shows on schedule, while others attempted to shorten 
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storylines for the attenuated season.
342
 Many other shows had limited television seasons 
at the start of 2008. Lost, which originally planned 16 episodes for its fourth season 
beginning in January 2008, could only finish eight by the time of the strike.
343
 After the 
strike ended, show creators filmed five more episodes, but not without a five week gap. 
The WGA strike also interrupted Heroes‘ second season, with producers only able to 
complete 11 of its 25 scheduled episodes.
344
 
During the strike, some writers sought to continue their creative work by 
producing alternative, mostly Internet-based texts like graphic novels and mini-series. 
Perhaps one of the most popular texts to emerge from the work stoppage was Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer creator Joss Whedon‘s Dr. Horrible‟s Sing-Along Blog, starring Neil 
Patrick Harris. The series was Whedon‘s attempt to ―create new work that circumvented 
the [studio] system.‖
345
 Whedon brought in family and friends to write and shoot the 
three-part series that was delivered for viewers around the world via the Internet in July 
2008. After three days of free viewing, Dr. Horrible and its soundtrack were then made 
available for purchase on iTunes, then on DVD later in the year. As ―writers tried to form 
partnerships for outside funding,‖ Whedon explained to viewers, the idea behind Dr. 
Horrible was to ―show how much could be done with very little. To show the world there 
is another way.‖
346
 In the end, Whedon‘s project earned twice what it cost to produce,
347
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generated an action figure and graphic novel, and prompted a sequel. Whedon‘s creation 
highlighted the ever-increasing importance of web content in entertainment distribution, 
which was indeed the crux of WGA negotiations.  
Studios also used the work stoppage to experiment with new content. For 
example, NBC took negotiations over entertainment industry business models as a signal, 
and an opportunity, to embrace ―NBC 2.0,‖ cutting 700 jobs and expanding its digital 
offerings in an attempt to stay competitive with YouTube, social networks, and other new 
media distribution channels. In this new model, NBC‘s goal was to be a media company 
that ―happens to do television.‖
348
 The new ―NBC 360‖ image aimed to draw young 
audiences to the NBC web site and the other distribution channels under its corporate 
conglomerate.  
Trying to maintain audience interest in Heroes, which had significantly boosted 
the network‘s primetime ratings,
349
 NBC supplemented the show with a project called 
Heroes Evolutions. Originally dubbed Heroes 360, Heroes Evolutions was a digital 
extension of the show to bring Heroes content to fans, along with the graphic novels 
started in 2006. ―Go beyond your television screen and take the next leap forward with 
Heroes Evolutions,‖ NBC.com advertised. ―Online, offline, and on your phone, Heroes 
Evolutions brings adventure into every corner of your world.‖
350
 With the original intent 
to add short-form scripted content after each episode aired, NBC instead posted behind-
the-scenes, unscripted videos to the web to avoid WGA regulations.
351
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What the WGA strike signaled was an historical turning point in the way 
Hollywood and its audiences conceived of entertainment and its production, distribution, 
and consumption. The strike was symptomatic of larger shifts in the industry that began 
to fully emerge in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with the rise of digital technologies and 
niche programming. By 2007, the WGA work-stoppage revealed the challenge 
broadcasters faced in moving beyond television to appeal to audiences, who in turn had 
given up on traditional television viewing for newer, more personalized channels of 
consumption.  
Giving up on TV? Audience shifts 
The period of interest in this dissertation, roughly 2000-2008, marks a shift from 
an era in which television was originally conceived as a delivery system for network 
content, to what some have dubbed the ―post-network era.‖ Television was a mass 
medium when only three channels were available and limited content was delivered to 
captive audiences. Today, the proliferation of niche television channels caters to a 
fragmented audience of varying interests and desires. Nielsen research in 2004 showed 
that the average American home received 100 television channels, compared to a mere 27 
channels a decade earlier.
352
 By the 2007-2008 season, ABC and NBC stood out as two 
of the three original television broadcast networks trying to stay afloat in this moment of 
audience fragmentation and proliferation of choice. Ratings research has shown that 
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primetime programs remained the most dominant and popular form of television, but 
shrinking ratings for broadcast networks.
353
 
Amanda Lotz (2007) identifies the 1980s as the start of major industrial shifts. 
She labels the period as a ―multi-channel transition,‖ when new broadcast and 
subscription channels offered more choices to audiences, who also had more control over 
what they wanted to watch. This was in part due to changes in government regulations 
and new technologies like Video Cassette Recorders, which altered the ways in which 
content was delivered and could be watched, respectively. Institutional structures and 
practices responded to appeal to smaller segments as audiences fragmented into smaller 
demographics and interests. Content delivered to broad swaths of the audience faced 
competition from niche content providers ―narrowcasting‖ to specific target audiences, 
altering the definition of television‘s interpretive community. The broadcast networks 




Broadcast television not only competed with the rise of niche cable television 
networks‘ original and syndicated content,
355
 but also with digital video recording (DVR) 
technologies problematizing traditional structures of distribution and viewing. When 
TiVo was first commercially released in March of 1999, consumers were introduced to an 
even more flexible way of watching television. With new digital video recording (DVR) 
technology, hard drives replaced chunky, barely programmable video cassettes, allowing 
viewers to pause and rewind live TV, and introduced new programs of potential interest 
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based on personal viewing profiles. Most importantly, larger hard drives enabled viewers 
to store more television content for timeshifted viewing; television content from sitcoms 
to movies could be watched not only live, but an hour, a week, or even months after their 
original broadcast. As Advertising Age declared in 2002, ―Primetime is no longer a ‗time 
of day.‘ It‘s a frame of mind. Prime time is ‗my time.‘‖
356
 
The embrace of advanced technologies like recording devices and the Internet, as 
well as the move to make content specifically for these technologies, contributed to an 
overall digitalization of entertainment and its reception,
357
 and audiences‘ divided 
attentions were exacerbated by an ever-growing number of competing outlets and 
technologies. This has allowed individuals to view material on a variety of personal and 
mobile devices, freed from the confines of their living rooms to watch, pause, and share 
content on the go. The widespread adoption of digital, broadband technology by content 
providers and audiences made it difficult for advertisers to accurately predict financial 
expectations for a single television program;
358
 it also made other financial calculations, 
such as residual pay to WGA writers, tricky to estimate.
359
 Yet, looking to reach 
audiences and maintain interest in television texts, broadcast networks turned to digital 
technologies to expand their offerings. Technology, financing, and corporate deregulation 
made room for networks to embrace multi-platform productions that took advantage of 
the many media divisions under their corporations.
360
 Highly experimental in nature, this 
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synergistic business model created new texts and representations in an attempt to build a 
wider audience. 
The demographic of the interviewees for this project make them part of a wave of 
media users who have moved beyond television for entertainment. Members of this 
―millennial generation,‖ born roughly from 1982-1995, have been referred to as ―digital 
natives‖ whose technology-driven lives enable them to be ―always connected.‖
361
 While 
the concept of ―digital natives‖ has been critiqued for its essentialism and inability to 
capture the diversity of lived experiences among children, teens, and adults,
362
 market 
research confirms viewing habits that suggest at least some sort of generational 
phenomenon that encapsulates the men I interviewed for this project. For example, 
viewers aged 25-34 lead the statistics in timeshifted viewing,
363
 and younger men are 
more likely than other viewers to watch television shows online.
364
 As television 
producer Mark Burnett explained of his sons, ―My kids don‘t know what a TV network is 
anymore. They watch one channel: TiVo.‖
365
 
Beyond Television: The Transmedia Experiment 
Truly, this ―post-network‖ era saw the television industry warp, buckle and 
reshape itself in response to the changing affordances of technology and the demands of 
audiences. In an attempt to capture more audiences beyond television, broadcast 
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networks, led by ABC, began to offer reruns of recently aired episodes for viewing on 
studio web sites. In May of 2006, ABC experimented with Lost, one of their most popular 
shows, by airing episodes on television and then posting the episode for viewing on 
ABC.com the next day. They decided to allow audiences to purchase episodes through 
iTunes. Supplementing their television broadcasts with digital offerings, studios could 
still compensate for potential losses in one area (television) with profits in another 
(digital downloads)—indeed, a $1.99 iTunes download of Lost generated roughly three 
times more revenue for ABC than from primetime television advertisements.
366
  
The move to offer episodes beyond the television proved so successful that by the 
next season, the majority of ABC programs were distributed in this way: first television, 
then the web.
367
 Other broadcast networks followed, and in 2007 ABC, NBC and FOX 
partnered to create the online service Hulu, a web site which collected television and film 
content for free, limited-advertisement, online viewing.
368,369
 Catering to new audience 
demands, Hulu‘s business model was predicated on ―help[ing] people find and enjoy the 
world's premium video content when, where and how they want it.‖ Hulu secured 
audiences who did not tune in during the original broadcast, and also ensured network 
advertisers that timeshifting viewers would come to a studio-sanctioned portal to view the 
online episode. It also helped show producers keep the attention of busy audience 
members: ―On a practical level,‖ wrote James Poniewozik of Time, ―DVRs, DVDs and 
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 In order to provide access to their television narratives whenever, wherever and 
however audiences wanted, broadcast networks began to think of ways to expand on their 
traditional creative, marketing and distribution models. This new model of media 
production required what Göran Bolin calls ―textual production that travels over 
technologies‖
371
 or, in other words, transmedia texts. The transmedia text involves 
intricate multi-platform narrative webs that, according to Henry Jenkins (2006), capitalize 
on the affordances of digital media convergence.
372
 In his case studies of transmedia 
stories, Jenkins points particularly to The Matrix (2000), a feature film with a story 
extended into video games, animated series, web stories, and comic books, all providing 
clues to understanding the larger narrative in an interactive, iterative process for fans.
373
  
The transmedia text thus capitalizes on cultural synergy, or texts and formats that 
travel over several technologies, and a non-linear narrative, in which different stages and 
threads of a story are distributed through different channels. One of the noted economic 
incentives for non-linear storytelling, then, is that the parceling of stories onto different 
platforms makes consumers dependent on multiple platforms to fully appreciate and 
interact with the narrative. As Jenkins and other scholars of transmedia production 
suggest, these moves to expand commodification across different platforms have been 
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driven by producers‘ needs to maximize means of consumption in response to a diverse 
array of technologies. 
In an April 2010 move that acknowledged the truly ―post-network‖ business, the 
Producers Guild of America (PGA) approved the title of ―Transmedia Producer‖ to the 
list of official project credits. The PGA defined a transmedia producer as one working to 
produce upwards of three narrative storylines from the same fictive world on multiple 
platforms including film, TV, internet, print media, comics, and mobile downloads.
374
 A 
few months later, Heroes creator Tim Kring started his own entertainment company, 
Imperative, devoted to transmedia storytelling and marketing. The move to officially 
incorporate transmedia production into the entertainment industry signals a change in the 
way we conceptualize television production and use.  
Creating a transmedia narrative can be a successful marketing and branding 
strategy. Ivan Askwith has extensively discussed the evolution of a program into a brand, 
with expanded access as ―touchpoints‖ for viewers to connect with the narrative.
375
 These 
multiple access points increase the potential to draw in, and foster the loyalty of, multiple 
niche audiences. The transmedia strategy offers a path by which new texts—and 
subsequently new content and new audiences—can be introduced into the broadcast 
television arena, often more constrained and regulated than its cable counterpart. Lost and 
Heroes were two of the first major broadcast shows to wholeheartedly embrace the 
transmedia model, and this embrace was not without its challenges.  
“Fishing Where The Fish Are”: The Niches of Transmedia Universes 
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Experiencing Lost: Alternate Reality Games And Audiences at the Periphery 
Working to capture as wide an audience as possible, Lost creators Damon 
Lindelof and Carlton Cuse worked to develop the narrative into a larger mythology, one 
to be experienced rather than merely watched. In the first official Lost podcast, Lindelof 
explained, ―You‘re going to have to watch the show, and not just the show, but what 
happens in between the show, sort of fairly carefully, in order to…begin the path on this, 
what we‘re calling an experience.‖
376
 Lost‘s transmedia narrative was comprised of 
mobile phone episodes—―mobisodes‖—podcasts, and web-based Alternate Reality 
Games (ARGs) between television seasons. The idea behind each of Lost‘s many 
distributed narratives was to keep existing audiences interested and potentially draw in 
new viewers through different points of engagement.  
Lost‘s first ARG, The Lost Experience (TLE), was truly an experiment in 
interactive participation, and its intense storyline requiring obsessive and dedicated work 
was ultimately deemed a failure by Lost creators.
377
 Helping to intensify the mythology 
behind the program, the ARG engaged players in an intricate public relations campaign 
that blended Lost‟s narrative fiction into game players‘ real lives. A collaborative project 
between ABC and television companies in Australia and the UK, the TLE centered on the 
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premise that the Hanso Foundation, a company from the show, was a real-world business 
that Lost writers had appropriated for their teleplays.
378
  
In true non-linear fashion, The Lost Experience ARG would make sense to 
players as a self-contained game. Season three of Lost would still make sense to viewers 
if they did not play the TLE; the richest experience, however, would be for viewers who 
became players, with the game adding a level of depth to the show and its mythology. 
Abba situated the ARG within a network of digital technologies. Viewers, slowly 
becoming players in a five month-long game, would further Lost‟s narrative through their 
dedicated consumption of ARG texts and their collective digital labor.  
In his analysis of ARGs, Tom Abba offers that an ARG player might not even be 
aware that a game has begun, and that he or she is an active participant.
 379
 A viewer 
interested in exploring one clue might find a hidden piece of information that leads to a 
longer and more complex line of participatory exercises that constitute the ARG. In TLE, 
a curious viewer could quickly become an active co-creator in the interactive, transmedia 
universe. TLE began during a commercial break during a second-season Lost episode, 
which provided a Hanso phone number and an address to the Hanso Foundation web site. 
This point of entry—a ―rabbit hole‖
380
—into the ARG at first provided details about the 
company, with several hidden ―Easter eggs‖ on the web site that, when found, would link 
visitors to new web pages. Other areas of the web site were password protected; when 
viewers dialed the number in the Hanso TV commercial, voice messages provided clues 
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as to what these passwords were. TLE entered a new stage when the Hanso web site was 
hacked by Internet activist Rachel Blake (the only female lead to appear in a Lost ARG). 
Along with other ARG characters, Blake enlisted players to follow her attempts to 
publicize the Hanso Foundation‘s shady business ethics. 
Simultaneously, an integral part of TLE was the novel Bad Twin, authored by 
Gary Troup, a fictive character who did not survive the crash of Oceanic flight 815. 
Published as part of the Lost mythology, the Bad Twin was key to narrative developments 
in the ARG because it contained controversial statements about the Hanso Foundation; it 
also provided readers with more information about the TV narrative itself. Real-life 
publicity for Bad Twin thus centered on the Hanso Foundation‘s supposed attempts to 
dismiss Troup‘s work. ―Interviews‖ with Troup posted on Barnes and Noble, Borders, 
and Amazon web sites revealed that the Hanso Foundation had pulled an earlier book, 
also written by Troup, from public access Foundation. On May 9, 2006, newspapers 
across the country including the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post and the New York 
Times featured a quarter page advertisement purportedly bought by Hanso, pleading 
readers to disbelieve the claims made in the novel: it was billed as ―the book the Hanso 
Foundation doesn‘t want you to read.‖ The advertisement urged readers to instead visit 
the Hanso web site for information about the company. The back-and-forth between the 
company and the novel would also be aired out on publisher Hyperion Books‘ web site, 
with an ―official‖ statement about the novel‘s controversy. 
The dual function of Bad Twin highlights transmedia storytelling‘s structural and 
interactive capacities to subvert reality and hail audiences on multiple levels.
381
 TLE‘s 
blend of new and old, digital and print media enabled Bad Twin to hold multiple 
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functions—not only serving as narrative artifacts, but also as a ―meta-text‖ of the Lost 
narrative.
382
 The role of the novel in the game, in the actual TV show (characters read the 
manuscript to pass time on the island), and in its real, published form, added multiple 
layers of meaning to the Lost experience. Yet, while Lost fans criticized the novel for 
failing to contribute meaningfully to the Lost narrative, it still managed to rank on the 
New York Times bestseller list.
383
 With a narrative unable to be contained in a single 
medium, Lost experimented with ―meta-texts‖ such as Bad Twin to connect audiences 
from one line of the story to another.
384
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Figure 7: The fictional Hanso Foundation's newspaper advertisement against Bad Twin, the TLE tie-





As TLE progressed, Blake‘s new web site provided ARG players with new clues, 
or glyphs, that unlocked fragments of a secret video exposing some of Hanso‘s business 
ventures. Glyphs were revealed to players in a complex, integrated marketing campaign 
involving ABC subsidiaries: they were found in advertisements for both Sprite and Jeep, 
as well as on the job-seeking web site, monster.com. At one point in the ARG, Hanso 
Foundation was revealed to own Apollo Candy (a food item on Lost); shortly after, 
Apollo Candy giveaways were scheduled at state fairs and other summer events around 
the United States as well as in the UK and Australia. These market tie-ins highlight how 
transmedia storytelling is motivated by economic incentives: through media convergence, 
producers maximize points of distribution and therefore consumption and revenue.
386
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Providing so many points of entry through product tie-ins, integrating known brands into 
the narrative, and bringing the ARG into players‘ everyday experiences worked to 





Figure 8: A TLE glyph, found on a Sprite ad in People Magazine, led to a series of clues and 
information when "NANITE" was entered into sublymonal.com, a specially designed website which 
viewers were led to from the Hanso Foundation website. Not only were TLE players expected to be 
knowledgeable in following these web-based clues, but were also tasked with finding glyphs in places 




TLE players were asked to complete increasingly difficult tasks, particularly when 
it came to identifying hidden glyphs and cracking encrypted video files. The tasks 
involved in playing TLE—finding clues hidden within web page source code, obsessively 
tracking clues, translating mathematical and computer coding—depended on an audience 
well-versed in the digital labor of the Internet. While ARGs are built on the concept that 
no one individual can participate without the help of others, they do depend, as Jenkins 
states, ―on consumers with the kind of cultural competencies that could only originate in 
the context of global convergence.‖
389
 To be a fully dedicated participant in TLE, one 
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must have had access to the Internet, a certain mastery of ―pop cosmopolitanism,‖
390
 and 
the ability to ―grind…away at these games for 10, 20, 30 hours a week.‖
391
 The ―play‖ of 
the ARG was, indeed, ―homework,‖ with a global study group of Lost fans collaborating 
with one another to share answers.
392
  
Jenkins‘ formulation that the transmedia system provides content for ―migratory 
media audiences who will go anywhere in search of the kinds of entertainment 
experiences they want,‖
393
 suggests that the success of a niche text is reliant on active 
consumers willing to seek it out. This makes the success of transmedia paratexts a 
complicated challenge: it must be unique enough to appeal to a different audience, but 
similar and general enough to feed back into the central television program. Developing a 
narrative on a new platform must account for the types of audiences drawn to that 
platform. 
While designed to draw in new audiences, TLE instead reinforced fan loyalty 
among a community already used to the ARG genre and its level of detail. By the end of 
TLE, some had criticized that ABC and Lost producers created the game for ―the 1%‖ of 
―minutiae-obsessed,‖ ―serious hard-core fans.‖
394
 Indeed, the ARG built on an already 
existing collaborative intelligence project, the online wiki LostPedia. This online 
encyclopedia was so devoted to the minutiae of the show that loyal viewers helped each 
other make connections between episodes, characters, and even objects. After TLE 
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concluded, even Lindelof admitted that it ―went too deep‖ and became inaccessible to a 
mainstream audience, potentially turning away new viewers. Ultimately, creators missed 
the goal to bring back old audiences and intrigue new ones, losing 5 million viewers in 
the season premier that followed the ARG.
395
 It is important to note that the ARGs in 
following seasons were much more simplified and less dependent on the types of digital 
labor mentioned above. 
While the ARG may have struggled to bring in new audiences to the program, it 
did offer new possibilities in distributing narrative content and appealing to a niche 
audience beyond television. In the next section, I suggest that transmedia texts also open 
possibilities for content beyond what is found on television. What might (un)conventional 
texts and representational spaces in transmedia narratives offer audiences, in terms of 
racial and gendered representations? 
Building Heroes: Bringing Peripheral Representations to the Center 
Similar to Lost, the Heroes transmedia universe was calculated and intense. Even 
before Heroes‟ 2006 premiere at Comic-Con, the world‘s largest annual comic book 
convention, show creators developed the web site ―9
th
 Wonders‖—named after a comic 
book read by characters in the show—to create a fanbase and build anticipation.
396
 This 
was quickly followed with other digital components that provided entry into the Heroes 
mythology. Show writer Jesse Alexander wrote on his personal blog:  
At HEROES we have embraced the transmedia approach. We extend our 
narrative across multiple media platforms simultaneously. Taking the 
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characters, stories, and concepts from our broadcast show and expanding 
them via every platform we have access to. DVD. Websites. Cell phone 
games. Comic Books. Manga. Toys. And so on. Every piece of content 
that we create is designed to be a point of engagement for our audience, 
both a way for potential fans to discover the franchise, and for loyal fans 
to immerse themselves in the world of HEROES.
397
  
Indeed, Heroes‘ embrace of transmedia storytelling‘s ―encyclopedic capacity‖
398
 was 
evident even in some of the show‘s opening images. In the first episode, viewers see 
geneticist Mohinder Suresh discover his father‘s research into individuals around the 
world who hold super powers. The image, a world map dotted with thumbtacks 
connected by different colored string, points to the interconnected stories of Heroes‘ 
characters but also mirrors the ―‘contextualizing devices—color-coded paths, time lines, 
family trees, maps, clocks, calendars, and so on,‘ [that storytellers create] to help viewers 
make sense of the world.‖
399
 The inclusion of global storylines and characters was also 
brought to the show‘s marketing campaigns, with extensive premieres and cast 
appearances in cities around the world.
400
 
Heroes presented a television text that was accessible to mainstream, primetime 
television audiences, but also spoke to a niche audience that appreciated the graphic 
novel genre, superhero narratives, and the mythology and origin stories that accompanied 
them. As with Lost, Heroes producers established a fan community through a forceful 
presence at Comic-Con, where fellow comic book fan and cult director/independent film 
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actor Kevin Smith announced that he would direct an episode of Heroes: Origins, a spin-
off mini-series for fans.
401
 Origins was designed to add to the Heroes universe while also 
luring viewers to the television: Origins was meant to allow viewers to pick their favorite 
mini-series character for inclusion in the regular primetime story. However, Origins was 
put on hold due to the 2007 WGA strike and ultimately canceled by NBC entertainment 
in order to ―focus on keeping the Heroes mothership as strong as possible.‖
402
  
While trying to experiment with offshoots like Origins, show creators and writers 
kept their fans engaged and interested by thinking of additional paratexts. When the 
WGA strike preemptively ended the show‘s second season, writers continued their work 
on the Heroes graphic novel offered on the show‘s NBC web site. Premiering alongside 
the television show, the graphic novel at first continued the show‘s narrative and 
provided the origin stories of the show‘s characters. Later, the graphic novels soon began 
depicting new characters not seen on the show, adding more depth to the television 
content. Writers Aron Eli Coleite and Joe Pokaski, graphic novel writers, shared: 
We had so many stories to tell and there was only so much room in the TV 
show—so we decided that we could tell these alternative stories in the 
comics. The stories could be deeper, broader and reveal more secrets 
about our characters. It was also a way to tell stories that would be 
otherwise unproduceable[sic] on our show.
403
 
One deeper, broader, alternative story that the Heroes comics told was Hiro Nakamura‘s. 
A unique element of the Heroes universe was the fact that it featured a lead Asian male 
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character in its transmedia narrative. Not only was Hiro central to the television narrative 
(as his name suggests), but he was also a central character in the transmedia narrative. 
Following the transmedia representations of Hiro provides insight into the ways in which 
transmedia strategies may allow for new representations of race and gender. 
The second issue of the Heroes graphic novel focused entirely on Hiro Nakamura, 
casting him as a central figure in the larger Heroes mythology. Entitled ―The Crane‖ and 
set in Japan,
 
the issue provided Hiro‘s origin story, including what motivated him to take 
action after prophesying a nuclear explosion in futuristic New York. The comic‘s panels 
showed Hiro rummaging through his room for a particular comic book given to him by 
his grandfather. Finding it, he rips off the cover and folds an origami crane, then takes the 
crane to a Hiroshima memorial site where he envisions talking to his grandfather. 
Readers learned that Hiro‘s name was given to him ―so that we would never forget‖ the 
story of Hiroshima victims like Hiro‘s grandfather, who ―survived devastation 
and…fought cancer.‖ Throwing away his Yamamoto Industries ID card, Hiro promises to 
remember this history and to honor his grandfather‘s memory.
404
  
Here, Hiro is presented as a fellow comic geek, a nod to the audience that actively 
sought out Hiro in this comic book paratext. Posters of Japanese anime and comic book 
heroes adorn the walls and ceiling of his room. The panel shows his room as sparse, with 
just a bed and a computer, boxes of comic books piled on the floor, and bookshelves 
neatly lined with action figures. The comic book that Hiro searches for is Action Comics 
#1, an issue in which several iconic American superheroes, including Superman, were 
introduced in 1938; the origami crane he folds is from the cover page and prominently 
features Superman.  
                                                 




Figure 9: A panel featuring Hiro Nakamura’s bedroom from the Heroes graphic novel, issue no. 2 
(“The Crane”). 
 
As reflected in the previous chapter, Hiro Nakamura is interpreted by many as a 
stereotypical Asian character, with a meek demeanor, childlike behaviors, nerdy clothing 
and non-sexual physique. The same may be found in the graphic novel. His room is a 
boy‘s room, not a grown man‘s. Hiro‘s name is tied to honorable duty; the tradition of 
origami is so central to this issue and Hiro‘s personal history that the issue is named after 
it. Yet, there is something to be seen in the multicultural tone of Hiro‘s origin story. He is 
inspired by an American superhero to honor the memory of his grandfather, a survivor of 
the U.S. nuclear attack. Superman, an American symbol that has traversed geographical 
and cultural boundaries, is a prominent character in the issue. With its diverse cast of 
characters and global storylines, Heroes skirted the line multicultural politics and 
representations, presenting characters that were different, but not too different. In this 
way, Hiro is presented as an Asian-American character, whose racial difference in the 
comic was eclipsed by larger, more abstract human interest issues such as family pressure 




Figure 10: East meets West: A quintessentially American Superman appears on Hiro’s 
quintessentially Japanese origami crane. From the Heroes graphic novel, issue no. 2 (“The Crane”). 
 
The other prominent text in the transmedia narrative featuring Hiro‘s story is 
Saving Charlie: A novel, released during the WGA strike.
405
 When Hiro and Ando take a 
cross-country drive from LA to New York in the show‘s first season, Hiro meets waitress 
Charlie at a Texas diner and falls in love, only to witness her murder several minutes 
later. In an attempt to save her, Hiro uses his powers to teleport back in time. Saving 
Charlie presents Heroes fans with 256 pages of unseen romantic storyline, from Hiro‘s 
perspective.  
As a text in which the primary focus is an inter-racial, sexual relationship with an 
Asian man, Saving Charlie opens new possibilities for a narrative rarely seen on 
television sets. The novel‘s challenge to the dominant television representations is seen in 
Hiro‘s courtship of a white woman and ultimate triumph over a white man, Lloyd, who 
also wants to date Charlie. As an alternate text in the transmedia universe, the novel 
makes room for new performances of sexuality that Asian American interviewees 
rarely—or never—see on screens. In Saving Charlie, Hiro is given an entire novel in 
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which to become a man—quite literally, as the story follows courtship with Charlie and 
ends with Hiro losing his virginity. 
While the novel broadens the range of racial and gendered performance for a 
mainstream TV character, whether or not the content appealed to and was consumed by a 
wider range of audience members remains in question. While show producers and 
scholars might suggest that texts in a transmedia narrative are intertwined and form a web 
of meanings, I contend that the aesthetics, representational logics and niche audiences of 
each alternative text can be understood in terms of the aesthetics, representational logics 
and ―mass‖ audience of television. As the creative labor and assumed audience 
undoubtedly shape the content of a cultural text, portrayals of Hiro were implicated not 
only by the broader mass market of the TV show but also the niche female market of the 
novella. The author, Aury Wallington, is a writer whose target audience is female young 
adults: her work has included Pop!, a controversial novel about a high school senior 
looking to lose her virginity, as well as a series of books based on the FOX teen show, 
The O.C.
406
 Additionally, Wallington has television writing credits in HBO‘s Sex and the 
City and UPN‘s Veronica Mars.  
As such, the content of the novel is written for those familiar with the genre of 
Wallington‘s work. Written in a style and register for teenage girls, Hiro becomes a 
stand-in for a teenage heroine. He is often placed within stereotypical feminine situations, 
ranging from retail therapy to decorating his apartment with scented candles. When 
detailing Hiro‘s preparations for his first date with Charlie, Wallington drives home the 
appeal to teenage consumers: 
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Choosing the perfect outfit had required four additional trips to the mall…. 
As he assessed and revised every single item of clothing he had planned to 
wear, from his sexy-yet-modest underpants…. to his shoes.
407
 
Teen girls might also identify when they read that Hiro‘s knowledge of seductive 
performance is informed by America‟s Next Top Model,
408
 and that his only 
understanding of sexuality comes from a book his older sister has discarded, titled I Like 
Me: A Growing Guide for Girls.
409
 
In writing for young adults, Wallington‘s portrayal of Hiro focuses on 
inexperienced, awkward encounters. Hiro is thus presented as child, whose virgin history 
is an ―embarrassment,‖ consisting of ―only a handful of dates, each more humiliating 
than the last.‖
410
 Throughout the novel, Texas policeman Lloyd links Hiro‘s effeminate 
nature to his racial difference, at one point stating, ―He can barely grow a mustache. He 
probably doesn‘t even have hair on his yin-yang yet.‖
411
 As Hiro contends with this 
bullying as well as his burgeoning sexuality, complete with inconvenient erections,
412
 he 
is reverted to adolescence despite being 24 years old. While Hiro‘s determination and 
sincerity do win him love at the end, he fails to become any more articulate or confident, 
only uttering, ―Wow,‖ once he loses his virginity.  
Saving Charlie thus offers a contradictory presentation of an Asian male. Like the 
television show, it can be read as portraying Asian manhood as stereotypically feminized. 
Providing more details about his shopping and clothing than his sexual encounter, the 
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novella makes the ending as asexual as it can be, marginalizing his masculinity. Yet, 
Saving Charlie can also be read as a progressive text that markets a minority character in 
an inter-racial romantic relationship, providing an Asian American male character 
opportunities not normally seen in American mass media. In this context, we can 
understand the transmedia universe of Heroes as liberating and norm-breaking, providing 
an opportunity to delve into characters‘ histories in venues and formats beyond 
television. 
A multitude of texts contribute to our understanding of Heroes and its characters. 
This transmedia context troubles readings of Hiro‘s masculinity, and Asian masculinity 
overall, in the Heroes universe. As a part of the show‘s transmedia mythology, the 
novella might have drawn in a broader audience, but ultimately was geared toward a 
niche readership attracted to Wallington‘s work and others in her genre. I argue that 
Hiro‘s ―adult‖ adventure was infantilized for the novella‘s assumed female audience in 
order to make it as marketable as possible beyond the comic book audience of Heroes.  
I also contend that Hiro‘s story in Saving Charlie added an interesting and 
ultimately marginalizing nuance to understanding Hiro‘s story on television. Hiro‘s entire 
sexual relationship was contained between the book‘s covers, allowing the Heroes 
universe to parcel away what Hiro has gained—ostensibly, his masculinity—within the 
novella. Mainstream audiences not caring to seek out paratexts would never have to be 
aware of Hiro‘s sexuality. Furthermore, even if the novel‘s narrative were inserted into 
the chronology of the television program, it becomes clear on the television program that 
Hiro did not ―earn‖ any more manliness from his transmedia experience. On the show, he 
returns to Texas to see Charlie die despite his efforts, and his continued bumbling and 
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buffoonery is not mitigated by his sexual encounter. While the peripheral spaces of a 
transmedia text like the Heroes novella provide the opportunity to challenge traditional 
television norms, it is precisely the periphery of that text in comparison to the central 
television text that illuminate how those challenges are marginalized. 
Transmedia Narratives: Connecting the Dots  
As transmedia universes allow audiences to construct meanings beyond 
television, analyses must take into account the dialogic relationships between paratexts. 
The market logics behind each transmedia text lend insight into the assumptions about 
the content within, and audience hailed, those texts.
413
 Amanda Lotz‘s (1995) 
ethnographic work shows that the rise of niche networks have opened possibilities for 
new audiences and content, but that some of the new content must still work within the 
limits of existing ideological and economic structures.
414
 If a transmedia universe with ―a 
narrative that cannot be contained within a single medium,‖
415
 we must look at what 
narratives offer as they shift from the television. As the example of Saving Charlie shows 
above, such an analysis shows what representations are offered in new contexts, and also 
how the newness of those contexts may limit, or even undermine, the content. In this 
way, we can see how the economic imperatives of supporting a broadcast television 
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The transmedia universes discussed in this chapter center on television shows as 
the primary text from which each new offshoot builds. While Lotz‘s Any Day Now 
investigation does not contend with a transmedia model, her observations suggest a way 
to understand how niche paratexts support or challenge televised narratives. Here, the 
dialogic relationship of niche texts with central text can provide insight into the presumed 
value of niche texts and audiences in serving the ―mothership,‖ or central television 
show. While Carlton Cuse explained the transmedia capacity of Lost, he also admitted, 
―The show is the mothership.‖
417
 When NBC attempted to broaden the Heroes audience 
developing the Heroes: Origins mini-series, it was, in part, canceled for fear that this 
peripheral text would draw mass interest away from the central broadcast show. 
TLE, the Heroes graphic novel and Saving Charlie were all texts with forms and 
genres already located at the margins of mainstream media, and consequently appealed to 
audiences already congregating at the margins of the mainstream. With TLE and the 
Heroes graphic novel in particular, ABC and NBC worked to target a specific 
demographic of fanboys, often conceptualized as predominantly young, white and 
male.
418
 Both programs built influential presences at Comic-Con, featuring show 
premieres as well as continued appearances from show creators, writers, and stars. 
Identified as fanboys themselves, show creators were pointedly targeting a particular type 
of consumer with their mythologies.
419
 As described above, TLE‘s intricate digital labor 
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and fanboy aesthetic was a gendered and classed experience.
420
 While ARGs have been 
discussed as a more democratic form of video gameplay, presenting more female lead 
characters than traditional video games and showing a more even split between male and 
female players, game designers admit that ARGs and similar projects typically target 
young men.
421
 While this is not to deny the role of women in fan or comic book culture 
or the democratizing power of collaborative participant communities that transmedia 
universes privilege, the political economy of such transmedia texts suggests narratives 
marketed to, for and by white men. 
Similarly, texts like Saving Charlie can, due to their peripheral status in the 
transmedia narrative, do the work of appealing to niche audiences in order to draw them 
to mass audience market. In a transmedia model, niche texts may do the work of 
identifying another portion of the population as a financial market. By drawing these 
niche audiences to the mothership and its more general audience base, television can 
assure financial success by delivering viewers to advertisers. However, the examples in 
this chapter suggest a need to balance the fine line between being too niche (just 
appealing to a small group who will not have interest in the main text) or not niche 
enough (continuing to appeal to those already loyal).  
In a discussion on transmedia strategy, Lindelof expressed some frustration over 
the difficulty of extending a central narrative to new texts: 
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Let‘s face it, what is the subset of your audience that is going online to 
seek this [extra content] out? So suddenly like Joe from Poughkeepsie 
who doesn‘t give a crap about the Internet at all has heard that you need to 
basically have this online experience to understand Lost, then he gets 
turned off of the mothership. He‘s basically like, 'I just want to watch the 
show, man. If you tell me I have to go online for an hour and unlock all 




Here, Lindelof pointed to the larger issue of understanding each texts‘ narrative and 
audience boundaries. The structure of a text like TLE shapes the boundaries of its 
engagement. A text like Saving Charlie may be ―too niche‖ in its format and style, failing 
to appeal to mainstream viewers. On the other hand, a text like TLE, while increasing the 
potential promote fan loyalty and interest, may have only appealed to those already 
dedicated as loyal fans. In Lindelof‘s terms, the ARG merely served as ―liner notes‖ for 
fans already invested in the narrative.
423
 The highly experimental nature of transmedia 
universes and the uncertain terrain of appealing to audiences was best described by Tim 
Kring: when asked to explain the show‘s transmedia strategy, he claimed that show 
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While it is impossible to know the true impetus for creating such texts without the 
kind of industry ethnography done by Lotz and others, analyzing what the text tells us 
about audience assumptions—through its aesthetic, its use, the dominant or preferred 
readings in the narrative—helps us understand the larger context of its production. 
Despite many challenges, industry producers have embraced—albeit experimentally—
transmedia models for their marketing and narrative potential.
425
 Each narrative format 
and its accompanying market can create new content beyond television‘s standards (e.g., 
narrative arcs) and restrictions (e.g., show length). However, the economic imperatives a 
transmedia universe built on a television mothership, may limit any truly progressive 
challenge to industry norms. Close analysis of transmedia narratives can provide insight 
into how each new format and its market, in relationship to television, shapes 
representations and stories as they travel throughout the transmedia universe.  
Written with full cooperation of Heroes producers, Saving Charlie was, according 
to fans of the TV show, riddled with so many inconsistencies that its role as a legitimate 
text in the Heroes canon is hotly debated. It is precisely the debate over what constitutes 
the canon of a particular universe that troubles who or what can define legitimate 
identities. In other words, that Hiro‘s masculinity is placed into a text that is itself on 
shaky canonical grounds relegates his masculinity—whatever it is that he achieves—to 
the margins of the Heroes universe. Additionally, paratexts are dictated by the audience 
they attract. Saving Charlie, written by an author who recognizes and is recognized by 
young adult romance readers, is thus shaped like other texts in that genre. Appealing to 
an audience already attracted to this genre necessarily shapes how Hiro‘s character can 
think, interact, and perform. In this context, Hiro is a character in a double bind: he is 
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feminized in the subject position of a teenage heroine within the text, and is also 
feminized as a character catering to teenage female readers. In the specific examples of 
the Heroes graphic novel and Saving Charlie, we can see that these media texts were still 
shaped by the industry‘s expectations of a successful mainstream, televised text. In these 
experimental cases, transmedia texts support the story found on the mothership; some 
continuity must be provided for fans of the show following characters throughout the 
transmedia narrative. If the story for mainstream audiences promoted a reading of Hiro as 
a stereotypical Asian character, the paratexts featuring Hiro could not diverge too far 
from this portrayal. 
My reading of Hiro-as-transmedia-character suggests a spectrum of visibility 
depending on the location of the text within the Heroes universe. In this case, at least, 
Hiro can be given a fully visible, central role Saving Charlie, located in the outskirts of 
his transmedia world. In this most niche of texts, Hiro can win over a white woman and 
lose his virginity. However, as portrayals of Hiro move closer to the mothership, the 
character is more visibly stereotypical, brought to a level safe for a general audience to 
consume. In a graphic novel that might appeal to wider audiences, Hiro becomes more 
stereotypically Asian, a character rooted in ―Oriental‖ stereotypes of family honor and 
saving face. Even closer to the mainstream, a TV Guide cover featuring Hiro has the 








Whether or not this progression of ―visibility‖ can be applied to other transmedia 
narratives remains to be seen. However, the dynamic representations of Hiro Nakamura‘s 
masculinity suggest that a representational logic, favoring television, that influences the 
extent to which race can be articulated in a transmedia environment. This is not to say 
that the audiences hailed by mainstream and niche texts, are mutually exclusive consumer 
positions. Rather, in an era when transmedia texts are created to counteract the erosion of 
a mainstream television audience, it will remain interesting to see how new possibilities 
for audience fragmentation, cohesion, and representational shifts arise.  
Conclusion 
The transmedia model for broadcast television shows arose in a time of crisis, in 
part driven by the shifting economics of the industry, the WGA strike, and the need to 
engage audiences with fleeting attentions. Transmedia narratives provide an opportunity 
                                                 




to engage with these audiences, through a diversity of texts and the ability to expand what 
is offered on television. However, as case examples show, paratexts must walk the fine 
line of providing new and exciting content and attracting niche audiences, while also 
staying true to televised narratives and a generalized market. This struggle brings the 
dialogic relationship of transmedia texts to light. 
With show producers articulating a conscious move to make transmedia 
phenomena like Lost and Heroes, a series of questions thus shapes how we must 
approach the move from the ―post-network era‖ to a full-fledged, ―transmedia era.‖ This 
chapter shows how content is affected by genre and presumed audiences. As such, how 
do such narratives remain similar, despite diverse platforms? In the complex world of 
transmedia mythologies built around a central mothership, what texts are deemed 
canonical and which are not? And, what does the canonical standing of a text mean for 
the representations of race and gender it can provide? In addition, the development of 
transmedia spaces not only opens up space for representational shifts, but also shifts in 
the political economy of creative labor. Might transmedia texts provide entry points for 
Asian American artists and performers? Might they allow for Asian Americans to control 
how they are presented to audiences?  
If transmedia narratives continue to reflect the ―spectrum of visibility‖ that still 
privileges stereotypes for mainstream audiences, what might it tell us about the value of 
viewers interested in diverse representations? Additionally, what might it tell us about the 
value of diverse representations, if those representations are pushed to the margins? 
These questions can point to ways of analyzing texts in the ―transmedia era,‖ beyond the 
examples listed here. As the entertainment industry continues to consider issues of 
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distribution, political economy, and the responsibilities and ethics implicated in these 












The interviews presented in this dissertation suggest that Asian American use 
multiple social categories, from Asian to America, and multiple media narratives, from 
news and entertainment texts, to define their sense of identity. In Chapter 1, ―Visibly 
Invisible: Exploring ―Asian America,‖ men shared a commonly practiced definition of 
―Asian American‖ based on racial phenotype. Even interviewees who identified 
themselves as Asian American for this study, when asked to define the category, would 
exclude themselves if they did not share ―East Asian‖ racial signifiers. For some 
interviewees, this exclusion means identifying more as a person of color; for others, it 
means expanding the definition of ―Asian American‖ to include cultural differences that 
set ―Asian Americans‖ apart from ―Asians,‖ or ―FOBs.‖ As interviewees shared their 
experiences growing up in predominantly white hometowns and schools, they showed an 
acute awareness that they had no model of what it meant to be Asian American. Growing 
up with histories that failed to contain a visible Asian American narrative, in real life or 
in the media, the narrative that seemed to define them most is what it means to be 
―Asian,‖ or ―non-American.‖ 
Interviews showed how multiple media sources, from entertainment to news texts, 
can influence understandings of self. In particular, interviewee responses to prominent 
news events concerning Asia show how the social categories that pervade their lived 
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experience were reinforced or reaffirmed by rhetoric in the news. As my textual analyses 
of news sources in Chapter 2, ―Managing the Octopus: 21
st
 Century Yellow Peril,‖ 
showed, the social categories of ―Asian,‖ ―Oriental,‖ and the accompanying ―yellow 
peril‖ stereotype were rife in the news sphere. By the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the tenor of 
the news rhetoric surrounding China was overwhelmingly negative, with themes of 
contamination, ruthlessness and aggressiveness shaping how the country was to be 
interpreted by Americans. 
Before the Olympics‘ opening ceremony, Tom Brokaw joined Jim Lampley at 
NBC‘s Olympic studio to narrate a video retrospective NBC.
427
 Brokaw stated that the 
video served as ―an overview of just how much these games, and this night, mean[t] to 
the Chinese people,‖ stressing the role of the video in formulating American ideas not 
only of the event, but of China as well. This 20 minute, documentary-style retrospective, 
allowed for an explicit acknowledgment of America‘s anxiety over the rise of China. One 
of America‘s most trusted news anchors,
428
 Brokaw, a white male, legitimized a rhetoric 
of Chinese difference (describing China‘s readiness to ―finally move beyond its walls,‖ 
and the build-up to the opening ceremony as a ―long march‖) that shaped China as a 
looming, potential threat to the American way. 
With sweeping panoramic shots of Beijing skyscrapers and construction on the 
stadium, China was described as having a ―building revolution‖ to become ―a city of 
tomorrow, so far removed from the deprivations and the self-imposed exile of the China 
of not so long ago.‖ Brokaw narrated, ―culturally and especially politically, China and the 
West have an uneasy relationship.‖ As Brokaw claimed that China‘s emergence as a 
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world player has been, and should continue to be, watched closely by critical eyes, the 
video showed how China was actually viewed by the West, with news clips from the 
Szechuan earthquake in 2008. In the next segment, with images of rice paddies and a 
farmer with a water buffalo juxtaposed with bird‘s-eye views of China‘s sprawling 
roadways, Brokaw proceeded to highlight the tensions unique to China, but also the 
paradoxes of China‘s modern existence: 
There are so many Chinas. This is a country where a half a billion people 
live on two dollars a day, but where hundreds of millions now experience 
modern prosperity. It‘s a country where the few rule the many, where 
protest is not welcome, a country that still can‘t shake the echoes of the 
1989 Tiananmen crackdown. It is a country racing into the future, 
confident it can claim its place on its own terms.  
This video retrospective served as a primer for the NBC audience but also as a guide to 
how America, in 2008, should approach China as a nation. At a moment of patriotic 
displays and heightened national articulations, the video reminded viewers of China‘s 
communist history, using rhetoric that connected China‘s government and politics to a 
mysterious, threatening past and a calculating, suspicious present and future. The 
pageantry and capitalist celebration spurred by the Olympics, the video suggested, was a 
façade hiding a troubled past that could break through at any moment. In case this 
implied message was unclear, Brokaw told Lampley after the video, ―My standing rule is 
don‘t assume you know what the Chinese government will do.‖  
The texts explored in Chapter 2 thus work to show how outward glances toward 
China in the East inform glances within, to Asian Americans in the United States. The 
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video retrospective reinforced a rhetoric that, circulating throughout the news media in 
the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics, constructed China as a source of anxiety for, and 
managed by, white men. This narrative was made ―common-sense‖ as narrative tactics 
converged in various news texts to foster Orientalist fear, found everywhere from 
mainstream newspapers like USA Today and The New York Times to the extremist 
viewpoints of Lou Dobbs Tonight. As interviewees recalled prominent news stories about 
Asia/China, they also shared how, due in part to the lack of any visible Asian American 
narrative in their lives, they feel implicated in discourses of Asia writ large.  
This was also the case with a recent controversial, viral video on YouTube posted 
by University of California Los Angeles student, Alexandra Wallace. In the video, 
Wallace sat in front of her computer‘s camera complaining about the ―hordes of Asian 
students‖ admitted to UCLA each year and their lack of ―American manners;‖ mimicking 
Asians on the telephone, Wallace adopted a sing-song accent as she exclaimed, ―Ching 
chong, ling long, ting tong.‖ Wallace‘s sweeping generalizations reaffirmed many of the 
stereotypes identified by my informants, including the fact that, despite being Asian 
American, they were still viewed as one of the faceless ―horde.‖ The video caused an 
uproar on the Internet, with thousands of video responses also posted to YouTube. The 
fact that Alexandra Wallace was a white, blonde woman prompted Asian American men 
to respond with their own commentary, some angry, but most using humor to challenge 
stereotypes, but also accepting and taking ownership of others.  
In these mediated spaces, the narratives of Asians as threatening and ruthless 
combine with other dominant narratives that cast Asian masculinity as also effeminate, 
asexual, nerdy, and thus low on the social, political, and sexual hierarchies of American 
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culture. The interview data throughout these chapters show the ways in which Asian 
American men feel structured by the dominant culture‘s stereotypes of Asians. For Lisa 
Lowe, the diffuse standards of this dominant culture often essentializes and 
underestimates differences in the Asian American community. She writes: 
To the degree that the discourse generalizes Asian American identity as 
male, women are rendered invisible; or to the extent that Chinese are 
presumed to be exemplary of all Asians, the importance of other Asian 
groups is ignored. To the extent that Asian American discourse articulates 
an identity in reaction to the dominant culture's stereotype, even to refute 
it, I believe the discourse may remain bound to, and overdetermined by, 
the logic of the dominant culture.
429
 
Interviewees were, indeed, aware of the dominant culture‘s definition of Asian 
Americans as ―Oriental,‖ and, while acknowledging its essentialist function, also found it 
a helpful social category. Even though my research design promoted self-identification, 
South Asian or Indian American interviewees continually excluded themselves—
rendered themselves invisible—from the category of ―Asian American.‖  
While Lowe contends that Asian American identity is largely classified as male, 
interviewees argue that Asian American visibility privileges women over men. My 
dissertation thus points to how diffuse the feeling of invisibility is for Asian American 
men as men, as Asians, and as Americans, as well how the diffuse standards of whiteness 
and masculinity shape their lived experience. While still aware and critical of the racial 
and patriarchal dynamics shaping the sexualization of Asian American women, 
                                                 
429 Lisa Lowe, "Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity: Marking Asian American Differences." In A 
Companion to Asian American Studies (254-275), ed. Kent A Ono (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 251. 
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interviewees feel that being objectified is to be made visibly desirable. This yearning to 
be desired reveals how absolute the absence of positive Asian masculinities is for Asian 
American interviewees. This is a paradox of marginalized masculinity: interviewees 
desire an idealized Asian masculine form, but the visibility of such an ideal will leave 
them continually striving (and potentially failing) to attain it. to attain. However, 
interviewees‘ discussions of how ―Asian American‖ is seen in the eyes of others suggest 
that the desire to see a visible masculinity on screen is driven by the knowledge that other 
audiences will see it. 
From early ages, these Asian American men engaged with continually shifting 
boundaries of invisibility and visibility, both in lived and mediated experiences, 
depending on who is there to ―read‖ them. The identities and presumptions of those with 
whom Asian Americans interact play an enormous role in defining the boundaries of their 
visibility. In predominantly white social settings, they are made ethnically invisible as 
general ―Orientals,‖ and visible as a generalized racial minority. In other contexts, such 
as when they surround themselves with Asian friends in college, interviewees‘ racial 
difference becomes invisible, while ethnic differences may become visible. Cultural or 
class differences can also become visible when race is ostensibly invisible, such as in 
settings like Japanese camp or Chinese school, or when interacting with ―FOBs‖ or ―real 
Asians.‖ Future research would benefit from an in-depth investigation into ethnic 
schools, churches, and even family gatherings, as key sites of socialization and cultural 
education. 
Interviewees brought their lived experiences to their negotiations of Asian 
American men on screen. Focusing specifically on contemporary, working Asian 
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American actors, interviewees were quick to note when Asian men on screen are still 
defined as ―FOBs‖ or foreigners. This was particularly evident in the persistent role 
appearance played in attitudes toward characters and actors. Interviewees dismissed 
actors Jackie Chan and Masi Oka for their inability to ―look American‖ and fit into their 
Americanized surroundings on screen. For interviewees, the presence of these men on 
screen only works to make Asian men visible as stereotypical, ―FOB‖ outsiders. 
Alternatively, the overall admiration for Daniel Dae Kim‘s character, Jin, hinged 
on his muscular, typical ―American‖ ideal body; as Francis put it, he is ―a Korean in an 
American body.‖ In this way, Kim was able to be looked at as ―just another guy,‖ 
objectified as any other white Hollywood male celebrity. The ability to objectify Jin thus 
allowed interviewees to worry less about his performance of masculinity and instead 
focus on his performance of ―Asian American.‖ Despite being a Korean national on the 
show, Jin embodied the Asian American experience for many interviewees, making a 
transformation from his identity in an Asian world to a new identity in an American 
world. For interviewees, Jin‘s American body completely ruptured the ―Asian‖ narrative 
that accompanies the emasculated stereotypes of Asian Americans. This was especially 
highlighted by the shirtless image of Daniel Dae Kim, posed as a model to be desired. 
Future research might investigate how the aesthetic qualities of these images signify a 
particular narrative of masculinity that interviewees found desirable. 
The texts and narratives discussed throughout this dissertation reveals a 
multifaceted mediascape simultaneously projecting racial anxieties and embracing 
multiculturalism. The celebration of multicultural inclusivity is especially visible in the 
ensemble casts on primetime television shows like Lost and Heroes. Some interviewees 
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saw the diverse casts and integrated characters on these shows as progressive, as they 
allowed interviewees to see Asian American actors in a new light. Yet, as close readings 
of Lost and Heroes suggest, these ostensibly progressive portrayals reveal power 
dynamics that continue to uphold the dominance of white masculinity. Hiro struggles to 
speak English and focuses on his role in uniting mostly white male characters to save the 
world, and Jin also struggles to speak English and focuses on his role in becoming a 
cooperative and productive member of a survivor society led by white men. In both of 
these programs, the marginalization of minorities becomes subtler, masked as deviance 
from the more abstract themes of humanity, civility, and citizenship. Difference, in this 
context is not a matter of race, but a matter of individual fault. 
While scholars and critics see the problems of patriarchy and white dominance in 
these narratives, interviewees see a helpful narrative. The men I talked with embraced the 
notion of being judged as individuals, rather than as racial or ethnic minorities. This is, 
indeed, the message promoted by multicultural programs lauding the commonality of 
―humanity‖ rather than the difference of race. Interviewees placed immense value in the 
thought of being seen as ―just another guy,‖ who ―happens to be Asian,‖ by others around 
them. In this ideal context, they can move freely without the burden of race impinging 
upon how they are read, or interpreted, by others. This desire to be interpreted a ―just 
another guy‖ is a call to be visible but not to the point of intolerable difference, to relieve 
the burdens of carrying an entire history of what it means to be ―Asian.‖ Put another way, 
interviewees identified a common desire to reduce their visibility as a racial minority and 
to simultaneously counter their invisibility as Asian Americans. 
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As interviewees move from classroom to classroom on their college campus, or 
from one social group to another, they feel their lives are informed by dominant 
discourses of race and gender that limit their performance and how they can be read. In 
some ways, what their ever-shifting moments of dual consciousness reveal is how diffuse 
the hegemonic concepts of masculinity and whiteness can become, and how these 
concepts at times limit how their performances can be seen. In this light, understanding 
the negotiations of Asian American interviewees becomes similar to understanding 
transmedia representations and how they can travel throughout a transmedia universe, 
discussed in Chapter 4, ―Transmedia Narratives and the Possibilities of Race and 
Gender.‖ Representations of Hiro Nakamura in the Heroes transmedia world are shaped 
by larger, dominant narrative logics of the mainstream ―mothership;‖ the larger a text‘s 
appeal to a wider audience, the less progressive his character can be in breaking the 
stereotypes of Asian masculinity.  
So far, transmedia studies have yet to address the ways in which race and gender 
are represented in transmedia narratives. Cases—The Lost Experience ARG, the Heroes 
graphic novel and Saving Charlie novella—discussed in the chapter reveal the 
complexities of negotiating both mainstream and niche audiences in the transmedia 
universe. Not only do genres and their audiences shape the content of the text, but so does 
the text‘s location in transmedia world. While it is difficult to draw conclusions regarding 
the overall success of these transmedia experiments, the various portrayals of Hiro 
Nakamura in the Heroes universe suggests that the central role of the television 
―mothership‖ limits the extent to which his character can legitimately break normative 
boundaries. Hiro moves from being ―just another‖ guy in the most niche of texts to a 
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more Orientalized stereotype in more mainstream contexts, and I use this example to pose 
important questions about how representations change from one platform to another to 
promote future analyses of transmedia narratives. 
The conversations in this dissertation point to future sites of research and analysis 
that can continue to shed light on how Asian Americans make sense of their social 
categories, and how these negotiations are interrelated with industry categories and 
artistic articulations of characters and cultures on screen. For example, casting calls and 
practices for major Hollywood projects can reveal the language used to describe Asia and 
its cultures, as well as the intentions (or lack thereof) of those in authority positions when 
it comes to presenting minorities. Additionally, this dissertation is not meant to deny the 
rich, grassroots, independent arena of Asian American performance and cultural 
production. There are, indeed, key sites—such as the Angry Asian Man blog, the online 
independent production company Wong Fu Productions, and the Center for Asian 
American Media, almost 30 years old, among others—in which Asian Americans 
perform themselves, articulate their own sense of self, and transcend definitional 
boundaries. The role of the Internet in allowing Asian American men express themselves 
and respond to moments of hatred and ignorance—as seen in the response to Alexandra 
Wallace—should not be denied in future research on audience engagement. These online 
arenas allow Asian Americans to serve as watchdogs, educators, comics, or support 
groups. 
What this project aimed to do was highlight how a particularly situated group of 
Asian American men identify their sense of what it means to be Asian/American and 
male, and how they negotiate the studio system and its hold on mainstream formulations 
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of race and gender. While advertisers struggle to define the boundaries of and capture an 
Asian American audience, Asian American interviewees have moved beyond television, 
embracing the freedom of digital downloads and alternative, independent productions. To 
capture fickle audiences and their divided attentions, content creators have turned to 
transmedia narratives and multicultural casts in order to diversify representations and 
distribution channels. The potential reach of these channels, audience configurations, and 
business models remains to be seen. In all of these realms, however, what it means to be 














Interview question guide 
Warm up questions 
1. Can you tell me a little bit about yourself?  
Prompts: How old are you? What are you studying? What languages do you 
speak? 
2. Where did you grow up, and what was it like? 
3. Tell me what it was like to come here for college.  
Prompt: Is it more/less diverse? How do you feel here? 
On being Asian American 
4. Can you recall a time for me where it was very evident to you that you were 
Asian American? 
Prompt: Was there ever a time for you where trying to define ―Asian American‖ 
was particularly difficult or confusing? 
5. How might you define ―Asian American?‖ 
Prompt: Do you think this definition differs from how the general public 
might define ―Asian American?‖ 
6. How is ―Asian American‖ is a useful racial category? How is it not? 
Prompt: Do you feel you can move in and out of racial categories? 
 
 245 
Prompt: Do you think we will see a point in the U.S. where race won‘t 
matter? 
Media, and masculinity 
7. What do you watch on TV? 
8. Where do you get your news? What newsmagazines or newspapers do you read? 
9. Who would you say is an important or memorable male character in the media? 
Prompt: Is this a person you admire? Why or why not? 
10. How would you define a good man? 
11. Can you recall an early moment when you saw an Asian character in the media? 
12. How do you think Asian men are presented in the media? 
Prompt: Do you think the description you just gave links up with your earlier 
definition of a good man? 
Asians in the media 
13. With photos: What are your general impressions of these characters and actors? 
Prompt: If you were to rank these photos from most Asian American to least 
Asian American, how would you do it?  
Prompt: Do you see yourself in any of these pictures? 
14. What would you like to change about, or add to, these representations? 
15. Do you think Asian men are portrayed differently in TV than they are in film? 
How? 
16. Do you think Asian men are portrayed differently than Asian women? How? 
17. Can you recall any major news stories about Asia from the past few years? 
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Prompt: Do you think these stories might influence Asians in America? Why 
or why not? 
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